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Summary 
In many regions of the world, water problems are on the rise. To prevent 
conflicts, water allocation and use, and in particular the role of agriculture 
as a major water user, have become important topics in the development 
discourse in recent years. With the momentum of several water confer-
ences in the 1990s and in accordance with the paradigm of sustainable 
development a new model of water management, Integrated Water Re-
sources Management (IWRM), has been developed. With a holistic ap-
proach, it tries to include many different key principles: the river basin 
perspective, integration of economic, ecological, and social aspects, con-
sideration of the principle of subsidiarity, and combination of supply-side 
measures with demand management.  
The present study sheds light on the implementation process of IWRM in a 
transition country. Based on an analysis of Kyrgyz water governance, the 
study assesses the status quo as well as the potentials of and obstacles to 
the realization of the normative framework of IWRM in a transition coun-
try. Comparing today’s institutional structure of water management with 
this normative concept, it reveals the most significant gaps between norm 
and reality, but it also identifies existing progress towards IWRM and 
provides recommendations on how to further develop Kyrgyz water gov-
ernance in a direction conforming to IWRM.  
For this purpose, the extensive model of IWRM was operationalized, and 
the components of ecological, sectoral, and regulatory integration were 
identified as the model’s three main pillars. Ecological integration means 
that IWRM is based on an eco-system approach. It therefore systemati-
cally takes into consideration ecological interdependencies such as water 
quality and quantity issues or water-land interaction. Sectoral integration 
denotes that economic, ecological, and social externalities of water use are 
internalized in order to direct water allocation to uses that are most benefi-
cial to society. Inter-temporal trade-offs are also taken into account to 
ensure that future generations will still be able to satisfy their needs, as 
enshrined in the principle of sustainable development. Regulatory integra-
tion requires decision-making structures to be organized according to the 
principle of subsidiarity. Decisions should be based on adequate data and 
combine supply-side measures with demand management, which aims at 
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prioritizing demands and promoting efficiency of water use. 
These three pillars of IWRM were further subdivided into criteria, and 
these in turn were broken down into subcategories. The result was the 
development of an IWRM Pyramid which helps to identify achievements 
of the ongoing reform process as well as further reform needs.  
Varying progress on different components of IWRM 
The analysis shows that Kyrgyz water management is indeed heading 
towards IWRM. However, having started no more than ten years ago, 
reforms are just at the beginning of this probably long and stony pathway. 
Only the latest stages of reform were explicitly based on the concept of 
IWRM itself. Yet progress is already considerable compared to most of 
Kyrgyzstan’s neighbors, and it is likely to continue with the implementa-
tion of the ambitious new Water Code, which was adopted by Parliament 
in December 2004. Nevertheless, progress varies considerably with regard 
to the different components of the IWRM Pyramid. There are aspects of 
Kyrgyz irrigation management that are clearly more ‘on track’ vis-à-vis 
IWRM than others, even though it is difficult to rank each of them pre-
cisely. 
Most progress has been achieved on the managerial principles of IWRM, 
i. e. regulatory integration. In particular, decentralization of irrigation 
management has advanced quickly since the 2002 Law on Water User 
Associations (WUAs) and the transfer of most tertiary infrastructure to 
these bottom-up organizations. Subsidiarity seems to be gaining ground, 
since merged WUAs and – probably – future WUA federations are sup-
posed to take over whole irrigation schemes. This implies the transfer of 
most competencies from district water departments (RayVodKhozes) to 
end users’ organizations, thus rendering the former superfluous in the 
middle term. Progress on other aspects of regulatory integration is less 
impressive, but nevertheless notable. Regarding information and commu-
nication, many infrastructure rehabilitation projects contain components 
aiming to improve the measurement of water flow, facilitating the calcula-
tion of individual water use. Transferring these tasks from the Ray-
VodKhozes to WUAs has improved the collection and aggregation of data 
on water needs of end users. The former were overburdened by the task of 
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collecting and processing water applications for each individual land plot 
that resulted from the land reform. Demand management has also im-
proved thanks to the introduction of volumetric water fees to be paid by 
end users or WUAs to RayVodKhozes. The adaptation of outdated Soviet 
irrigation norms to current circumstances, albeit in a pilot stage, offers 
some promising perspectives as well. Finally, most donor-financed reha-
bilitation projects aim at reducing losses from infrastructure that has fallen 
into disrepair.  
Moderate progress can be observed regarding ecological integration. With 
the introduction, merging and future federation of WUAs, management 
structures will be more in line with hydrological boundaries. If the new 
Water Code is implemented, the future State Water Administration will be 
organized at national and basin levels, replacing the current province 
(oblast) structure. It remains unclear, however, whether the district (rayon) 
level of water management will be eliminated. For the moment, the Ray-
VodKhozes remain the most problematic organizations for the shift from 
administrative to hydrological units in management structures. Progress on 
integration of water quality into irrigation management is far from suffi-
cient. Although pollution standards are rather strict, lack of enforcement is 
obstructing their translation into practice. The consideration given to wa-
ter-land interaction suffers particularly from the underfunding of drainage 
facilities and lack of know-how on the part of peasant farmers, who are 
still struggling to manage their privatized plots in a sustainable manner. 
Overall, moderate advances have been made on sectoral integration, al-
though differences within this component are considerable. The least pro-
gress has been made in relation to internalization of ecological external-
ities. The new Water Code does some lip service to nature conservation, 
but there is no genuine recognition of nature as a legitimate water user in 
Kyrgyzstan. The picture regarding the integration of social externalities is 
more ambivalent: While health and gender issues are neglected and local 
water conflicts continue to pose considerable problems, the continued 
subsidization of irrigation services, particularly in remote areas, could be 
interpreted as a measure designed to alleviate rural poverty. However, 
these subsidies seem to be the result more of a general sensitivity towards 
raising water fees than of any intention to provide targeted support to the 
poor. Partly due to the subsidization of irrigation water supply, the picture 
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regarding the internalization of economic externalities is ambiguous, too. 
Although water fees have been introduced, and raised several times in 
recent years, they cover no more than 15 % of real supply costs, contribut-
ing to the severe underfunding of irrigation services. In addition, non-
agricultural water-using activities are clearly underrepresented in public 
water administration, preventing a re-allocation of water resources to 
other, possibly more profitable uses such as tourism.  
Reasons for uneven progress 
Based on a model of institutional change by Saleth and Dinar, the reasons 
for uneven progress can be identified in a number of different dimensions.  
Objective reasons for change: External reasons for change clearly consti-
tute the main driving forces of Kyrgyz irrigation sector reforms. Two of 
these external reasons seem to be of particular importance: First, the dis-
mantling of the Soviet Union led to the end of Soviet transfers to the Kyr-
gyz economy, causing a severe lack of funds for maintaining public infra-
structure, as well as to the fragmentation of farm land in the course of 
post-Soviet land reform. This resulted in a marked deterioration of irriga-
tion infrastructure on the one hand and to a misfit between irrigation man-
agement and land ownership patterns on the other. Second, international 
donors replaced the Soviet Union in providing financial assistance, intro-
ducing new thinking in water management and articulating demands for 
IWRM-inspired irrigation sector reforms. 
Political articulation and actual reform program: Since independence, the 
serious problems besetting the Kyrgyz irrigation sector have provided an 
enabling environment for externally driven reforms: As the state lacks 
sufficient funds and an adequate administration to provide irrigation ser-
vices of satisfactory quality, overall resistance to reforms at the national 
level is relatively weak. Due to this openness as well as to considerable 
donor leverage on Kyrgyz policies in general, donors are able to heavily 
influence the reform program of the Kyrgyz government. This resulted in 
the launching of IWRM-inspired reforms before any significant mind 
change had materialized or genuine political demands had been voiced by 
water users or other Kyrgyz stakeholders. In fact, the political articulation 
of agricultural water users and their representatives in parliament is mostly 
limited to resistance to specific donor demands, e. g. raising water fees. 
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Other veto players are line ministries, which have successfully opposed 
any consistent concentration of their water-related responsibilities within 
the new State Water Administration. This political articulation is purely 
reactive, however, while donors push forward their IWRM-inspired, tech-
nocratic reform concepts. The far-reaching initiatives of donors therefore 
risk being out of touch with the inner-Kyrgyz political arena, complicating 
efforts to globally reform Kyrgyz water management, as IWRM would 
require. The newly created institutions are at best weakly embedded in the 
institutional framework and socio-economic environment.  
Donor demands have been met inasmuch as new formal institutions (in the 
form of legislation and policies) have been established. The related re-
forms, however, (in the form of organizational rearrangements, shifting 
competencies, and a new strategic orientation) have only been imple-
mented where they are politically the least problematic and financially the 
least costly or even profitable for the state. These areas are clustered in the 
field of regulatory integration: Resistance from RayVodKhozes to decen-
tralization is weak because of their sheer inability to manage water supply 
to the multitude of fragmented private land plots. Farmers generally wel-
come their empowerment through the introduction of WUAs. Improving 
water measurement is a technical issue and thus unproblematic as well. In 
the short run, installing measuring devices turns out to be relatively cheap 
for the Kyrgyz government, as it is mostly donor-financed. The same goes 
for rehabilitation projects designed to reduce water losses. Notwithstand-
ing the mounting debt progressively burdening the national budget, donor-
financed irrigation projects constitute win-win constellations for Kyrgyz 
actors in the irrigation sector.  
However, one aspect that must be seen as politically sensitive is the objec-
tives of water management, i. e. the field of sectoral integration. Since 
nature completely lacks voice and ecological concerns are only weakly 
embedded within the broader societal context, nature conservation is the 
field most neglected. Cost recovery is the area where donor conditionali-
ties are the strictest. This explains the fact that some progress has been 
made in this respect.  
These mechanisms explain the asymmetries within the reform program. 
The politically less problematic aspects of IWRM figure prominently in 
the new Water Code – the reform agenda’s current key document – while 
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others figure less prominently or not at all. In addition, there are inconsis-
tencies between the more programmatic Water Code on the one hand and 
the legal provisions for its implementation on the other. Instruments for 
implementation are mostly lacking in the politically more sensitive or 
financially more costly areas, i. e. regarding aspects of sectoral integration 
and lack of advocacy.  
Institutional change: While the reform program is already biased, imple-
mentation of agreed-upon reforms – i. e. the required institutional change 
itself – is also proving to be difficult. Slow progress mostly results from 
particular features of current institutions in Kyrgyz irrigation management.  
A common problem in implementing irrigation sector reforms continues to 
be the state administration’s lack of enforcement power and capabilities. 
Although these are key for the success of reforms, they are also challeng-
ing to tackle, because they affect most sectors of public authority.  
Another reason for the slow pace of institutional change is the important 
role played by informal institutions and organizations originally not in-
volved in Kyrgyz water management. The newly introduced formal rules 
(laws and policies), which are not rooted in informal ones, are difficult to 
implement and enforce. As a result, informal rules derived from behavioral 
factors tend to be at odds with newly introduced institutions. They exist 
alongside formal rules, destabilizing the overall system. Thus the in-
volvement of local self-governance organizations (ayil okmotus) has an 
ambiguous character; it stabilizes water management in general, but at the 
same time it hampers new organizations in improving and fulfilling their 
tasks independently.  
Summing up, the process of institutional change is mostly focused on the 
establishment of formal institutions, but without giving consideration to 
informal rules. This results in the coexistence of new water institutions 
with old and in part contradictory informal rules of water management. In 
order to avoid dual structures, informal rules need to be taken into account 
when establishing new ones. Old institutions of water management and 
other forms of local self-governance organizations should be considered, 
e. g. when concepts for Audit Commissions or WUA federations are 
developed and introduced. At the same time, lack of political will and/or 
enforcement are hampering the implementation of several new formal 
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institutions, e. g. adherence to the concept of hydrological boundaries as 
demanded in the law on WUAs.  
Behavioral change and mind change: The actual impact of irrigation sec-
tor reforms depends on their ability to induce behavioral change in all 
stakeholders. Evidence on this change with regard to Kyrgyz irrigation 
farmers varies. Overall water use has decreased during the last years. Yet 
it is not clear whether this is due to raised awareness and new water-saving 
irrigation techniques or to more general developments in Kyrgyz agricul-
ture. A fact that clearly hints at behavioral change is the rising willingness 
of farmers to pay irrigation fees, which indicates a departure from the 
traditional idea of water as a free good.  
However, most positive effects on the performance of the Kyrgyz irriga-
tion sector currently result directly from donor-financed infrastructure 
projects. The rehabilitation of canals has an immediate positive impact on 
the quality of irrigation services. It thus supports building confidence in 
the irrigation management system and encourages behavioral change, e. g. 
with regard to the willingness to pay water fees.  
Nonetheless behavioral change and mind change have not yet reached the 
higher levels of water administration. So far, the Department of Water 
Management (DWM) has not come up to its task of developing a vision 
for the water sector and of strategically shaping water management 
reforms. Overall, a lack of conceptual implementation of IWRM in both 
form and content has to be attested. The current path of reform is more 
reminiscent of patchwork, and there is no clear vision behind it. This 
applies, for example, for social and ecological externalities as well as for 
the restructuring of the institutional arrangement, i. e. water management 
organizations.  
Main recommendations 
— Continue efforts to create and strengthen WUAs: Further 
decentralization of irrigation management has a high potential for ad-
vancing different aspects of IWRM. Notwithstanding their currently 
manifold shortcomings (underqualified staff, weak organizational 
setup, etc.), WUAs have a high potential as change agents for realiz-
ing many aspects of IWRM, including the currently more neglected 
ones like water-land interaction. Furthermore, WUAs are forced to 
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achieve cost recovery for tertiary canal management, and this favors 
sustainable funding of irrigation services. WUAs (and future WUA 
federations) are supposed to manage whole hydrological units, pref-
erably replacing the district water management departments (Ray-
VodKhozes). They bring water management nearer to end users, thus 
improving responsiveness to users’ needs. In addition, properly func-
tioning WUAs contribute to solving many of the overall problems of 
the water management sector. These include improved enforcement 
of rules (e. g. payment of fees, imposition of sanctions for illegal wa-
ter abstraction, etc.) and enhanced accountability and thus also sup-
port mind change at the local level.  
Considerable advances have already been achieved in establishing 
WUAs, and the WUA Support Units (WSU) are now in possession of 
experienced and qualified staff. Further reforms can capitalize on this 
asset, as resistance to the decentralization of irrigation management 
seems to be limited. Besides training for management and staff, fur-
ther finance for infrastructure rehabilitation should be provided to 
WUAs. In general, strengthened WUAs are more likely to overcome 
problems posed by interference by other actors, which is currently 
impeding the proper implementation of decentralization reforms.  
— Further move towards cost recovery in irrigation management, 
one that ensures that social safeguard mechanisms are provided 
for the poorest: Proper funding of irrigation services is a precondi-
tion for advances in most other areas of IWRM: Drainage facilities 
cannot be maintained if funds are lacking or the profitability of irri-
gated agriculture suffers from unreliable water supply induced by un-
derfunded infrastructure, and decentralized management structures 
cannot be expected to prosper if WUA staff is not paid adequate sala-
ries. Since resistance from beneficiaries of subsidized irrigation ser-
vices to fee increases continues to be great, political efforts have to be 
concentrated on efforts to convince water users of their long-term in-
terest in better cost recovery. Both WUA fees and irrigation service 
fees (ISF) should be progressively increased and differentiated in 
keeping with real supply costs.  
Politically, it is difficult to raise WUA fees and ISF, and in the past 
members of parliament have been very reluctant to tackle this issue. 
Given the present political situation, this situation is likely to con-
tinue, since the new parliamentarians appear to be even more depend-
ent on their constituencies in rural areas. Nevertheless, there is scope 
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for raising ISF for several reasons. First, in the end these fees were 
introduced because of massive donor pressure in the past. This pres-
sure by relevant donors like the World Bank continues and there are 
plans to come up with estimates on real costs of water delivery by the 
end of 2005. Second, with the introduction of WUAs and their (at 
least in some areas) growing ability to improve irrigation infrastruc-
ture and management, acceptance of fees for water delivery among 
farmers has increased. Both donor pressure and rising acceptance 
among farmers make a further increase in fees a realistic option.  
Yet initiatives for better cost recovery should not neglect negative so-
cial externalities bound up with fee increases. It is, for instance, nec-
essary to provide adequate safeguards for the poorest. Higher and 
better targeted social assistance from the national budget are desirable 
options. However, additional cross-subsidization mechanisms via 
‘social funds’ should be created within WUAs in order to further 
limit risks of social hardship.  
— Implement the new water management structure with a special 
emphasis on integrating non-agricultural water users: Key provi-
sions of the new Water Code include reorganization of the water ad-
ministration in keeping with hydrological units and a clear inter-sectoral 
orientation of the planned National and Basin Water Councils. At 
present, the national Department of Water Management (DWM) and its 
regional branches are conspicuously dominated by agriculture, and this 
has tended to sideline other uses such as drinking water supply and 
tourism. Probably, a more balanced representation and real leverage of 
these two sectors on national and basin water policies could not only 
promote economic efficiency – based on a possible reallocation of water 
from agriculture to other uses – but also strengthen the integration of 
social (human health) and ecological (nature conservation) externalities. 
This would contribute positively to sectoral integration.  
As initial steps toward implementing the new water administration 
have shown in the past, this is a task difficult to achieve given the 
reluctance of most of the agencies involved. The ongoing reorganiza-
tion of the general political administration should therefore be used as 
a window of opportunity to shift staff and adjust the water manage-
ment structure at the same time.  
— Amend the new Water Code, strengthening ecological concerns 
and introducing a provision on WUA federations: The new Water 
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Code is an important legal tool for advancing IWRM in Kyrgyzstan. 
Nevertheless, it could and should be improved. Ecological concerns, 
for example, feature prominently only in the general, more program-
matic articles. They should also be integrated into the more concrete 
provisions, adding for example an ecological flow requirement to the 
provisional water use priorities of basin water use plans. Another 
shortcoming seems to be that WUA federations are not mentioned in 
the Code. However, in the future they are to take over the Ray-
VodKhozes’ tasks of irrigation water supply. This needs to be clari-
fied in the document. To avoid ambiguity, respective provisions 
should thus be added to the Water Code to improve the internaliza-
tion of ecological externalities on the one hand and to continue the 
decentralization of water management on the other.  
In particular the introduction of WUA federations appears to be a po-
litically sensitive issue. The greatest reluctance to hand over respon-
sibility to WUA federations is, however, centered not in the Ray-
VodKhozes, where staff already plan to become engaged in these fed-
erations, but at the national level of administration. To facilitate tasks 
and support the DWM in fulfilling its original tasks, further measures 
should therefore be taken to strengthen the DWM’s ability to engage 
in strategic planning.  
— Increase agricultural knowledge among farmers: Insufficient 
integration of water-land interaction in local irrigation management 
endangers the long-term sustainability of water use patterns. Many 
farmers, particularly in the north, lack knowledge on these issues. 
Know-how on new farming techniques and best practices in irrigation 
farming is also limited to a minority of farmers. This undercuts not 
only the ecological sustainability of agriculture but also its produc-
tivity and profitability. Agricultural extension services should thus be 
encouraged to offer training on these questions to both farmers and 
WUA staff. Due to their in part public-good character, attendance at 
these trainings could be subsidized, in particular for poor and inexpe-
rienced farmers.  
Resume and outlook 
IWRM is, in part, on its way in Kyrgyzstan, but realization of a water 
management in conformity with IWRM has yet to materialize. Significant 
steps have been taken, and more are set to follow, but these steps have not 
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been bundled through an underlying overall strategy or vision, and the 
reason why they have been achieved is mainly that donors pushed the 
country into them. This in turn is why most IWRM principles are only 
weakly embedded in other social rules.  
Thus far, lack of ownership or mind change for reforms has not been an 
essential factor. Reforms have concentrated on predominantly technical and 
managerial issues. A comprehensive adoption of the normative framework 
of IWRM, a step that has not yet been taken, would require a fundamental 
rethinking of water management and a shift in societal values. Otherwise 
chances are slim that it will turn out to be a success. What could be achieved 
through outside pressure and demands has already been achieved. 
Developments have come to a point where the initiative for the process now 
has to pass over to Kyrgyzstan. There are first signs of such a change 
detectable especially at the local level of Kyrgyz water management, which 
should be further supported through donors continuing efforts in reha-
bilitation and awareness raising.  
If the pace of reform in Kyrgyz water management is to be sustained, a 
substantial demand for respective reforms needs to be articulated by Kyrgyz 
water users and stakeholders themselves. Thus, in the long run, mind change 
is a necessary condition for continuing moving towards IWRM. Without 
such change, implementation of IWRM will founder or at least slow down 
considerably. It is crucial to develop an overall strategy based on the 
preferences and the commitment of society. As long as this has not 
happened, further steps towards taking water management reforms in 
Kyrgyzstan further down the road towards IWRM are unlikely to occur.  
It is questionable, though, whether and how both such a strategy and the 
further overall reform process will be developed and adopted in the future. 
Donors, the main push factor for water reforms, have not yet shown any 
major interest in such an undertaking. At least the main players, the World 
Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), aim for the most part at 
lopsided approaches that emphasize economic aspects. The same applies for 
the (former) Kyrgyz government. Donors should continue to underline the 
importance of IWRM for a functioning and sustainable agricultural sector to 
the Kyrgyz government and pay higher attention to ecological and social 
aspects of IWRM. They should not be content with progress on paper but 
demand progress on the ground and with implementation of reforms. This 
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should not, however, include predefining results. At the same time, awareness 
should be further raised through the provision of information on sustainable 
water management and use and participation of all stakeholders encouraged.  
Notwithstanding these efforts, mind change cannot be orchestrated delib-
erately from above or outside but will have to develop over time. It could 
result from positive impacts of current reforms on the one hand and on the 
other from changing preferences of Kyrgyz society, like a sense for water 
scarcity or appreciation of nature conservation on a higher scale. Only if 
societal demand for the realization of further aspects of IWRM strengthens 
can a departure from the current half-hearted and asymmetrical ‘way to-
wards IWRM’ be expected.  
The revolutionary events of March 2005 and the subsequent formation of a 
new government might provide a window of opportunity needed to reshape 
water policy and initiate change in water governance. But the new government 
has so far not excelled at adopting policy changes or developing innovative 
reform steps. In addition, chances are that the pace of reform is, (at least) 
temporarily, slowed down, as staff is changing and the new government is 
adopting a more populist attitude towards the rural population.  
However, the analysis also raises questions about the more distant future of 
Kyrgyz irrigation sector reforms. WUAs have a crucial role to play as 
change agents in the reform process. But until now they have mainly been 
initiated for economic reasons and as a condition to secure donor finance. 
Once donors withdraw from this field, WUAs will have to legitimize 
themselves more through the service they provide rather than by the money 
they bring in. This point is crucial for the further path of Kyrgyz water 
management towards IWRM. Furthermore, the notable asymmetries 
between single aspects of IWRM, in particular, are problematic. Even 
though it is up to democratically elected Kyrgyz decision makers to define 
societal preferences and thus to prioritize the objectives of Kyrgyz water 
management, the clear-cut neglect of sectoral integration stands in contra-
diction to the holistic ambition of IWRM. Modern water management 
acknowledges that ecological, economic and social spheres are interde-
pendent. Thus additional efforts to integrate ecological, economic, and social 
externalities are highly recommendable.  
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“If you want to govern the country, 
first learn to govern water.”1 
Introduction 
In many regions of the world, water problems are on the rise. The main 
reasons are poor water management, population growth, and ecologically 
unsustainable economic development, leading to water pollution and 
overexploitation of freshwater resources. Although water war scenarios no 
longer top the agenda, as they did some years ago, it is generally accepted 
that access to and distribution of water causes conflicts today and will 
continue to do so in the future.  
To prevent such conflicts, water allocation and use, and in particular the 
role of agriculture as a major water user, have become important topics in 
the development discourse in recent years. This is reflected in the an-
nouncement of the International Decade for Action ‘Water for Life’ from 
2005 to 2015 by the United Nations or the rise of the new paradigm of 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). This new model of 
water management was developed in accordance with the paradigm of 
sustainable development and has emerged as a prominent topic on the 
development agenda since the beginning of the 1990s. Accordingly, 
IWRM approaches water management problems from a holistic perspec-
tive. The river basin perspective, integration of economic, ecological and 
social aspects, consideration of the principle of subsidiarity, and combina-
tion of supply-side measures with demand management are its key princi-
ples. UN Water, the coordinating body for water related activities and 
programs, identified IWRM as a priority for the water decade (UN 2005).  
Over the past years, some first experiences have been made with the 
implementation of IWRM in several countries, among them developing 
and transition countries. The intention of the present study is to provide 
some answers to the question of what has been achieved so far. The Kyr-
gyz Republic, where IWRM-inspired water management reforms have 
been in the process of implementation since 2001, was chosen as a case 
study. Based on an analysis of Kyrgyz water governance, the study aims at 
assessing the status quo as well as the potentials and obstacles for the 
                                                          
1  Central Asian saying (FES / SOCINFOBURO / IISS 2004, 19).  
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realization of the normative framework of IWRM in a transition country 
like the Kyrgyz Republic. The objective is to compare today’s institutional 
structure of water management with this normative concept to reveal the 
most significant gaps between norm and reality, but also to identify exist-
ing progress towards IWRM. The analysis is followed by concrete rec-
ommendations on how to further develop Kyrgyz water governance in a 
direction conforming to IWRM.  
In Central Asia, a region with high water withdrawal and an unequal dis-
tribution of water resources, access to water is of major relevance for 
social and economic development. All countries in the region are highly 
dependent on irrigated agriculture. The reason for this dates back to Soviet 
times. Due to their favorable climatic conditions, Soviet policy forced the 
Central Asian republics to specialize in the production of highly water-
consuming agricultural products, like cotton. Since the 1960s, orientation 
towards large-scale agriculture was further reinforced by the massive ex-
pansion of irrigation systems. This policy marked the beginning of the 
overexploitation of Central Asia’s water resources, which has led to severe 
ecological problems.  
When the Soviet Union broke up, the whole extent of the water crisis in 
Central Asia was unveiled. The most distinct result of persistent overuse of 
water resources is the Aral Sea catastrophe. Water extraction from its 
inflows Amu Darya and Syr Darya is the main cause for its desiccation. 
The consequences are regional climate change, glacial melt, desertifica-
tion, dust storms, decrease in biodiversity, and poor water quality. The 
resulting negative influence on food security and health records make 
water management one of Central Asia’s main development challenges.  
The relative and absolute allocation of transboundary water resources 
between upstream (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) and downstream (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan) riparian states is highly controversial. The 
upstream states have been forced to continue respecting the quota system 
from Soviet times, which provides the politically dominant downstream 
states with the lion’s share of the region’s annual runoff. But the greatest 
conflict potential results from competing water utilization schemes in the 
region: The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan prefer to release water re-
sources in winter for hydropower generation, while Uzbekistan and Turk-
menistan mainly depend on water allocation in summer for irrigation pur-
poses. Additionally, distribution of water at the international level is 
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growing even more difficult as Afghanistan, recovering from civil war and 
Taliban rule, begins to demand its share.  
As regards Kyrgyzstan, besides the exploitation of its huge hydroelectric 
potential, the agricultural sector is the driving force for the country’s medium-
term economic development. The country is highly agriculture-oriented, and 
more than 65 % of its population lives in rural areas (Kyrgyzstan 
Development Gateway 2003). While the industrial sector is still shrinking, 
about 39 % of gross domestic product (GDP) is generated in agriculture 
(World Bank 2005). Agriculture depends heavily on irrigation, since 
precipitation in most regions is not sufficient for rain-fed agriculture. 
Therefore, as in most other arid countries, 94 % of available water is claimed 
by the agricultural sector. After independence the agricultural sector grew 
significantly in terms of employment, because it served as a pool for 
unemployed persons from the other sectors. Today it accounts for slightly 
more than half of the country’s labor force (Kyrgyz Republic 2004).2 This 
shows the relevance of the agricultural sector, a functioning irrigation system, 
and efficient water management for poverty reduction in the Kyrgyz Republic.  
Today, Kyrgyzstan, like all other Central Asian republics, is characterized 
by water consumption far above average. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan range among the seven countries with 
the highest water consumption worldwide. With more than 2,000 m3 per 
person per year, Kyrgyzstan ranges fifth, thus consuming more than three 
times the world average (WWF 2004, 16). Accordingly, the annual aver-
age use of irrigation water per ha exceeds 11.000 m³ in some regions, 
which is far above international standards (UNECE 2000, 76).3 These high 
rates are mainly due to large water losses, which are estimated to amount 
about 2.5 km3, or 25 % of Kyrgyz water use (FES / IISS 2003, 7), a situa-
tion similar to that in the other Central Asian countries. As a consequence, 
even though Kyrgyzstan, being situated upstream, has abundant water 
resources, water scarcity is common in the country. But notwithstanding 
this scarcity, Kyrgyzstan does not yet fully utilize the quotas granted by 
                                                          
2  Note that figures from different sources on agriculture’s share in GDP as well as on 
employment in agriculture show a great variation. The numbers cited appear to reflect 
the most plausible and commonly stated figures. 
3  Egypt or Pakistan, for instance, which are also not known for efficient water use, apply 
9–10,000 m3 per hectare (Bucknall et al. 2003, 3). 
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international treaties. Therefore, water scarcity is not the fault of insuffi-
cient water provision due to these treaties. The main reasons for water 
scarcity in Kyrgyzstan must be sought in deficient irrigation infrastructure, 
poor water management, and low incentives for water saving. Thus, “the 
water crisis in Central Asia is currently not a crisis of quantity but of 
distribution and use” (UNEP et al. 2005, 21).  
Nevertheless, with the continuing recovery of the Kyrgyz economy, and 
especially of the agricultural sector, the country is likely to come close to 
the given quotas in the medium term. Given the relatively marginal role 
Kyrgyzstan plays in regional affairs, and with politically and economically 
dominant Uzbekistan still depending on cotton production, though, it is 
unlikely that Kyrgyzstan will be able to obtain higher quotas in the near 
future, even though the largest part of the region’s water originates here 
(IMF 2005b, 4 f.).  
The only option to raise the availability of water is therefore to increase 
the efficiency of water use in the agricultural sector. Given the country’ 
extremely high water use rates, there is considerable scope for improving 
efficiency. This does not only concern rehabilitation of the irrigation infra-
structure. Additionally, “a fundamental change is needed at national, 
regional and local levels in the institutional arrangements governing wa-
ter, in particular for agriculture” (Spoor 2004, 37).  
In recent years, efforts have been undertaken to reform Kyrgyz water 
governance. The general reform process, which has been going on in the 
Kyrgyz Republic since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is an op-
portunity to break with old patterns of water overexploitation and to attain 
a more sustainable system of agricultural production. Since independence, 
the Kyrgyz government has provided many impulses towards reforming 
the agricultural sector and the system of water governance. These include 
reorganization of the water administration, transfer of responsibilities to 
local Water User Associations (WUAs), and introduction of economic 
instruments like water fees. As regards the legislative framework, impor-
tant steps have been taken in the direction of a more sustainable water 
management, e. g. with the adoption of the new Water Code by the Kyrgyz 
Parliament in December 2004, a step which clearly aims at introducing 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). Accordingly, the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) has acknowledged that the country has a 
high potential for realizing IWRM, since its “governance system is de-
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veloping rapidly” (GWP 2004, 16). Yet problems and open questions 
remain with regard to the implementation and enforcement of this ambi-
tious legislation. It remains to be seen how fast and how far-reaching these 
reforms can be put into practice against considerable resistance from dif-
ferent stakeholders. In addition, the reform process could be slowed down 
by the political turmoil following the second round of parliamentary elec-
tions in March 2005, leading to the ousting of the former president, Akaev, 
and the election of the new president, Bakiev.  
This study is based on qualitative field research, which was undertaken in 
spring 2005, the main instrument being semi-structured interviews and, to 
a lesser extent, tools of participatory rural appraisal. Overall, 100 inter-
views were conducted in several regions of the country and with various 
stakeholders at all levels of administration, with WUAs and farmers. For a 
detailed description of the empirical approach, cf. the Appendix.  
The study is divided into two sections. Part A sets out the research design 
of the study. Chapter one contains the conceptual framework, including 
the development of a set of IWRM criteria for assessing the progress made 
in Kyrgyz water governance. Since the aim of this study is not only to 
depict the shortcomings and gaps of the Kyrgyz water sector with regard 
to IWRM, but also to give some indications of their causes, the second 
part of Chapter one highlights selected concepts of institutional economics 
that will serve as an analytical toolbox. The second chapter outlines Kyr-
gyz water governance by mapping the different administrative levels and 
organizations involved and highlighting water management reform. Spe-
cial attention is given to Water User Associations (WUAs) because they 
are considered a key instrument for the implementation of IWRM at the 
local level.  
Part B analyzes the extent to which Kyrgyz water sector reform is in line 
with IWRM and provides concrete recommendations for stakeholders, 
which are intended to help define further reform efforts. It is structured in 
accordance with the previously developed IWRM criteria. The third chap-
ter analyzes whether eco-system interdependencies are integrated into the 
decisions taken by Kyrgyz water managers. Chapter four focuses on sec-
toral integration, investigating the degree of internalization of ecological, 
economic, and social effects in the process of water allocation. Chapter 
five deals with regulatory integration by analyzing decision-making 
structures, aspects of demand management, and the involvement of water 
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users in current water management. The final chapter summarizes the key 
findings and answers the question of whether and to what extent Kyrgyz 
water management is “on its way to IWRM.”  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part A: Research design 
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1 Conceptual framework: normative and analytical 
concepts 
With a view to setting the study’s conceptual framework, the first sub-
chapter (1.1) introduces the concept of IWRM as a model of efficient 
water management, against which the reforms of Kyrgyz water manage-
ment will be assessed. As a normative model or guideline, IWRM helps to 
identify achievements of the ongoing reform process as well as further 
reform needs. This assessment will provide the basis for recommendations 
on future reform efforts. However, if the recommendations are to be 
realistic, the causes of problems and constraints to reform need to be 
understood. The analytical instruments used to explain the functioning of 
Kyrgyz water management and its reform path are elaborated in the sec-
ond part of this chapter (1.2). Selected concepts of institutional economics 
are presented as tools for identifying causes of lack of progress on re-
forms.1  
1.1 Normative model: Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) 
Since the early 1990s, IWRM has emerged as the new state-of-the-art 
model in water management. The 1992 International Conference on Water 
and the Environment in Dublin is generally considered as its origin. The 
principles of IWRM can now be said to have gained universal acceptance 
within the water community,2 and influential organizations such as the 
Global Water Partnership (GWP) promote it actively. IWRM aims at 
improving water governance by introducing interdisciplinary thinking into 
a field traditionally dominated by engineers and technicians. IWRM has in 
fact been developed in response to growing problems of the formerly pre-
dominant “engineering” or “supply-side” approach to water management 
(GWP 2005a, 1). Thus, in order to understand IWRM’s philosophy and the  
 
                                                          
1  For a general discussion of possible obstacles to water management reform, cf. GWP 
(2005a). 
2  According to John Waterbury, IWRM has even become the ‘mantra’ of water managers 
(Waterbury 1997, 279). 
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Box 1: The engineering approach to water management 
The engineering approach focused on technical solutions to making water 
supply fit increasing water demand. More often than not, this led to 
economically inefficient water policies. For instance, irrigated agriculture 
frequently received water at heavily subsidized prices. Thus water was not 
necessarily directed to the most productive use, or it was even provided at a 
loss. In the long run, this turned out to be financially unsustainable, particularly 
for developing countries faced with heavy debt burdens.  
The constant upward trend in water supply and use also had severe effects on 
ecosystems, such as pollution, the desiccation of wetlands, or falling water 
tables. As pressure on water resources increased with growing populations and 
economic development, the conventional approach proved to be unable to 
respond to these ecological problems.  
Finally, the engineering approach to water management was unsuited to take 
into account the social consequences of water management decisions, like the 
social costs of resettlement due to infrastructure projects, the impact of water 
policy on poverty or on gender relations, etc.  
The inadequacies of the engineering approach can be traced back to five main 
factors:  
— Water supply was seen as a free good, provided by the state in sufficient 
amounts to satisfy total demand. Thus the economic costs of supply were 
not given sufficient attention.  
— Trade-offs between the economic – but also environmental and social – 
benefits of different water uses were not systematically assessed. 
Therefore, priority setting in water allocation was hardly rational.  
— The engineering approach regarded water as an infinite resource, which 
could be exploited at wish. Ecological damage and its impacts on human 
well-being were widely ignored; environmental costs of supply und use 
were not reflected in water prices.  
— Management structures were usually organized according to traditional 
territorial and administrative boundaries, ignoring hydrological (upstream-
downstream, groundwater-surface water) and other ecological interdepen-
dencies (such as water-land interaction). This made sustainable water 
management more difficult to achieve.  
— Management often followed a hierarchical top-down approach, which did 
not sufficiently consider the perspectives and needs of end users. The 
resulting distance between water managers and water users led to further 
losses of efficiency.  
Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
German Development Institute 23 
 
model’s specific components, it is useful to have a closer look at the 
conventional approach first, as provided in Box 1. 
The GWP defines IWRM as “a process, which promotes the coordinated 
development and management of water, land and related resources, in 
order to maximize the resultant economic and social welfare in an equita-
ble manner without compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems” 
(Agarwal et al. 1999, 22, cf. also World Water Assessment Program 2003, 
299). Thus IWRM aims at overcoming the weaknesses of the engineering 
approach in order to maximize the overall, social benefits of water use.3 
To achieve this general goal, IWRM pursues a holistic, that is to say an 
integrated, approach to water management. But what does ‘integration’ 
mean in this context? IWRM calls for threefold integration: ecological, 
sectoral, and regulatory (cf. Figure 1). Ecological integration means that 
IWRM is based on an eco-system approach; it systematically takes into 
consideration ecological interdependencies (1.1.1). Sectoral integration 
signifies that economic, ecological, and social externalities of water use 
are internalized in order to direct water allocation to uses that are most 
beneficial to society. Inter-temporal trade-offs are also taken into account 
to ensure that future generations will still be able to satisfy their needs, as 
enshrined in the principle of sustainable development (1.1.2). Regulatory 
integration requires decision-making structures to be organized according 
to the principle of subsidiarity. Decisions should be based on adequate 
data and combine supply-side measures with demand management, which 
aims at prioritizing demands and promoting efficiency of water use 
(1.1.3). These different components of IWRM will be discussed in detail 
in the following sections to elaborate criteria for assessing Kyrgyz water 
management in the agricultural sector.  
                                                          
3  Agarwal et al. (1999) and Neubert et al. (2005) provide authoritative introductions to 
IWRM. The GWP has also developed an IWRM ‘Toolbox’ (GWP 2005b). For a critical 
discussion of IWRM, in particular of the concept’s diverging interpretations, cf. 
Huppert (2005a). Hartje (2002) discusses the international implications of IWRM. 
To summarize, the engineering approach was characterized by a fragmented, 
technology- and supply-biased view of water management, which did not allow 
water management to be perceived as the interdisciplinary task it necessarily is: a 
task that links both natural and social systems and affects most sectors of society.
Source: Own compilation 
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However, it should be emphasized that IWRM is an overall concept that is 
very hard to realize completely in all parts of the world. The Kyrgyz Re-
public, as one of the poorest transition countries, can be expected even less 
to have fully implemented this concept in the given time frame. In addi-
tion, IWRM cannot provide a blueprint for water management reform. 
IWRM offers just a general framework of basic principles or guidelines 
for good water management. How this framework should be filled in detail 
depends on the specific context and preferences of each society and cannot 
be determined a priori (Agarwal et al. 1999, 44–45; GWP 2005a, 1). Nev-
ertheless, IWRM indicates the direction that water management reform 
should take if the social benefits of water use are to be maximized. And it 
can be argued that poor countries that rely as heavily on their water re-
sources as Kyrgyzstan does have even greater incentives to choose the 
IWRM approach.  
1.1.1 The eco-system approach: ecological integration 
Hydrological boundaries 
Water does not respect state, province, or district boundaries. It chooses its 
way along geomorphologic structures. Because of the one-way mobility of 
water within hydrological units, IWRM considers it imperative to manage 
a catchment area as a whole, with a view to internalizing positive and 
negative externalities of upstream uses on downstream riparians (Agarwal 
et al. 1999, 24). The general orientation of IWRM along hydrological 
boundaries can be broken down to sub-catchment areas.  
Things are further complicated by the fact that surface water interacts with 
groundwater, adding a third, vertical, dimension of ‘hydrological bounda-
ries.’ IWRM demands that water managers4 consider these surface water- 
groundwater interactions to avoid, for example, pollution of groundwater 
by substances infiltrating from rivers, or the drying up of rivers due to 
groundwater overpumping (Agarwal et al. 1999, 25). 
                                                          
4  The term ‘water managers’ is used here for all people in charge of coming to decisions 
on water allocation, discharge regulation, and fee collection as well as on infrastructure 
financing, construction, operation, and maintenance: The term ‘water management’ 
accordingly comprises all tasks related to these spheres.  
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In order to assess water management in Kyrgyzstan against the model of 
IWRM, we will look into the extent to which management structures 
correspond to hydrological boundaries. If water along a specific canal or 
river is allocated by no more than one competent authority, this structure 
can be said to conform to IWRM. It should be noted that IWRM does not 
deny the need for different institutions at different levels of water man-
agement – e. g., at the level of tertiary canals, secondary canals, primary 
canals, rivers, and for complete catchment areas – but at each level man-
agement should cover the whole respective hydrological unit. In addition, 
we will look at the way groundwater-surface water interactions are han-
dled. If Kyrgyz water managers consider these linkages systematically, 
they are acting in accordance with IWRM principles. 
Water quantity and water quality 
In the past, water quantity issues – in most cases measures for increasing 
water abstraction – have dominated water management, whereas problems 
of pollution, changes in temperature, or eutrophication have received 
much less attention. But both quantity and quality issues are important, 
and they are interlinked. If irrigation water is saline, for instance, this 
increases the risk that fields will salinize. In order to wash out the salt 
before the next cropping season, enormous amounts of water are needed to 
‘leach’ it out of the topsoil. 
In sum, it is of great importance to manage quantity and quality aspects of 
water in an integrated way. In the present study, one task will be to inves-
tigate to what extent this is done in Kyrgyzstan’s agricultural sector. As 
water quantity issues have traditionally been in the focus of Kyrgyz water 
managers, the study will look into whether quality issues are beginning to 
receive more attention. Measures in this respect include regulations con-
cerning the discharge of pollutants and waste, limits for the use of pesti-
cides and fertilizers, as well as protection of water sources used for drink-
ing water supply. Apart from the mere existence of such regulations, the 
key issue is their implementation. Management organizations should have 
the necessary competencies as well as the enforcement power to translate 
environmental regulations into practice. One precondition for enforcing 
environmental regulations is the existence of the monitoring capacities 
needed to collect the necessary data on water quality. 
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Water-land interaction 
Ecological integration also requires that water managers bear in mind the 
impacts of land use on the water cycle and the consequences of water use 
for land areas (Agarwal et al. 1999, 24). A common problem of water-land 
interaction is siltation of reservoirs and canals due to upstream erosion. 
Erosion is frequently augmented by deforestation, intensive agriculture, or 
overgrazing. Deforestation also increases the abruptness of water runoff 
following precipitations, as forests normally act as buffers, favoring 
infiltration and evapotranspiration. Changes in water flow regimes for 
their part have considerable consequences for land areas. Decreasing flows 
may eliminate wetlands and turn lakes into steppes or deserts. Increasing 
flows – e. g. due to irrigation – provide needed humidity for plant growth, 
but they may also cause salinization or waterlogging of soils. Some of 
these water-land effects are intended, others are not; but to understand 
them and to consider their occurrence in managing water and land is an 
important element of IWRM.  
How can this kind of integration be measured in relation to Kyrgyzstan’s 
water management? Although the principle of water-land integration is 
rather abstract and difficult to grasp, evidence of efforts in this direction 
was detected in initiatives to limit erosion, salinization, or waterlogging. 
Farmers’ awareness of these problems could indicate a tendency in this 
direction. In contrast, abandonment of formerly irrigated fields due to soil 
degradation or siltation of water supply facilities could prove to be effects 
of defective water-land integration.  
1.1.2 Maximizing societal benefits: sectoral integration 
… of ecological externalities 
Growing awareness of ecological problems has contributed much to the 
development of IWRM. While the conventional engineering approach did 
not view nature as a legitimate water user, IWRM recognizes the relevance 
of nature. This aspect must be distinguished from the topic of ecological 
integration discussed above. Ecological integration can be understood as 
the mere consideration of eco-systemic interdependencies, which could 
also be motivated by a purely economic rationale (e. g. maintaining soil 
productivity). ‘Integrating ecological externalities,’ in contrast, means that 
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effects of water management on the environment are integrated into water 
managers’ set of objectives: The beauty of nature and a sound environ-
ment are considered as values on their own. Thus, in the case of water 
scarcity for example, minimum ‘ecological flows’ must be guaranteed in 
order to sustain vital functions of the ecosystem. The political system 
should aggregate and translate social preferences into rules of water man-
agement that provide the society-specific ‘optimum’ amount of healthy 
nature in relation to economic gains from water abstraction, regulation, 
pollution, etc. Thus the ideal handling of ecological concerns cannot be 
defined a priori. However – as a minimum condition – explicit considera-
tion of ecological aspects is needed in water management to satisfy the 
IWRM principle of integrating ecological effects. Additionally, current 
water policy should safeguard future generations’ chances to enjoy a 
healthy natural environment.  
These aspects will also serve to assess the performance of Kyrgyz water 
management. However, since it is difficult to judge generally the extent to 
which water managers recognize nature as a legitimate water user, the 
more concrete criteria used to measure the internalization of ecological 
externalities will be, first, the adequateness of legal responses to environ-
mental problems and, second, the way in which nature conservation is 
considered in practical, everyday decisions of water management. 
… of economic externalities 
In relation to the economic sphere, sectoral integration demands that the 
costs of water supply be weighed against the benefits of water use. If no 
compelling social reasons justify subsidized water supply, full-cost pricing 
should be aimed for. This principle enhances overall economic efficiency 
and reduces public financial burdens, thus guaranteeing financial sustain-
ability of water services (Agarwal et al. 1999, 41–42). 
In addition, integration within the economic sector means that all water-
using activities (such as agriculture, fishing, power generation, manufac-
turing, household provision with drinking water, transport, tourism, etc.) 
are jointly taken into account by water managers. In this way, water allo-
cation can be oriented towards the most beneficial economic uses. In prac-
tice, scarce water resources have often been directed to economically less 
productive but politically powerful actors, e. g. the agricultural sector, 
which usually has the most privileges. Much water is consumed by rela-
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tively low-value crops, such as wheat or fodder plants, although it might 
generate far greater benefits in manufacturing or drinking water supply, 
for example. In order to ensure efficient allocation of limited water re-
sources, unjustified privileges of specific users need to be eliminated.5  
This reasoning also applies to Kyrgyz water governance: Water provision 
should not operate at a loss in order not to compromise the financial vi-
ability of suppliers. Although this study’s focus is on water use in agri-
culture, it will also touch on trade-offs with other economic uses. If allo-
cation between different economic sectors is effected in an inclusive 
manner, favoring water distribution based on the relative benefits, man-
agement is in line with IWRM. 
… of social externalities 
Measurement problems similar to those encountered with ecological ex-
ternalities appear again in relation to social externalities of water manage-
ment. The value of human well-being, of poverty reduction, of equitable 
gender relations, or of social peace is impossible to quantify. However, 
water management has substantial impacts – both positive and negative – 
on these issues. Once neglected, social aspects have risen on the agenda of 
water management in recent years, not least in the context of the Millen-
nium Development Goals. Additionally, debates on the consequences of 
water service privatization for the poor and popular protests against major 
dam projects have highlighted the extreme relevance of water policy for 
social issues. There is a consensus on the fact that good water management 
considerably enhances human development. Irrigation-based rural devel-
opment in particular can contribute to combating hunger, reducing pov-
erty, and decelerating rural exodus. As water needs are usually gendered 
(e. g. drinking water provision is frequently women’s work), specific at-
tention to the particular needs of women can contribute to gender equity.6 
Finally, when competition over increasingly scarce resources leads to 
growing ‘water stress’ (Falkenmark 1989), resulting conflicts may harbor 
                                                          
5  Subsidized water supply may be justified for social reasons (cf. below: “… of social ef-
fects”), but social policy is generally less costly (and less harmful to the environment in 
this case) if it is effected via direct financial transfers, which have fewer distorting 
effects on the economy (Agarwal et al. 1999, 61–62). 
6  Women’s participation in water management is also included in the Dublin Principles 
(Principle no. 2). 
 Elke Herrfahrdt et al. 
30 German Development Institute 
the risk of destabilizing local communities or even whole societies. Thus 
good management of water conflicts is particularly relevant for social 
peace. 
Since the social effects of water management are multi-facetted, there is 
no simple criterion for measuring the internalization of social externalities 
in the Kyrgyz irrigation sector. However, clear-cut issues of interest in-
clude, first, the effects of water management on poverty, second, the inte-
gration of health considerations, and third, the integration of women’s 
needs into water management. If the poor are not discriminated against in 
water allocation, water management can be said to have positive social 
effects. If water managers take health risks into consideration, and act 
accordingly, they contribute to internalizing social effects as well. Gender 
equity in decision-making procedures is of particular relevance with re-
gard to women’s participation (Agarwal et al. 1999, 17–18). Fourth and 
finally, the way in which water conflicts are managed will be considered 
as an indicator for the effects of water management on social cohesion and 
peace. 
1.1.3 Managerial principles: regulatory integration 
Decentralization and participation 
As outlined above, water management traditionally adopted a top-down 
approach. Public authorities – like an infrastructure ministry or a ministry 
of water and natural resources – decided on behalf of the population how 
much water to deliver, to whom and when, as well as what infrastructure 
to construct. IWRM, on the contrary, demands that the division of labor 
within water management be organized according to the principle of sub-
sidiarity (Agarwal et al. 1999, 15–17). This means that decisions should be 
taken at the lowest appropriate level. It is a common misunderstanding, 
though, to conclude that decisions should always be taken at the lowest 
level. This is not the case. Implementing IWRM also necessitates basin-
wide coordination or even integration of decision-making structures. What 
is needed therefore is an adequate distribution of competencies over all 
administrative levels depending on the specific tasks to be carried out at 
each level. Nevertheless, in practice decision-making procedures in most 
countries’ water sectors are still disproportionately centralized. Thus, in 
most cases IWRM implies that competencies should be further decentral-
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ized (Agarwal et al. 1999, 46). In order to limit transaction costs, to boost 
the ‘user-friendliness’ of management institutions, and to improve com-
munication between water managers and water users, participation of the 
latter should be increased. One possible – and broadly used – instrument to 
facilitate participation is the creation of WUAs. Irrigation farmers are en-
couraged to unite within these organizations to manage their own water 
supply at the local level. They are expected to decide on water distribution 
themselves and to care and pay for infrastructure operation and mainte-
nance. Like other forms of decentralization, this direct involvement of end 
users in service provision is intended to improve the quality and prompt-
ness of water management by strengthening bottom-up communication 
and control. 
In assessing the Kyrgyz water sector, it is tempting to take the mere exis-
tence of WUAs as an indicator for the realization of IWRM. While the 
creation of WUAs is certainly an important step in this direction, their 
concrete functioning must still be scrutinized in order to ascertain whether 
they actually possess the bottom-up qualities ascribed to them. Further-
more, the division of labor between the different levels of decision-making 
have to be evaluated, e. g. that between WUAs and district-level admini-
stration, to find out to what extent it is in line with the principle of subsidi-
arity. 
Information and communication 
The best organization of management structures will, though, be of little 
help if the data available are not sufficient to reach qualified decisions. As 
IWRM is holistic in its ambition, data requirements for the implementation 
of IWRM are considerable (Agarwal et al. 1999, 51–54). Data are needed 
on both ecological and socio-economic variables.7 Ecological data include 
volumes of precipitation, amounts and distribution of surface and ground-
water runoff, evaporation and infiltration, river flow regimes and their 
seasonal variations, water quality indicators, etc. Important socio-eco-
nomic data include information on the amount and timing of water de-
mand in different economic sectors, specific quality needs of economic 
                                                          
7  The integration of these two types of data constitutes a particular challenge, as the 
‘human factor’ continues to be widely ignored in water management (Kluge 2005, 36–
37). 
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users, elasticity of demand in relation to water price changes, reactions of 
users to water rationing, farm systems, water use efficiency, etc. Of 
course, collecting and processing all data needed for a truly holistic view 
of a river basin is neither possible nor rational considering the associated 
costs. However, it seems reasonable to assume that the database of most 
water managers has to be substantially enlarged if their aim is to imple-
ment IWRM. 
The present assessment of Kyrgyz water management will analyze what 
kind of data are available to water managers. A major condition for in-
creasing efficiency in the water sector is information on individual water 
use. Only if individual consumption is measured can water-saving behav-
ior be rewarded. Thus water meters at farm gates would significantly ease 
the implementation of IWRM. In addition, local water managers and water 
end users need trustworthy information on the amounts of water that are 
actually delivered by the authorities. Only if water supply is reliable can 
water use be planned without intolerable risk. As regards socio-economic 
data, managers should be aware of the water needs of all users in their 
respective zone of responsibility, and consider these needs in their man-
agement decisions. 
Demand management 
In response to foreseeable limits of exploitable water resources as well as 
to growing ecological problems, IWRM has shifted attention to demand-
side measures, i. e. to water saving. What does this mean in practice? De-
mand management in the irrigation sector aims to increase water use 
efficiency by improving infrastructure, by adapting irrigation norms, and 
by providing incentives for additional water saving, e. g. through pricing. 
The potential for water saving is enormous – more than half of irrigation 
water is usually lost through infiltration and evaporation before it reaches 
plant roots. Investment in water-saving technology and infrastructure (drip 
irrigation, lined and covered canals) can be provided by public authorities 
or by water users themselves, if they have appropriate incentives to do so. 
In addition, overwatering is a frequent phenomenon in irrigated agricul-
ture. In post-Soviet Central Asia in particular, outdated irrigation norms 
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appear to contribute to the waste of water.8 Adapting these norms to real 
crop water needs would thus contribute to decreasing water demand as 
well. Water managers may encourage further water-saving behavior, for 
instance, the planting of water-saving crops. Possible incentives include 
calculation of water fees on the basis of actual water use (volumetric fees) 
rather than in relation to irrigated hectares and water markets, which may, 
however, run up against practical difficulties (Agarwal et al. 1999, 21). 
In an assessment of Kyrgyz water management, volumetric water fees 
would be a clear sign of demand management, as would further public 
initiatives to improve water use efficiency, e. g. through water-saving 
infrastructure. Another important criterion for change in this direction 
would be improved knowledge of specific crop water needs. 
1.2 Analytical framework: institutional economics 
The shift from classic water supply management to IWRM requires 
changes in water governance as well as in people’s attitudes. The follow-
ing provides a toolbox designed to help identify the most relevant institu-
tional hindrances and possible trigger points for the implementation of 
IWRM. After briefly introducing and discussing the term water govern-
ance, we will focus first on the design of institutions and second on condi-
tions for institutional change.  
In institutional economics, institutions form the framework in which inter-
actions between individuals take place, or the ‘rules of the game’.9 
Organizations are a special category of institutions in that these rules are 
implemented through them and at the same time influenced by them. Or-
ganizations are players acting in a specific way to achieve their goals 
(North 1990, 5). The term ‘institutional arrangement’ refers to the sum of 
all organizations involved in water management. The term ‘institutional 
environment’ means the sum of all institutions and includes formal rules 
(legislation), informal rules, and policies. Water governance covers the 
                                                          
8  On average, the Central Asian countries use 1.5 times more water than recommended by 
water experts (ICG 2002, 12). 
9  “[Institutions] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. In 
consequence they structure incentives in exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic” (North 1997, 2). 
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ensemble of institutional environment and institutional arrangement, i. e. 
all institutions and organizations involved in water management as well as 
their interactions (cf. Figure 2).10  
While IWRM formulates ‘best practices’, i. e. deals with specific contents 
of water management, the categories presented in the following section 
aim to explain the institutional implementation of water management 
(1.2.1). The last section refers to potentials of and obstacles to changing 
this institutional setup (1.2.2). 
                                                          
10  Some authors subsume informal rules under laws (Bandaragoda 2000, 10), but with 
regard to the cleavage between formal and informal rules they are treated as an 
independent analytical category in the present case.  
Figure 2: Water governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Saleth / Dinar (2004, 102) 
 
Organizations 
Legislation Informal rules
Policies 
Institutional 
environment
Institutional 
arrangement 
Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
German Development Institute 35 
1.2.1 Explaining water governance 
To explain water governance, it is helpful to have a look at specific fea-
tures that characterize water-related institutions and organizations. In in-
teraction with the social environment, these features are important for the 
ability of institutions to facilitate change.  
Formal and informal institutions11 
Ideally, formal rules derive from informal ones in such a way that customs 
and traditions serve as an anchor for formal laws and policies. This re-
duces transaction costs12, because such institutions are widely accepted 
and generally more stable.  
Referred to Kyrgyz water governance, this means that successful imple-
mentation of the new water legislation and policies depends on whether 
account is taken of existing informal institutions and rules. If this is not the 
case, implementation and enforcement are likely to be obstructed and to 
entail considerable transaction costs.  
Embeddedness 
Water institutions exist not in a vacuum but within the broader institu-
tional framework of society. The introduction of new water policies there-
fore not only requires consideration of informal rules, it also has to be 
embedded in the overall institutional framework, which is constituted by 
other (higher) societal rules, e. g. constitutional rules (Saleth / Dinar 2004, 
29).  
Thus, to be successful, the new Kyrgyz water legislation or water policy 
needs to take into account existing rules such as land rights, environmental 
legislation, and also informal institutions such as existing norms of water 
distribution. Only if water policy is closely linked to these existing sets of 
                                                          
11  While formal institutions include, for instance, laws and policies, informal institutions 
refer to customs and traditional norms etc.; the latter are referred to as rules-in-use, 
which often have a greater influence than formally declared laws (Eggertsson 1996, 13). 
Informal institutions are determined by traditions, clan membership, and kinship 
relations, etc. 
12  Transaction costs are defined here as costs linked to economic exchange.  
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formal and informal institutions can there be scope for successful imple-
mentation.  
Stability and durability 
Stable institutions provide continuity for human interactions, thereby re-
ducing uncertainty and improving the framework for exchange by mini-
mizing transaction costs. In addition, the stability of institutions is influ-
enced by two factors: the learning ability of organizations and path de-
pendency. Learning ability refers to how quickly and flexibly an organiza-
tion adapts to new knowledge. Good learning ability is essential for a 
stable organization. Otherwise it will be simply replaced by new organiza-
tions. Path dependency, on the other hand, refers to the phenomenon that 
institutional change is always limited in scope. A complete turn-around is 
not possible, because ‘history matters’ for institutional development, and 
because institutions that have existed for a long time develop increasing 
returns and economies of scale. These give them advantages vis-à-vis 
alternative institutions, even when the alternatives may be more efficient in 
the long run (Doering / Rose 2002, 10). Thus path dependency constitutes a 
constraint for change but at the same time a guarantee for stability.  
With the adoption and implementation of the new water legislation in Kyr-
gyzstan, many formal rules are subject to change. In this atmosphere of 
instability, informal rules and institutions are likely to gain importance 
since they appear to be the ones that guarantee stability in a changing 
environment.  
Accustomed as they are to the top-down oriented Soviet scheme of water 
management, Kyrgyz water managers may lack learning ability and find it 
difficult and inappropriate to implement certain new rules, for example 
participation of all stakeholders, since the latter are too distant from the 
former’s ‘traditional’ perception of water management, and are further-
more associated with the transfer of power. For the same reasons, water 
users may be reluctant to claim their rights to participate. Thus participa-
tion is likely to materialize only if considerable change takes place in 
thinking and probably also in the staff of water management organizations 
and if water users become aware of the chances participation holds for 
them. The same applies for the principle of decentralization, which, with-
out certain changes in the staff of water management organizations, is 
likely primarily to benefit the old elites.  
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Structure and nestedness 
Institutions as well as organizations are usually hierarchically structured 
and may be structured spatially as well. Within this structure there are 
linkages between different levels, forms of nestedness, overlapping of 
competencies as well as regulation-free spaces.  
If it is to be efficient, Kyrgyz water governance has to recognize existing 
organizational structures and if new organizations and institutions are 
developed, it must abolish others or adjust them to the current structures 
without duplicating competencies or creating regulation-free spaces. This 
could be especially relevant with regard to the structure and competencies 
of the ministries concerned as well as of the WUA federations that are 
replacing RayVodKhozes.  
The determinants of transaction costs 
The exact composition of these features determines how costly exchanges 
are for individual actors (North 1997, 2). To be able to point out more 
clearly what features influence transaction costs to what degree, the fol-
lowing four determinants for transaction costs will now be introduced. The 
concrete design of these determinants results from the interaction of insti-
tutional features. It may be helpful to clarify which elements of water 
governance are important – for lowering transaction costs or for raising 
them. 
Property rights: The first determinant is the security and measurement of 
property rights to goods or services. Property rights are defined as control 
over valuable assets (Eggertsson 1996, 7). Thus the term refers to the 
distribution of power within society. It is assumed that clearly defined (and 
accepted) property rights facilitate exchange. For instance, uncertain rights 
regarding land tenure or water use can hinder investment in infrastructure 
and thus hamper the implementation of IWRM.  
Enforcement of rules: This factor refers to conflicts that may arise in hu-
man interactions. In a world of perfect enforcement all stakeholders would 
be forced to adhere to the rules and a third party would resolve conflicts 
impartially and without cost. In reality, the enforcement of rules depends 
mainly on the quality of the (formal) judicial system or on other (informal) 
mechanisms of conflict resolution. New rules, like new water legislation or 
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the introduction of water fees, are thus dependent on the vigorous support 
of judicial organs or other organizations able to accomplish the task.  
Behavioral factors: Behavioral factors comprise all non-economic drivers 
of human activities, such as ideologies, perceptions, and preferences. Of-
ten it is supposed that these factors augment transaction costs because they 
prevent people from acting purely rationally, i. e. in line with their own 
economic self-interest. But behavioral factors such as reputation, credible 
commitments, and social capital can also have positive effects, i. e. in 
reducing transaction costs. Formal institutions become generally more 
effective when they take such factors into consideration. An example in 
the Kyrgyz context is the belief in water as a gift of God. Since water has 
been a free good for a long time, and many people regard it as God-given, 
it is difficult to implement the principle of water fees in this context, and 
attempts to do so can be only successful if fees are introduced cautiously 
and gradually.  
Socio-economic environment: Institutions interact with the socio-economic 
environment. This has considerable influence on transaction costs. 
Changes within the environment – like revolutions, regime change, etc. – 
can set strong incentives for institutional change when uncertainty out-
weighs the stability of institutions. Thus the general uncertainty connected 
with the revolutionary overthrow and the change of power in the first half 
of 2005 might serve as a catalyst for change in Kyrgyz water management, 
as regards for instance the composition of staff etc.  
1.2.2 Explaining change in water governance 
Using the categories introduced above, it is possible to estimate the quality 
of an institutional setup. If transaction costs are high, institutional change 
is required. The basic assumption that institutional change occurs when the 
opportunity costs of maintaining the status quo exceed the transaction 
costs of changing it (Saleth / Dinar 2004, 155) does not say anything about 
the concrete course of change.13 The latter is influenced by several factors. 
The following sections will present a model for institutional change intro-
ducing the notion of ‘mind change.’ A next step discusses the interactions 
                                                          
13  Costs in this context include both economic and non-economic costs – such as social 
costs. 
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between individual incentive systems and institutional change as well as 
concrete reasons for such change.  
Course of change 
The subjective theory of institutional change presented by Dinar and 
Saleth (2004, 75 f.) emphasizes the importance of ‘mind change’ for insti-
tutional change (cf. Figure 3). Dinar and Saleth assume that prior to any 
successful reform there has to be a shift in the collective attitude of people 
towards their institutions and preferences. Even if people diverge in their 
opinions about the direction of change, they often agree about its neces-
sity. This situation can be described as perceptional convergence, which 
creates a demand for institutional change. 
‘Mind change’ is understood as the result of an interaction between several 
factors. Reasons for change interact with behavioral factors. New knowl-
edge diffuses through the learning ability of institutions. Thus ‘mind 
change’ refers to a change in people’s perception of their institutions, “a 
change in their mental construct of the world, and it gathers power when a 
critical mass of perceptional convergence builds up” (Saleth / Dinar 2004, 
79).  
As the cycle model implies, ‘mind change’ can be the starting point of 
institutional change, an unconscious sense of discontentment with a situa-
tion. But it may also be the final product of an externally induced process. 
Additionally, it can function as backing for political entrepreneurs who 
articulate their actual reform agenda. Their bargaining strength and the 
political process determine the concrete shape of institutional change, 
which in turn may effect shifts in people’s behavior, called ‘actual impact’ 
in the model. In the long run, these behavioral changes may again change 
people’s minds.  
Despite its fair amount of simplification, this model provides fruitful cate-
gories for the analysis of institutional change, especially against the back-
ground of the fact that IWRM, as a normative framework, requires consid-
erable behavioral changes from both water managers and water users. 
Looking into the role played by mind change in the current reforms of 
Kyrgyz water management helps to understand the problems related to this 
process.  
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Reasons for change 
Viewing ‘mind change’ as a possible product and at the same time as a 
basis for institutional change, we must ask for concrete reasons that con-
tribute to such perceptional convergence. Apart from the influence of 
information and learning on institutional change, these reasons can be 
grouped broadly into two categories: objective and subjective ones. The 
objective reasons include technical developments or a shift in relative 
prices resulting for instance from a change in resource endowments. In the 
context of water management, objective reasons for change can result 
from deteriorating irrigation infrastructure or the inability of the state to 
further finance the rehabilitation and construction of irrigation and 
drainage systems. The subjective reasons for change comprise shifts in 
ideas or ideologies. Such shifts have implications for water institutions 
because of their embeddedness within broader societal rules. The intro-
Figure 3: Subjective model of institutional change 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Saleth / Dinar (2004, 79) 
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duction of IWRM itself amounts to such a change in ideas within the water 
sector. 
Reasons for change can thus contribute to the formation of a perceptional 
convergence. But individual behavior based on simple cost-benefit ratios 
also plays an important role.  
Individual behavior and institutional change 
Institutional change is to a large degree driven by change agents, individu-
als, or organizations that seek to improve their position by catalyzing 
change processes. At the same time, change of the kind involved in the 
introduction of IWRM “usually involves reductions in discretionary au-
thority on the part of existing managing agencies” (Svendsen / Wester / 
Molle 2005, 2). Thus individuals or organizations fearing to loose influ-
ence can seek to prevent change. To understand the trigger points for 
change and the reasons for persistence of an institutional structure, it is 
important to note the incentives driving individual behavior. Thus the level 
of individual choice based on personal benefit calculations may be associ-
ated with the amorphous phenomenon of institutional change. The fol-
lowing ‘incentive systems’ are theoretical ideals, and they describe general 
mechanisms more than concrete situations.  
A model frequently used to explain individual incentives, especially in 
hierarchical institutional arrangements, is known as the principal-agent 
constellation. It describes an information imbalance between a principal 
and her/his agent. As a result of this imbalance, the principal loses control 
over the agent‘s activities, and this opens up opportunities for the agent to 
act solely with an eye to her/his personal benefit. The efficiency of the 
organization suffers from this behavior and this raises transaction costs for 
other individuals who, in their exchanges, are dependent on the organiza-
tion’s services. The agent’s behavior frequently leads to social losses that 
exceed the agent’s personal gains. In order to ensure her/his rent from the 
information imbalance, the agent may influence change in a certain direc-
tion, or even impede institutional change.  
Principal-agent constellations are often connected to another incentive 
system for individual behavior: moral hazard. It arises when collective 
rationality contradicts individual rationality and individuals choose to act  
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according to their own individual rationality to the detriment of society. 
Conditions of insecurity for individual actors and information asymmetries 
support this behavior (Eggertsson 1994, 32). If, for instance, water provi-
sion is insecure, this situation can be exploited by a water master (mirab) 
Box 2: Kyrgyz water resources and their use 
Kyrgyzstan is situated in a rather arid, continental region. Nevertheless, because of 
its markedly mountainous geography, the country holds abundant water resources 
of regional importance. The main source of water in Kyrgyzstan is precipitation in 
the form of snow. It accumulates predominantly in the mountainous regions during 
the winter season, between October and April. As a consequence, major shares of 
Kyrgyz water reserves are stored in glaciers and permanent snowfields.  
There are an estimated 3,500 rivers originating on Kyrgyz territory, most of which 
run across the country’s borders to neighboring states. For that reason, downstream 
riparians, in particular Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, depend on Kyrgyz water re-
sources. Besides surface water, Kyrgyzstan has large groundwater reserves, which 
are presently exploited only at a fraction of their potential. The largest reserves, 
however, are surface lakes and reservoirs, above all Lake Issyk Kul, one of the 
Earth’s deepest lakes.  
The annual drain of surface water on Kyrgyz territory amounts to about 44 
km³/year, while total renewable water resources are slightly higher, 46.5 km³/year, 
including surface and groundwater. Because of its important supply function for 
neighboring states, Kyrgyzstan has committed itself in international agreements 
not to consume more than 24 % of the total annual surface runoff. On average, this 
amounts to about 11.6 km³/year.  
Agriculture represents by far the most important water-consuming activity in Kyr-
gyzstan. It accounts for 94 % of total water use, while industrial and domestic 
water uses share the remaining portion, with 3 % each. The explanation for the 
huge share accounted for by agriculture is the marked predominance of irrigation. 
Precipitation in the regions suitable for agriculture mainly ranges between 200 and 
400 mm and does not exceed 600 mm per year, a circumstance which makes rain-
fed agriculture impossible in most places.  
Total water use amounts to about 10 km³/year, and this consists basically of 
surface water. Groundwater represents only 6–7 % of total uptake and is mainly 
used for drinking water supply. The urban population, which accounts for about 
35 % of total population, and large parts of the rural population are served by 
groundwater.  
Source: FAO AQUASTAT (2004), FES / IISS (2003, 6), UNECE (2000, 69 and 
74 f.), data provided by the Institute of Water Problems, Bishkek  
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to extract extra charges for water delivery from water users (Huppert 
2005b, 10). 
Outlining the beneficiaries and losers of these constellations is an impor-
tant step towards analyzing the conditions for institutional change or per-
sistence. In the end, whether and how change takes place depends mainly 
on the bargaining strength of these beneficiaries and losers (individuals 
and organizations). 
2 Water governance in Kyrgyzstan 
The aim of this chapter is to give a descriptive overview of Kyrgyz water 
governance, which will facilitate access to the analytical chapters (part B). 
Boxes 2 and 3 serve as an introduction to the topic, giving an outline of 
available water resources and their use as well as some general informa-
tion on the Kyrgyz agricultural sector.  
Since the Soviet legacy plays an important role in Kyrgyz water govern-
ance, the first section (2.1) of this chapter provides a short review of water 
management before 1991. The chapter then takes a closer look at the 
ongoing reforms in the water sector. Section 2.2 focuses on the institu-
tional environment, explaining Kyrgyz water legislation (2.2.1) and the 
legislation on WUAs (2.2.2). Section 2.3 concentrates on the institutional 
arrangement, describing first the governmental water management bodies 
(2.3.1) and second the local organizations involved in water management 
(2.3.2). 
 
Box 3: The Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
Agriculture is the key pillar of the Kyrgyz economy, accounting for 39 % of the 
country’s GDP in 2003 as well as for slightly more than half of its labor force. 
Because of its mountainous topography, only 7 % of Kyrgyz territory is suitable 
for agriculture. The scarcity of arable land therefore constitutes an important 
limiting factor for agricultural production. At present, the cultivated area 
(annual and permanent crops) amounts to 1.35 million ha. Of this area, 1.07 
million ha, or 80 %, are irrigated. Irrigated agriculture in Kyrgyzstan is confined 
to the main river valleys and hence concentrated on four principal regions: the 
Chu and Talas rivers in the north, the Naryn river in central Kyrgyzstan, the 
surroundings of lake Issyk Kul in the east, and the Ferghana Valley in the 
southwest.  
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The crops most commonly grown in Kyrgyzstan are cereals, which cover almost 
60 % of the cultivated area. In particular, wheat cultivation was broadly 
expanded after independence, with total production more than doubling between 
1990 and 2002. This can be explained by the fact that the country has set its 
sights on self-sufficiency in wheat production. Other important crops are barley, 
maize, potatoes, sugar beets, vegetables, cotton, oilseeds, and fodder crops. 
Sugar beets, mainly used for lucrative sugar and vodka production, are a 
significant cash crop in the northern Chui Oblast, whereas cotton, rice, and most 
of the tobacco crop are grown exclusively in the southern Ferghana Valley. 
Fodder crops have declined in importance since Kyrgyz independence, but they 
still occupy a significant share of agricultural areas in the northern parts of the 
country. Furthermore, many Kyrgyz farmers raise livestock, and milk, meat, and 
wool production are the major sources of income in agriculture. Livestock 
breeding currently generates about 60 % of gross agricultural income in 
Kyrgyzstan.  
Although agricultural yields are comparatively low, Kyrgyz agriculture has 
recovered since 1996, and in 2001 it surpassed Soviet era production levels, 
leading the World Bank to label Kyrgyz agricultural reforms and subsequent 
agricultural growth a ‘success story.’14 Figures indicate that there has been an 
increase in total agricultural production of more than 20 % over 1992. Since the 
cultivated area has declined meanwhile, this can only be explained as the result 
of an increase in yields.15 
Source: FAO AQUASTAT (2004), FAOSTAT (2004), Fitzherbert (2000), 
Kyrgyz Republic (2005), Kyrgyz Republic/National Statistical 
Committee (2003b), UNECE (2000, 113), World Bank (2004a, 10 and 
2004b) 
2.1 The Soviet legacy  
Incorporation into the Soviet Union changed water management in Central 
Asia radically. Already in 1923, the Soviet administration abolished the 
traditional form of water management (cf. Box 4). Kyrgyzstan was divided 
into several hydrological regions based on soil type and climate, and this 
                                                          
14  The World Bank distinguishes between a ‘recovery period’ (1996–1999), during which 
the newly established private farms considerably increased production for self-
consumption, and a ‘post-recovery period’ (1999–2002), during which continued 
agricultural growth was accompanied by a shift towards market production (World 
Bank 2004a, 14–30). 
15  IMF (2005b, 10) provides a good overview of productivity increases for different crops.  
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in turn served to specify the amount of water to be applied within a deter-
mined time period and for different crops. These hydrological standards, 
which were elaborated between 1940 and 1960, are still in use. 
Following the collectivization of land, central planning was imposed on 
farmers. In order to increase cotton production, with its high water con-
sumption, the Soviets expanded Central Asia’s irrigation network begin-
ning in the 1940s. The consequence was a significant increase in water 
use.16 With a view to meeting the irrigation needs of the downstream 
republics, huge reservoirs were built in Kyrgyzstan (O'Hara 2000, 370 f.). 
This policy has led to an extreme overexploitation of Central Asia’s water 
resources, with negative impacts that have persisted until today. 
In the Kyrgyz SSR, inter-farm canals fell under the responsibility of the 
state, and their operational costs were covered by the national budget, 
whereas on-farm irrigation networks belonged to the members of collec-
tive farms. In spite of that, water end users were not involved in the opera-
tion and maintenance of their irrigation systems. Irrigation management 
was in the hands of a small number of specialized workers, the so-called 
irrigation brigades (Johnson III / Stoutjesdijik / Djailobayev 2002, 4). 
Soviet water governance was characterized by an engineering approach. 
The maintenance work was done with heavy equipment purchased by the 
government. On every farm, the brigade leaders calculated the needs for 
their respective area (50–100 ha of land) and passed them on to the farms’ 
hydro-technician, who compiled the water requirements for the whole 
farm. The data were then sent to district, province, and republic offices, 
before finally being submitted to the basin organization. Then instructions 
were sent back, informing the agencies responsible for water delivery at 
the different levels on the amounts of water to be supplied to the various 
parts of the network.  
 
                                                          
16  Between 1960 and 1970, water use in the Aral Sea Basin rose from 65 km³ to almost 
104 km³. Altogether, the Soviets opened an additional 5 million ha of land for irrigation 
in Central Asia, bringing the total area of irrigated land to 7.5 million ha (O'Hara 2000, 
370 f.). 
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According to O’Hara (2000, 375 f.), the different bodies involved in the 
water management of the Aral Sea basin only theoretically respected man-
agement structures corresponding to hydrological boundaries. In practice, 
however, two departments under the same ministry communicated with 
each other only indirectly, via Moscow. This insufficient communication 
and information flow within an extremely hierarchical structure was one 
reason for inefficient water use. Furthermore, Soviet-era irrigation infra-
structure increasingly deteriorated, resulting in a huge waste of water. 
Reinforced by unsuitable modes of production, the consequence was 
widespread soil degradation, especially through waterlogging and salini-
zation. 
In contrast to pre-Soviet times, access to a sufficient quantity of water was 
not a problem. Water supply was supposed to satisfy total demand, but 
efficiency of water use received little attention. Many users thought they 
had access to an infinite quantity of water free of charge, and they no 
                                                          
17  Mirab means ‘water master’ (compound from the Arabic mir ‘master’ and ab ‘water’). 
In Kyrgyzstan, it is mostly referred to as murab. Bashi means ‘head.’ 
Box 4: Traditional water management in Central Asia 
The first irrigation canals in Central Asia were built some five to six thousand 
years ago. The irrigation system considered as ‘traditional’ was developed in the 
7th century under Arab influence. In this system, which was in place until the 
end of the 19th century, the official responsible for decisions on water allocation 
for the main canal system was called mirab bashi.17 The persons in charge of the 
management of secondary canals were local mirabs. Mirab bashi and mirabs 
were elected and paid by the peasant farmers. Their salary depended on the 
degree of water users’ satisfaction with their work. Ketman, water user 
associations comprising 3–4 villages, were responsible for the construction and 
maintenance of the irrigation system and for water distribution. Each village 
elected an elder (aksakal) who assumed overall responsibility for water 
management. When construction work became necessary, the mirab bashi and 
the mirabs conscripted the ketmans to do the work. Villages at the head of a 
water supply canal, which received more water, had to contribute more time and 
resources to construction projects. All water users were obliged to take part in 
annual maintenance work on the irrigation network. Individuals who refused to 
participate were denied access to land and water. 
Source: FES / SOCINFOBURO / IISS (2004, 19), O'Hara (2000, 373) 
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longer viewed water as a scarce resource. As a consequence, they started 
to waste water, a problem Kyrgyz water managers are struggling with 
today. 
2.2 Institutional environment 
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the Kyrgyz Republic became responsi-
ble over night for financing, managing, and maintaining its irrigation sys-
tem. In particular, the misfit between existing water management and land 
ownership patterns, which changed in the wake of comprehensive and far-
reaching land reform, made water governance reform necessary. Land 
reform influenced irrigation management mainly by splitting up large 
farms into numerous small agricultural units (cf. Box 5). The secondary 
and tertiary canals, however, were conceived by the Soviets for unitary 
management: Each canal served up to 900 ha of land, with turnouts for 
every 40 to 60 ha. Nowadays, parts of the tertiary canals formerly belong-
ing to the Soviet on-farm irrigation system have turned into inter-farm 
systems. Up to ten farms operate within a former field, each of them de-
manding its own water supply with different volumes and watering times 
(Bloch / Childress 2003, 13 f.).  
Box 5: The Kyrgyz land reform 
One of the major challenges for the newly independent Kyrgyz Republic was to 
privatize land, and to make farms responsible for their own agricultural 
production. Thus, in 1999, the Kyrgyz Parliament approved the ‘Land Code of 
the Kyrgyz Republic,’ which established private ownership of agricultural land, 
including the right to purchase, sell, and rent such land. However, the law ‘On 
Agricultural Land Regulation’ (2001) establishes restrictions on land sales and 
purchases, limiting the amount of land transacted, permitting a farmer only to 
sell whole privatized land shares, if she/he has resided in the rural area in 
question for at least two years, and stipulating that land must be sold exclusively 
to Kyrgyz citizens. Responsibility for the Agricultural Land Redistribution Fund 
(ALRF), which comprises unutilized or underutilized land, was handed over to 
the ayil okmotus (local self-governments; cf. 2.3.2). The lease period was 
increased from one to a minimum of five years. 
As a result, Kyrgyzstan’s agrarian structure is highly biased today. Peasant farms 
are the main organizational form of agricultural entities. Their number increased 
from 4,100 in 1992 (1 % of agricultural land) to 84,700, or 23.3 % of agricultural 
land, in 2002. At the same time, state and collective farms have declined in 
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importance. Broadly speaking, peasant farms are mostly small farms working 
between 0.2 and 0.5 ha of land, whereas the majority of collective and state farms 
are large enterprises with more than 100 ha of land. About 75 % of farmland is 
owner-operated; the rest is leased either from other farms or from the ALRF.  
Differences in farm production between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan are 
due to climatic conditions, agricultural specialization, and farm size. Owing to 
higher population density and the land scarcity it entails, land plots in the south 
are generally smaller and more intensively cultivated than those in the north, 
where land ownership is still rather concentrated. The majority of peasant 
farmers have adopted a self-sufficiency strategy based on risk minimization, 
aiming to provide their family members and workers with food for their own 
consumption. Only under favorable market conditions are crops sold. 
Implementation of the land reform is faced with two main problems. First, aban-
donment of state agricultural and economic planning required farmers to develop 
entrepreneurial capacities and to gain access to markets. Yet in many cases local 
markets are dysfunctional due to lack of infrastructure, information about prices, 
and/or cash availability. The result is the evolution of a vast barter system 
involving the private and the public sector alike. Second, access to land is still 
problematic for a considerable number of farmers, mainly due to lack of 
information about their legal rights. Besides, the privatization process has 
generated inequity in land distribution, since influential actors often gained 
preferential access to larger areas of better quality land situated along the 
upstream reaches of irrigation systems.  
In connection with the uprisings following the parliamentary elections in March 
2005, it became obvious that the land reform process in Kyrgyzstan has not yet 
been completed. People began to seize land on the outskirts of Bishkek, 
demanding legal land titles, which they claim to have been deprived of under the 
former regime. The land seizures have also highlighted the national north-south 
cleavage: The land occupiers often originate from the poorer south of the 
country, which suffers from land scarcity, whereas in the wealthier and less 
densely populated north, land reform was less comprehensive, leaving in its 
wake unused or underused land plots. 
Source: Bainazarov (2003), Bloch / Rasmussen (1998, 112), Childress et al. 
(2002, 9 f.), Kyrgyz Republic /National Statistical Committee (2003a, 
48 f.), Kyrgyz National Information Agency (2005), Spoor (2004, 16 
and 29), Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva (2004, 6 f.). 
The efforts to reform in Kyrgyz policies are reflected in the new Water 
Code as well as in the withdrawal of the state from management of the 
tertiary canal system and some secondary canals, which were handed over 
to Water User Associations (WUAs). Apart from the formal institutions 
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and rules, that will be described in the following sections, there are also 
informal rules that play an important role for Kyrgyz water management. 
Such informal rules can be observed especially in connection with water 
allocation and the settlement of conflicts. These rules will be analyzed in 
Chapter 4.3.4. 
2.2.1 Water legislation 
In 1994, the Kyrgyz Parliament approved the ‘Law on Water of the Kyr-
gyz Republic,’ which was characterized by several weak points, such as a 
lack of enforcement mechanisms or its failure to define the exact compe-
tencies, tasks, and duties of the state water management bodies. Subse-
quently, the Kyrgyz government, with the strong support of donors, set out 
to develop a new Water Code, which clearly derives its orientation from 
IWRM. It was approved by the Kyrgyz Parliament in December 2004. 
One key feature is the introduction of long-term rights to abstract specified 
quantities of water. For abstraction of water directly from the source, the 
Code provides for long-term water use permits for 15 or, in special cases, 
even up to 50 years, “if a substantial long term investment is to be made by 
an applicant into construction, improvement or rehabilitation” (Kyrgyz 
Republic 2005, Art. 23). Additionally, the Code introduces long term 
water supply contracts for the delivery of defined water quantities to 
WUAs, thereby providing them with both legal certainty and water secu-
rity (Art. 33 f.). 
The Code also aims at promoting private sector investment and providing 
planning security for state water management organizations. In addition, 
the Code redefines the competencies, tasks, and duties of state bodies 
involved in water management (Art. 7 f.). Water users are entitled to par-
ticipate in the planning and management structures envisaged for the prin-
cipal river basins, which are to be guided by Basin Councils (Art. 5 f.). 
There is also a provision on establishing Irrigation and Drainage Commis-
sions at the national, basin, and local levels; these are to act in the capacity 
of consultative and control bodies (Art. 79). Furthermore, the new Water 
Code contains a set of ecological provisions. 
Finally, the new water legislation increases water resource monitoring and 
introduces a system of water use planning (Art. 17 f.). The Code promotes 
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the collection of information relating to the use and management of water 
resources, for example by introducing a register of water use permits  
(Art. 32).  
2.2.2 Legislation on WUAs 
In 1995 and 1997, with the support of international donors like the World 
Bank, the government decrees ‘Regulations on WUAs in Rural Areas’ and 
‘Statute of WUAs in Rural Areas’ ordered the establishment of WUAs 
(Sehring 2005, 7). The ‘Law on Unions (associations) of Water Users’ was 
passed in 2002. It defines the legal status and the organizational basis for 
the establishment and operation of WUAs as voluntary, non-commercial 
organizations operating in public interest. The law charged WUAs with 
the task of maintaining the irrigation and drainage network situated within 
their respective service area, which is financed through a WUA fee to be 
paid by water users. 
Under the Kyrgyz Land Code, ownership of tertiary irrigation infrastruc-
ture can be transferred by government decision. Initially, it was turned 
over to the ayil okmotus, which were technically and financially overbur-
dened by the task of properly managing and operating the irrigation sys-
tem. As a consequence, irrigation infrastructure continued to deteriorate, 
water losses in canals increased, and the productivity of irrigated crops 
declined. In 2004 the decree ‘About Transferring Irrigation Systems to the 
Ownership of Associations of Water Users and Their Entities’ accorded to 
the legally registered WUAs ownership rights over the irrigation and 
drainage systems within their respective service areas. 
2.3 Institutional arrangement 
After independence, a key task for the Kyrgyz government was reform of 
the institutional arrangement inherited from the Soviets. At present, reform 
of water management bodies is a pressing problem in Kyrgyzstan. The 
ongoing reforms aim at both reducing administrative staff and sharing 
budget funding for water management. In addition, coordination among 
state administration bodies is to be improved “by eliminating parallel 
functions, separating their rights and responsibilities and improving the  
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execution of their control and administrative functions” (UNECE / UN-
ESCAP 2004, 55). One of the most relevant reforms for this study is the 
transfer of further administrative functions to WUAs. 
2.3.1 Governmental water management organizations 
The Kyrgyz administrative system relevant for this study is characterized 
by a dual structure: The regional subdivisions of administration directly 
depend on the president, whereas the water management administration is 
subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and Proc-
essing Industry (MAWMPI) (cf. Figure 4; for a general overview of the 
Kyrgyz administration system, cf. Box 6). 
President and parliament 
On top of the hierarchy, the president and parliament exercise mainly 
regulatory and programmatic functions in the water sector. Parliament is 
responsible for the legal framework regulating the management of water 
resources and determining the tariffs for water abstraction. The president 
is also involved in the legislative process. His main task is to define the 
Box 6: The administrative structure of the Kyrgyz Republic 
Currently, the administrative-territorial system of the Kyrgyz Republic has four 
tiers. The Republic is divided into seven provinces, or oblasts. Each oblast has a 
capital city, where most important administrative organizations (including 
deconcentrated branches of the central ministries) are located. The oblasts are 
divided into districts or rayons, which again are subdivided into ayil okmotus 
(meaning ‘village administration’), the local self-government units. Apart form the 
seven oblasts, the two cities of Bishkek and Osh have quasi-oblast status.  
There are 45 rayons and 494 ayil okmotus in the country. An ayil okmotu unites 
several villages and comprises the lowest level of administration. It is accountable 
to representative authorities of local government (kenesh), which are elected by the 
citizens, and to the state administration of the higher (rayon or city) level.  
In August 2005 the Kyrgyz Government announced its intention to abolish the 
oblast administration in order to come to a three-tiered administrative system 
consisting of national, rayon, and ayil okmotu levels.  
Source: Grävingholt et al. (s. a.); RFE/RL (2005); United Coalition (2005) 
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country’s water policy. He is supported by the National Committee on 
Water Strategy, a think tank of scientists and water professionals. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management, and Processing Industry 
(MAWMPI) 
The former Ministry of Water Economy was merged with the Ministry of 
Agriculture to form the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management and 
Processing Industry (MAWMPI). Within the MAWMPI, the Department 
of Water Management (DWM), the former Ministry of Water Economy, 
takes the lead in irrigation management, whereas the Department for Rural 
Water Supply is responsible for rural drinking water supply. The DWM 
has financial and institutional autonomy. It sets water consumption stan-
dards and limits and submits annual proposals on tariffs for water supply 
to the parliament. Its task is to plan and finance measures related to water 
management, such as improvements in efficient water management or 
rehabilitation of infrastructure. Together with its subordinate water man-
agement organizations, the Oblast Basin Water Management Departments 
(OblVodKhozes) and the Rayon Water Management Departments (Ray-
VodKhozes), the DWM is the main executive body responsible for water 
management (UNECE / UNESCAP 2004, 37). 
Water Management Departments at the oblast and rayon levels  
At the oblast level, there are six OblVodKhozes, formed in 1997. Besides 
distributing water to the rayons, they have mainly supervisory functions, 
controlling the water management of the rayons situated in the respective 
oblast. Furthermore, they are responsible for collection of data on alloca-
tion, financial requirements, and expenditures by the rayons. 
The main task of the RayVodKhozes is to distribute water to secondary 
and tertiary canals and to maintain the canal system. Since 1995, Kyrgyz 
farmers have been obliged to sign annual irrigation water supply contracts 
with the RayVodKhozes. Today such contracts are concluded between 
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Figure 4: Institutional arrangement of Kyrgyz water governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva (2004, 9)  
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WUAs and the RayVodKhozes (Tursunaliev 2002).18 These irrigation wa-
ter supply contracts determine the annual volume and amount of water to 
be delivered. Since the irrigation service fees (ISF) paid by water users to 
the RayVodKhoz are too low to reach cost recovery, the remaining costs 
are covered by the government budget, based on a demand-aggregation 
process.19 
At the inter-rayon level, there are two different ways of managing shared 
canals: In the Chui and Talas Oblasts, there are inter-rayon water man-
agement organizations, which are subordinate to the respective Obl-
VodKhozes. In Osh Oblast, relations between rayons responsible for the 
management of common canals are regulated by contractual agreements 
(Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2004, 14 f.; Chemonics 
International 2003, 28). 
WUA Support Units (WSUs) 
Within the MAWMPI, the OblVodKhozes and the RayVodKhozes, the 
Kyrgyz government, supported by international donors, has established 
WUA Support Units (WSUs) staffed with small teams comprising a WUA 
support specialist, a water management specialist, and an engineer. At 
national level, the WSU is responsible for technical assistance and training 
of instructors, who are supposed to strengthen existing WUAs and pro-
mote the creation of new WUAs. The oblast WSUs are charged with a 
long-term program for WUA development as well as with supporting 
WUAs in determining their financial and technical needs. The rayon 
WSUs are being established to assist WUAs in becoming legally regis-
tered and to provide training courses (Johnson III / Stoutjesdijik / Djailo-
bayev 2002, 1f.).  
                                                          
18  Exceptions to this rule are places where WUAs do not yet exist. Here farmers are still 
required to sign a contract for water delivery directly with the RayVodKhoz. 
19  The RayVodKhozes estimate the financial requirements for the year to come and submit 
them to the OblVodKhoz, where the financial demands are aggregated, including their 
budget needs. This financial requirement is then submitted to the MAWMPI, which 
aggregates all demands from oblast level, includes own requirements, and submits them 
to the Ministry of Finance. Financial allocations are made on the basis of resource 
availability , following the hierarchies of the administrative units (DFID 2003, A–24). 
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Figure 5: Stakeholders involved in local water management 
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Box 7: The potential of Kyrgyz WUAs for promoting IWRM principles 
The potential of Kyrgyz Water User Associations for the realization of the IWRM 
concept can be depicted along the three pillars of the IWRM Pyramid:  
Ecological integration 
Hydrological boundaries: The principle of managing water resources along hydro-
logical boundaries is enshrined in the 2002 Law on WUAs. The service area of the 
latter is supposed to be based on hydrological units, which are considered as 
indivisible and have to be managed as an entity. 
Water quality and water quantity: Responsible for ensuring rational water use and 
preventing water pollution, WUAs have an important role to play in avoiding water 
losses and safeguarding water quality at local level. 
Water-land interaction: Ideally, WUAs should promote new irrigation techniques 
among farmers and undertake measures to “prevent soil erosion and salinity” (Kyr-
gyz Republic 2002, Art. 4). Their work is thus directly related to the issue of water-
land interaction.  
Sectoral integration 
Integration of economic externalities: A central objective underlying the transfer of 
irrigation management to WUAs is to establish financially self-reliant water service 
providers responsible for the operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of tertiary 
irrigation infrastructure. By promoting WUAs, the Kyrgyz government has thus 
taken an important step towards cost recovery.  
Integration of social effects: Ideally, WUAs should ensure the “fair and equitable 
distribution of irrigation water among all WUA members” (Kyrgyz Republic 2002, 
Art. 4). The social dimension of water utilization is thus explicitly taken into 
account in the Kyrgyz WUA approach.  
Regulatory integration 
Decentralization and participation: In contrast to the highly centralized top-down 
management in Soviet times, the WUA approach clearly constitutes a shift towards 
decentralizing water management. By participating in WUAs, Kyrgyz farmers can 
become active in decision-making on local water management. Aiming at enforcing 
water users’ participation, this principle is explicitly called for in the 2002 Law on 
WUAs. It is widely believed that participatory forms of irrigation management not 
only enhance farmers’ ownership but also lead to improvements regarding service 
provision. 
Information: In charge of drafting water use plans, WUAs are expected to 
communicate water needs to the RayVodKhozes. As in the framework of ongoing 
donor projects, WUAs are increasingly being equipped with measurement devices 
(e. g. IWRM Ferghana Valley project), efforts are also currently being undertaken to 
promote information on individual water use within the WUAs’ service areas. 
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Furthermore, WUAs have the task of providing information and training to their 
members.  
Demand management: By maintaining irrigation infrastructure, WUAs contribute to 
the prevention of water losses. In addition, the responsibility of WUAs to ensure 
rational water use and prevent the overwatering of irrigated fields also demonstrates 
the role they could play in enhancing the IWRM principle of demand management.  
Source: Modified from Kyrgyz Republic (2002); Svendsen / Trava / Johnson III 
(1997, 10 f.). 
2.3.2 Local organizations involved in water governance 
Actively promoted by the Kyrgyz government, WUAs now appear to be 
the primary stakeholders responsible for water management at the local 
level. Yet this impression is only partly true, since there are a range of 
other actors that deal with water management (cf. Figure 5). 
Water user associations (WUAs) 
Introducing WUAs was one of the most important reform steps in the 
Kyrgyz water sector, as they have great potential for the promotion of 
IWRM principles (cf. Box 7). At present, there are about 420 WUAs in 
Kyrgyzstan, 387 of which are officially registered, the rest currently in the 
process of registration. The number of both registered and unregistered 
WUAs is rising continuously. By the year 2010, the government aims to 
have established 500 WUAs, which should then encompass all irrigated 
land (Chemonics International 2003, 29). While in the Chui Oblast 102 
WUAs cover approximately 65 % of all agriculturally used land, in the 
Osh Oblast 74 WUAs have been created so far, 72 of which have regis-
tered formally. The latter already cover about 72 % of irrigated land. 
The organizational structure of a WUA as per the 2002 Law on WUAs is 
depicted in Figure 6.  
In addition to formally registered WUAs, in some, mostly remote moun-
tainous areas, informal WUAs have taken over the management of water 
resources. The breakup of former state farms and the resulting need to 
operate and maintain former on-farm irrigation systems has fostered the  
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Figure 6: Organizational structure of WUAs as set out in the 2002 Law on 
WUAs 
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Ideally, a WUA is set up by a founding committee, which drafts the WUA’s 
charter and defines its service area. The founding committee then convokes the 
first general assembly (GA). The GA is viewed as the supreme governing body. It 
consists of either all farmers who own or lease a plot of agricultural land within the 
WUA service area, or of elected representatives. The GA’s role is to approve the 
WUA’s budget and work out plans and define the main direction of its overall 
activities. Since in the past power tended to be concentrated in the hands of the 
WUA’s executive and/or managing organs, the law explicitly states that the 
decision-making power of the GA cannot be delegated to any other organ. The 
WUA Council, with the chairman at its head, is the WUA’s management body and 
controls the performance of the WUA’s executive organ. Its activities are 
supervised by an Audit Commission, which is elected by the GA. The WUA 
direction and its staff perform executive functions. Their tasks include registering 
members and non-members, drafting budgets, elaborating plans for operation, 
maintenance, and water use, recording irrigation requests and controlling water 
delivery by the water supplier. Furthermore, the law provides for the setting up of a 
conflict resolution committee, whose function is to settle water conflicts among 
users. 
Source: Modified from IWMI / Scientific Information Center ICWC (2003, 
20 f.), Kyrgyz Republic (2002, Art. 5 f.) 
spontaneous creation of these informal associations (DFID 2003, 3–4; 
Johnson III / Stoutjesdijik / Djailobayev 2002, 7). The WSUs are now 
undertaking measures to formalize them through registration.  
Local self-government (ayil okmotus) 
Established in 1996, the local self-government executive bodies (ayil ok-
motus) are primarily responsible for economic and social development at 
local level. Ayil okmotus encompass village clusters comprising up to 
seven villages and often covering the territories of former state and collec-
tive farms (cf. Box 5). With agriculture the most important source of in-
come in rural Kyrgyzstan, ayil okmotus are heavily concerned with agri-
cultural issues, including the administration of the ALRF. 
The ayil okmotu’s role in water management is due to the fact that prior to 
the introduction of WUAs, the irrigation network (i. e. secondary and 
tertiary canals and drains) was initially transferred to them. Ayil okmotus 
now have to hand over irrigation infrastructure to registered WUAs within 
their administrative areas. This transfer is backed by the recently adopted 
Water Code. 
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In areas with operating WUAs, ayil okmotus often provide support and 
assistance to WUAs and thus deal only indirectly with water management. 
In areas without WUAs, they are more directly involved in water man-
agement. In these cases, a water and agricultural management specialist 
within the ayil okmotu not only provides farmers with advice on the culti-
vation of crops but also helps them to plan their water needs. The data are 
then submitted to the RayVodKhozes (Giovarelli / Akmatova 2002, 4 f.; 
Johnson III / Stoutjesdijik / Djailobayev 2002, 5; Sehring 2005, 26–27). In 
many cases, regardless of whether a WUA exists or not, the mirabs are 
employed by the ayil okmotus. 
Together with the ayil okmotus, the position of village heads (ayil bashis) 
was established in 1996. Ayil bashis facilitate the management of villages 
within ayil okmotus. They are either appointed by the ayil okmotus or 
directly elected by the village councils (ayil kenesh). Like the ayil okmo-
tus, the ayil bashis deal primarily with questions related to agriculture and 
provide assistance to WUAs, but they sometimes also interfere with water 
management. 
Other actors involved in water management 
In addition to the above-described formal organizations, other actors also 
play an important role in local water management in Kyrgyzstan. The most 
important of them is the traditional court of elders (aksakal sotu), which 
gained importance after independence. In 1995, aksakal sotus were 
granted the status of formal organizations. The akskal sotus consist of 
about five persons, mostly respected elders of the community. Usually 
there is an aksakal sotu in every village, but in the case of smaller ayil 
okmotu there may be only one for the entire ayil okmotu. Depending on 
their influence, aksakal sotus may also deal with land and water manage-
ment. Aksakal sotus are particularly relevant when it comes to the settle-
ment of conflicts between WUAs and farmers or among farmers (Gio-
varelli / Akmatova 2002, 5 f.; Sehring 2005, 21). 
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3 Ecological integration 
The aim of the following chapter is to assess the integration of eco-sys-
tematic interdependencies in Kyrgyz water management. Thus three main 
aspects will be analyzed. First, the structure of Kyrgyz water management 
will be compared with the hydrological boundaries in order to examine to 
what extent these two dimensions correspond (3.1). Second, the integra-
tion of quality aspects into the supply of sufficient quantities of water will 
be analyzed (3.2). A third subchapter will present and discuss the interde-
pendencies between water and land use and the way these interdependen-
cies are handled by water managers (3.3). IWRM explicitly requires that 
this interaction be taken seriously into account and that measures be un-
dertaken to prevent negative consequences, if necessary. 
3.1 Hydrological boundaries 
In analyzing hydrological boundaries in Central Asia, one is in fact forced 
to consider the whole dimension of the Aral Sea Basin, the main catch-
ment area in the region. The Aral Sea Basin stretches from most parts of 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, over the southern parts of Ka-
zakhstan and central and southern Kyrgyzstan to northern Afghanistan and 
Iran. For practical reasons, the authors decided against this approach, and 
the study was limited to the national territory of Kyrgyzstan. Within na-
tional water governance, a closer look is taken at the three most important 
layers of water management: the oblast, the rayon, and the local level. 
Due to topographic conditions, Kyrgyz hydrology follows a distribution 
that divides the country into two hydrological zones: first, the flow gen-
eration zone in the mountainous regions of Tien Shan and Pamir-Alay, 
representing 87 % of the country’s total surface, and second, the flow 
dissipation zone, which corresponds to the main valleys and plains, cov-
ering only 13 % of the territory (FAO AQUASTAT 1997). The flow gen-
eration zone comprises the principal areas of precipitation and water (or 
snow) accumulation, the elevated and sparsely populated regions of the 
country. In contrast, the flow dissipation zone covers the major populated 
areas in the north (Chu and Talas valleys) and the Ferghana Valley in the 
 
 Elke Herrfahrdt et al. 
64 German Development Institute 
Fi
gu
re
 7
:  
  H
yd
ro
gr
ap
hi
ca
l m
ap
 o
f K
yr
gy
zs
ta
n 
 So
ur
ce
: 
U
N
EC
E 
(2
00
0,
 7
0)
 
Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
German Development Institute 65 
 
Table 1: Major river basins in the Kyrgyz Republic 
Water-
shed 
(Main 
Tribu-
taries) 
Region Part of 
Territory 
( %) 
Internal 
RSWR* 
(km³/year) 
Outflow 
to 
Quantity 
Reserved 
for Other 
Countries
(km³/year)
Quantity 
Available 
to Kyr-
gyzstan 
(km³/year) 
Syr 
Darya 
(Naryn & 
Kara 
Darya) 
Central/ 
West 
 55.3  27.25 Tajikistan 
& 
Uzbeki-
stan 
 22.33  4.92 
Chu, 
Talas & 
Assa 
North  21.1  6.83 Kazakh-
stan 
 2.03  4.80 
South-
eastern 
Southeast  12.9  6.18 China  –  6.18 
Lake 
Issyk-
Kul 
Northeast  6.5  1.50 Interior 
basin 
 –  1.50 
Amu 
Darya 
(Kysyl-
Suu) 
Southwest  3.9  1.93 Tajikistan  1.51  0.42 
Lake 
Balkhash 
(Ili) 
Northeast  0.3  0.36 Kazakh-
stan 
 –  0.36 
Total   100  44.05   25.87  18.18 
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*RSWR=Renewable Surface Water Resources 
Grayed fields mark the watersheds which are of special interest for this study since 
they comprise the areas on which it focuses 
The total quantity available to Kyrgyzstan does not correspond to the above-
mentioned 11.6 km³/year (cf. Box 2) because it includes runoff to China and Lake 
Balkhash in Kazakhstan that is not regulated by international treaties. Since this 
runoff occurs in rather remote mountainous areas, Kyrgyzstan is not able to use 
these water resources 
Source: Modified from FAO AQUASTAT (1997) 
southwest, which are the natural centers of water discharge. They also 
constitute the principal economic centers of the Kyrgyz Republic. 
Kyrgyz surface water resources can be divided into six major river basins, 
which are summed up in Table 1. The geographical location of the main 
rivers and lakes in Kyrgyzstan is illustrated in Figure 7. 
As shown in Table 1, two major river basins, the Syr Darya Basin and the 
Chu, Talas, and Assa Basins, account for more than three fourths of re-
newable surface water resources. Both also include the main urban settle-
ments Bishkek, Tokmok, Kara-Balta, Talas, Osh, and Jalal-Abad as well 
as rural areas with relatively high population densities. Large parts of these 
river basins correspond to the major agricultural areas and have out-
standing importance for the Kyrgyz economy. At the same time, treaties 
committing water resources to neighboring countries have meant that these 
two river basins face the greatest restrictions concerning internal water use 
(cf. Box 8).  
3.1.1 Management structure and hydrological boundaries 
There is a clear will in Kyrgyz politics to shift water management away 
from administrative and to hydrological boundaries. The new Water Code 
states that water management must be “undertaken within the boundaries 
of the principal basin in accordance with hydrographic principles, which 
relate to Lake Issyk-Kul and the main rivers of the Kyrgyz Republic” (Art. 
5). What follows will assess the extent to which this creed is already being 
put into practice. 
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Below the national level, the next administrative bodies are the Oblast 
Basin Management Departments (OblVodKhozes). The term ‘basin’ in the 
organizations’ name was introduced recently and was not accompanied by 
any shift of competencies or service areas. Nevertheless it has to be ac-
knowledged that Kyrgyz oblasts correspond more or less to hydrological 
boundaries, even if this is mainly because of geographical particularities. 
Two exceptions are the oblast-crossing rivers Chu and Naryn. The second 
reason for the approximate congruence of oblasts with hydrological units 
is the planning of canal construction in Soviet times. All big canals were 
built within one oblast, without crossing the borders to another. This 
spares today’s Kyrgyz water managers the trouble of distributing water 
between different oblasts. 
At rayon level the situation is more difficult. Kyrgyz rayons are not 
structured in keeping with hydrological boundaries, they exclusively fol-
low administrative ones. This creates considerable problems, as the Ray-
Box 8: International water management 
The two Soviet inter-republic water management bodies (in Russian: BVOs – 
Basin Water Associations, one responsible for Amu-Darya, one for Syr-Darya) 
have been integrated into the 1991 Interstate Coordination Water Commission of 
Central Asia (ICWC), which is based in Tashkent/Uzbekistan. This organization is 
generally considered as the most relevant actor in regional water distribution. The 
Soviet quota system for water distribution between the different republics still 
serves as the basis of its work. At meetings held twice yearly, the Commission’s 
members decide about the actual amount of water each country has the right to 
extract from the transnational rivers. However, the enforcement of these 
agreements remains weak, because there are no generally accepted rules for water 
distribution. Especially in dry years, conflicts among the member states are 
frequent. 
Experts stated that the ICWC’s functioning depends to a large degree on continuity 
of personal memberships since most members had for the most part already 
occupied their positions in Soviet times. Apparently, personal contacts play an 
important role in finding agreements. It seems that at the international level water is 
mainly managed in informal bilateral ways that sometimes limit the formal body to 
state well-sounding programs and taking notes of meetings. Regularly, direct 
interventions of high state representatives like vice-prime ministers are necessary 
to find agreements at all. These difficulties result mainly from largely different 
use patterns in the region’s upstream and downstream countries. 
Source: Own compilation, field research 
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VodKhozes are key organizations in Kyrgyz water management. Their 
service areas, in combination with their great relevance for equal water 
allocation to users, constitutes a noteworthy hurdle on the way to imple-
menting IWRM. Some RayVodKhozes have no water source of their own, 
a circumstance that constitutes a big problem regarding the reliability of 
water provision to the WUAs on their territory.  
The research found indications of a further subdivision within the rayons, 
which is reported to be more of a technical nature. Two rayons within the 
research area were composed of several so-called irrigation management 
units (upravleniye oroshaemyh sistem, UOS). Each of these entities com-
prises one small hydrological unit, since they are structured in relation to 
the source of their water resources; if one rayon receives its water from 
two rivers and two big canals, it consists of four UOS. UOS are in charge 
of maintenance of infrastructure as well as the operational elements of 
water distribution. In regions where no WUAs exist, they have additional 
significance as direct contact points for water users. However, it is not 
clear whether this management structure exists everywhere or only in parts 
of northern Chui Oblast. 
At the local level, WUAs are the most important actors because they are 
promoted by the Kyrgyz government and receive strong financial support 
from international donors. One main principle for their formation is that 
they comprise one hydrological unit. This means at the local level that 
they cover all fields receiving water from the same source. It was found, 
however, that in contrast to official statements, the factors that determine 
WUA service areas are manifold. Even though some WUAs seem to re-
spect hydrological boundaries, many examples were found where WUA 
territory was determined by village frontiers, ayil okmotu borders, the 
structures of old kolkhozes, machine delivery stations, or study farms. This 
results in various problems like the availability of water in downstream 
WUAs or disputes over responsibility for rehabilitation measures in shared 
infrastructure (cf. Box 9).  
Nevertheless, the will to adjust management structures to hydrological 
boundaries is especially marked at the local level. Amalgamating WUAs 
with a view to having them cover one complete secondary or even primary 
canal is a process currently ongoing in Kyrgyzstan. In the Aravan rayon in 
southern Osh Oblast, the number of WUAs has already been reduced 
through such mergers from 50 to 14 in the course of recent years. 
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Box 9: Case study: consequences of disregarding hydrological boundaries 
This case study takes a closer look at two WUAs located in the Panfilov rayon – 
one situated upstream (WUA 1), the other downstream (WUA 2). As they share 
one canal, both WUAs operate within the same hydrological unit. The aim of the 
case study is to highlight inefficiencies of local water management resulting from 
the disregard of the IWRM principle of managing water resources along 
hydrological boundaries.  
Background: The system of water exchange between WUA 1 and WUA 2 
In spring, autumn, and winter, downstream WUA 2 manages to cover its water 
supply through its own canal, which is fed from the mountains. However, since in 
summer, the latter often does not deliver sufficient water, WUA 2 frequently 
suffers from water scarcity. In contrast, located near the intake structure, upstream 
WUA 1 usually has abundant water resources throughout the year. With a view to 
resolving its water scarcity problems, downstream WUA 2 has started to buy water 
from WUA 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Given that its water needs can usually be satisfied by the canal fed directly from 
the mountains, WUA 2 pays no fees to the RayVodKhoz. Yet for the water 
provided by WUA 1, it pays a fee of 3 tyiyns.  
Interestingly, while the RayVodKhoz is only in charge for the maintenance of the 
intake structure, WUA 2 is nevertheless officially required to submit to the
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RayVodKhoz an application for water to be delivered by WUA 1. However, both 
WUAs appear to ignore this regulation, which they consider as unnecessary, and 
instead to arrange water allocation between themselves.  
Conflicts over water 
While at first sight the arrangement between the two WUAs seems to work quite 
well, conflicts over water occur frequently: First meeting its needs from the canal, 
upstream WUA 1 does not always provide enough water to cover the water needs 
of downstream WUA 2. Water scarcity negatively affects agricultural productivity 
in village 2, thereby contributing to an overall lower standard of living of its 
villagers. Perhaps as a consequence, members of WUA 2 sometimes serve 
themselves from WUA 1’s part of the canal without paying for the water, thereby 
further aggravating the conflict. 
Lack of collaboration 
Another problem is related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of shared parts of 
the canal. As both WUAs depend on its good maintenance, canal rehabilitation 
work should, ideally, be carried out in collaboration. However, while one part of 
the canal (i. e. from the intake structure to the main division point near village 1) is 
managed by WUA 1, the other part (from the main division point to village 2) is 
looked after by WUA 2. Currently both parts of the canal are in quite bad 
condition. This is due to several factors: First, to water users, who sometimes 
deliberately break holes in the canal and remove water illegally; second, to the 
situation of scarce financial resources that both WUAs are suffering from; and 
third, to a lack of accountability and misappropriation of funds by WUA staff. For 
instance, one of the WUAs received credits to rehabilitate its part of the canal, but 
the money allegedly went into the pocket of the WUA director.  
Possible solution 
In order to make water management more efficient and to reduce conflicts over 
water, efforts are now being undertaken (e. g. through the ayil okmotu) to unite all 
WUAs which share the same canal. The negotiations with the WUAs and the 
RayVodKhoz are currently in progress.  
Whereas the director of WUA 1 has a positive attitude towards this unification, 
WUA 2 is rather reluctant. Upstream WUA 1 perceives the unification as a chance 
to “leave the dominion of the RayVodKhoz” and to avoid having to pay for water. 
Since after unification they would no longer have to rely on state infrastructure, 
WUA members would only have to pay for the provision of services. In contrast, 
downstream WUA 2 is strongly opposed to the idea of WUA unification. It fears 
discrimination in water allocation because it would lose influence in the course of 
WUA unification.  
Source: Own field research 
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New developments and perspectives 
As mentioned above, the new Water Code, the major policy statement of 
the (former) government in the water sector, includes explicitly a far-
reaching shift towards the principle of hydrological boundaries. The Code 
introduces a new organization called National Water Council, comprising 
“the heads of ministries, administrative agencies and other state bodies 
that are responsible for aspects of water resource management including 
financial and security aspects” (Art. 9). This council will mainly be in 
charge of coordinating the different state bodies as well as developing 
regulations for the implementation of the Code. There will also be Water 
Councils at basin level, with similar composition and tasks. The estab-
lishment of these councils is surely a positive signal towards an IWRM-
oriented water management, especially as it includes non-agricultural 
users, which has been rare until now. Nevertheless it remains to be seen 
how the councils will perform their tasks. The legal provision requiring (at 
least) yearly meetings gives little reason to expect too much as regards 
effective coordination. Furthermore, no such organization is provided for 
at the local level of administration, and there is still a need to clarify com-
petencies between several of the state bodies involved.  
An additional step towards a hydrology-oriented management includes the 
establishment, by the new Water Code, of Irrigation and Drainage 
Commissions. These commissions will be introduced at national, basin, 
and local level. They comprise representatives from the State Water Ad-
ministration, from the territorial bodies, and from irrigation water users. 
Among others, their tasks are “to review the performance of relevant irri-
gation and drainage systems; to supervise the implementation of recom-
mendations made; to act as a forum for information exchange; and to 
advise on issues that shall be their competence” (Art. 79). These compe-
tencies actually limit the Irrigation and Drainage Commissions to the role 
of a purely consultative body without any executive power. Furthermore, 
the relation between the Irrigation and Drainage Commissions and the 
Water Councils is not clear, and care should be taken not to establish 
parallel structures at the national and basin levels.  
The concept of WUA federations is completely lacking in the new Code. 
These federations, which are seen by many experts as the next logical step 
to shift Kyrgyz water management towards hydrological units, should 
comprise all WUAs sharing one primary canal. In contrast to the Irrigation 
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and Drainage Commissions, they will possess executive bodies and per-
manent staff, and thus be able to manage water resources on their own. 
This raises the question as to their future relations with the RayVodKhozes. 
International donors, who are the driving force behind the establishment of 
WUA federations, aim at dismantling the RayVodKhozes in the long run 
and replacing them with these new participatory organizations. Transfer-
ring tasks currently performed by state administration to new private 
organizations has led to skepticism within the administration. Interviewees 
from the administration frequently emphasized that it will take time until 
WUA federations are able to perform the tasks of the RayVodKhozes. This 
is surely true – thus far only one WUA federation has started working – 
but it will be imperative for implementation of IWRM to further support 
the creation of WUA federations and to enable them to manage whole 
canals, respecting hydrological boundaries. The interests at stake that 
serve to impede this difficult change within the organizational structure 
will be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 5.1.1. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
With regard to the ambiguous picture shown above, the main recommen-
dation is to further support the shift away from traditional water manage-
ment to basin management. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Apply the ‘basin ap-
proach’ consistently, also at the canal level, by supporting the 
process of federating WUAs.  
In order to adjust management structures to hydrological boundaries, 
the shift towards hydrological units has to be implemented at all ad-
ministrative levels. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Continue consistently 
to pursue this approach and dismantle the RayVodKhozes in the 
long term.  
In order to avoid duplications of functions, the competencies of Ray-
VodKhozes’ must be handed over to WUA federations over the long 
term. 
— Recommendation to international donor organizations: Continue to 
support WUAs in order to improve their management capacities 
and enable them to federate.  
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As regards the major relevance of donors for Kyrgyz water manage-
ment, the former have considerable potential to initiate institutional 
change through the promotion of WUAs, which have the potential to 
become relevant change agents. 
3.1.2 Groundwater – surface water interaction 
Another dimension of hydrological boundaries that is often underestimated 
is the interaction between ground- and surface water. The fact that hydro-
logical boundaries also have a vertical dimension is widely ignored in 
Kyrgyz water management. Not only is the administration of both water 
sources strictly separated, there is also a lack of awareness among water 
managers of the interaction between ground- and surface water. This 
situation is due to differing use patterns: while surface water is mainly 
used for irrigation agriculture, industrial and drinking water is supplied 
from groundwater resources. From a quantitative point of view, the situa-
tion is clear: About 95 % of all water used in Kyrgyzstan is surface water.  
Problems arise from the fact that this strict separation is a mere fiction. 
According to an expert from the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency 
Situations (MEES), about 700,000 people of a population of 5 million 
have no access to clean drinking water. Many of them provide themselves 
with water from irrigation canals. The health consequences of this practice 
are presented in Chapter 4.3.2. Further problems result from the use of 
drinking-water infrastructure for irrigation purposes (cf. 4.2.1) and inap-
propriate irrigation practices, which lead for instance to rising groundwater 
tables (cf. 3.3.1). 
Due to partly overlapping use patterns, it is necessary to ensure a maxi-
mum of cooperation and coordination between the different administrative 
bodies. The complete absence of cooperation, exacerbated further by a 
lack of communication structures between the ministries concerned, 
constitutes a major managerial problem for current water management. 
The establishment of Water Councils by the new Water Code at national, 
basin, and canal levels thus appears to be an appropriate step in the direc-
tion of a water management in conformity with IWRM. 
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Possible improvements / Recommendations 
The strict separation of tasks within the Kyrgyz water administration is the 
central problem for the integration of groundwater-surface water interac-
tion. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Improve cooperation 
between the state organs of surface water management (DWM, 
MEES etc.) on one side, and the State Sanitarian and Epidemiol-
ogical Body and the Ministry of Geology on the other. 
The formal path to improving this cooperation is already given by the 
new Water Code – the National Water Council. It is desirable that 
this Council should become an effective coordination mechanism. 
3.2 Integration of water quantity and water quality 
This section deals with the question of whether and to what extent the 
interaction between water quantity and water quality is taken into consid-
eration in Kyrgyz water management. Traditional supply management had 
a strong focus on quantity, i. e. supplying enough water to users. The fact 
that poor quality diminishes the benefits of water was generally not con-
sidered. With regard to the former practice of water allocation, the task for 
a water management in line with IWRM is thus the integration of quality 
aspects into the provision of sufficient quantities of water. 
Thanks to Kyrgyzstan’s upstream position, the country’s water quality is 
in fact much better than that in neighboring countries. However, big dif-
ferences exist between the regions with low population density and the 
densely populated areas, especially the Chu river valley and the Ferghana 
Valley. In these regions, which are also centers of agricultural and indus-
trial production, pollution with nitrates, nitrites, oil and grease, phenols, 
and pesticides constitutes a sizable problem. At various locations surface 
water is severely contaminated by residues from mining activities and 
mine tailing dumps. This contamination is primarily due to heavy metals, 
cyanide, and radioactive substances stemming from uranium mines. There 
are reported cases of groundwater pollution by infiltration from contami-
nated surface water (UNECE 2000, 73 f.). 
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One of the focuses of interest of the present study is quality problems 
caused by agricultural pollutants. According to the Ministry of Ecology 
and Emergency Situations, the organization responsible for monitoring 
and quality control, drainage water constitutes the main source of pollu-
tion, together with untreated sewage water from settlements. Drainage 
water often has a high content of nitrates and pesticides as well as high 
salinity. The main problem involved in assessing water quality in Kyr-
gyzstan is the lack of exact information about pollution levels as well as 
on the use of agrochemicals and organic fertilizer, which are often used in 
abundance (cf. Box 10). There is no doubt that after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the use of agrochemical inputs in the agricultural sector 
declined by about 75 % (UNEP / GRID 1999). It remains unclear, how-
ever, to what extent the recovery of agricultural production during recent 
years has been due to increased use of fertilizers and pesticides.  
Nevertheless, agrochemicals as such are not the main cause of pollution, 
provided they are employed appropriately. Inefficient irrigation and drain-
age practices as well as soil erosion are the most relevant factors for agro-
chemical filtration into water bodies (UNECE 2000, 117). The main 
problem is the inappropriate use and the infrastructural decay of the Kyr-
gyz agricultural sector. Drainage water often flows back to irrigation 
canals and is then used again for irrigation. This causes salinity and pollu-
tion levels to rise downstream.  
Box 10: Inappropriate use of fertilizer 
Chicken manure is a very effective organic fertilizer. In addition, it is more 
affordable for Kyrgyz farmers than mineral fertilizer, which has to be imported. 
Used with adequate irrigation techniques like drop-irrigation, chicken manure 
can be a helpful measure to increase the fertility of land. Applied in excess and 
improperly, it constitutes an ecological danger. The present study found one case 
in the northern Sokuluk rayon where farmers applied untreated chicken manure 
by simply mixing it with irrigation water. They applied fertilizer at the same time 
as they were watering their fields. However, the common practice of over-
irrigation makes it very difficult to apply only the necessary amount of fertilizer 
– overuse is nearly inevitable. The excess manure runs off into water bodies, 
raising their level of nitrate and thus contributing to eutrophication.  
Source: Own compilation 
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Furthermore, several interviewees emphasized the importance of livestock 
raising as a pollution source, especially for groundwater resources. As 
livestock density is highest near human settlements, this represents a 
danger especially to drinking water quality, and thus to human health (cf. 
4.3). 
Sewage water from settlements and factories is seen as an additional 
problem for water quality in Kyrgyzstan. Although the majority of urban 
settlements are equipped with treatment plants, most of them do not func-
tion appropriately at their nominal capacity or are not operational at all. 
About 90 % of rural settlements lack sewage systems or other individual 
facilities such as septic tanks etc. (UNECE 2000, 77 f.). The national 
report on the environment states that although industrial production has 
decreased by one half since independence, “the volume of pollution into 
waterways and reservoirs on main indices is increased: oil products – 2 
times, nitrates – 3.4 times” (Kyrgyz Republic/Ministry of National Envi-
ronment Protection 2000). This contradictory tendency is due to the mas-
sive deterioration of infrastructure. According to the Ministry of Ecology 
and Emergency Situations, the expected further increase in mining activi-
ties will affect water quality very negatively. 
3.2.1 Management of water quality  
Integration of water quality aspects into water supply remains weak in 
Kyrgyzstan. The focus of water managers is clearly on how best to provide 
a sufficient quantity of water. Integration suffers mainly from a lack of 
problem awareness among both water managers and farmers.  
In the course of the research for the present study, statements praising the 
very good quality of Kyrgyz water resources were frequently expressed by 
interviewees at different levels of Kyrgyz water management as well as by 
WUA staff. Unfortunately, such statements are only partly true, but they 
nevertheless provide a good insight into how water quality issues are per-
ceived and treated by Kyrgyz water managers. Generally, ecological 
problems are not perceived as pressing issues for Kyrgyz water manage-
ment. Water managers more or less ignore them due to the fact that these 
problems are – relatively – smaller than those encountered in neighboring 
countries. This perception of ecological problems leads to a focus on 
quantity aspects, as stated by an employee of the MEES: “The problems 
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are all decided only from one side. It is always looked on from the water-
taking side.”  
This statement reflects the strict separation of tasks between the 
MAWMPI, which is in charge of regulating water abstraction, and the 
Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations, which deals with regulat-
ing water pollution. Ignorance of the relevance of ecological issues 
throughout all levels of Kyrgyz water management constitutes a major 
obstacle to the introduction of IWRM. 
At farm level the situation is similar. There is a general lack of know-how 
about the ecological consequences of agricultural work in combination 
with the Soviet tradition of overuse of agrochemicals and organic fertiliz-
ers. This poses problems for attempts to make people aware of water qual-
ity issues, even when rural families are directly affected by reduced water 
quality, due for instance to saline drinking water. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In order to improve the poor managerial integration of water quality as-
pects into water management, the following steps are recommended. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Assure a maximum of 
cooperation and communication between the Department of Wa-
ter Management (DWM), i. e. the future State Water Administra-
tion, and the MEES. 
With regard to the remaining separation of tasks between the compe-
tencies for water abstraction and water pollution, collaboration be-
tween the two state bodies involved is key to making water quality 
aspects heard in water management. 
— Recommendation to the WSUs: Provide trainings with a focus on 
securing water quality to WUAs.  
As important multipliers, WUAs should be involved in informing 
farmers how to avoid overuse of fertilizer, etc.  
— Recommendation to agricultural extension services: Include in train-
ings information about the consequences of agricultural activities 
on water quality. 
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Awareness for sustainable land use is largely lacking among farmers. 
Agricultural extension services should inform farmers directly about 
eco-systemic interdependencies.  
3.2.2 Legal provisions on the protection of water quality 
The new Water Code considerably strengthens the protection of water 
quality. The introduction of ecological provisions was one of the big 
points at issue during the Code’s two-year preparation period. This dispute 
reflects the general cleavage between classic ‘vodniki’ (supply-oriented 
water managers) and ecologists. While the former emphasize the good 
water quality in Kyrgyzstan and the existence of standards, even though 
some of these standards date from Soviet times, the latter point to local 
problems and complaints from the Kazakh neighbors about polluted water 
in the Chu river. In the end, the Code introduced several new provisions 
designed to protect water quality. It, for instance, assigned to the MEES 
the right to define “maximum limit values for the discharge of pollutants 
and wastes to water bodies” (Art. 51). The same article reintroduced pro-
visions for the treatment of sewage and waste prior to their discharge into 
water bodies.  
Furthermore, the future State Water Administration is authorized to spec-
ify water protection areas and regulate economic activities in these areas, 
the purpose being to minimize the diffusion of pollutants into ground 
water sources. In addition, water protection zones will be created adjacent 
to or near water flows; these will have relatively strict provisions govern-
ing their permitted use. In these areas livestock farming, the use of pesti-
cides and fertilizers, the storage, processing, or disposal of waste, con-
struction activities, and specified industrial activities will be prohibited.  
According to an expert from the Kyrgyz NGO ‘Sustainable Use of Natural 
Resources,’ the MEES and Kyrgyz environmentalists were not completely 
satisfied with the Code, although they do accept it. Thus the crucial point 
will be its implementation. 
Enforcement 
Despite the considerable improvements brought about by the new Water 
Code, ecological questions still remain no more than weakly embedded in 
Kyrgyz water management. Due to lack of awareness as well as insuffi-
Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
German Development Institute 79 
cient monitoring capacities and procedures, it will prove difficult to im-
plement the ambitious legislation.  
Under the new Water Code, ecological competencies remain split up be-
tween several state bodies, in particular the State Water Administration, 
the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations, and the State Sani-
tarian and Epidemiological Body. Bearing in mind the agricultural bias of 
the current DWM, it seems probable that enforcement of rules will remain 
problematic. For the relatively powerless MEES, “it is hard to make peo-
ple follow the standards,” as one employee pointed out.  
The general problem of enforcement of rules by the government also ap-
plies with regard to water legislation. It is common, for instance, to avoid 
fines for water pollution by bribing the relevant officials. Thus informal 
regulations play an important role in that they obstruct the implementation 
and enforcement of many provisions of the legislation, and are thus also an 
impediment to IWRM.  
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
With regard to the existence of legal provisions for the protection of water 
quality, the following recommendation is key. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Consistently apply 
enforcement mechanisms. 
To reduce the gap between legislation and implementation, the exist-
ing mechanisms designed to punish infringements of legal provisions 
(e. g. fines) should be consistently applied and, if necessary, tough-
ened up. 
3.2.3 Monitoring of water quality 
There is a considerable lack of information on water quality resulting from 
insufficient monitoring capacities for irrigation canals, and especially at 
the farm level. There is also no monitoring of the inputs farmers use and 
the way they use them. For rivers, the situation seems to be better. Ac-
cording to a specialist from the DWM, river water quality is measured 
three times each season. However, the major problem involved in moni-
toring water quality is the progressive deterioration of monitoring stations 
and equipment due to lack of funds. The pure number of functioning 
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monitoring stations went down from 1,478 in Soviet times to a current 
number of 542, according to an expert from the Institute of Water Prob-
lems. This decrease by almost two thirds is mainly due to a lack of the 
financial means needed for their maintenance. 
An additional problem is that monitoring is done by several organizations. 
In general, the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations is in charge 
of securing good water quality. But monitoring is also conducted by the 
Inspection Department within the MAWMPI. In addition, both the Gidro-
met agency and two other research institutes in Bishkek collect data on 
water quality. There seems to be very little communication between these 
organizations, and this makes it difficult to make proper use of the data. In 
particular, the research institutes need to sell their data, and this constitutes 
an obstacle to their use by ministries, which are generally short of funds.  
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
Monitoring, a basis for assuring a good water quality, needs to be substan-
tially strengthened in Kyrgyz water management. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Improve the coopera-
tion between the DWM (i. e. the future State Water Administra-
tion), the MEES, and research organizations to ensure that the 
data are used in the political process. 
The current separation between spheres of responsibility of monitor-
ing organizations reduces their effectiveness. The ministries involved 
should be able to buy the necessary data from research organizations 
or have the possibility to access them free of charge. 
— Recommendation to international donors: Support the rehabilitation 
of monitoring capacities for water quality at all levels. 
Monitoring, a central aspect involved in ensuring good water quality, 
needs to strengthen substantially on the technical side. If IWRM is 
taken seriously, water quality monitoring capacities will be seen as a 
basis for integrating eco-systemic interdependencies into water man-
agement. 
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3.3 Water-land interaction 
One important component of ecological integration must be seen in efforts 
to pay due heed to the interaction between water and land use. A common 
problem of water-land interaction is soil degradation, and erosion, water-
logging, and salinization are its most widespread symptoms. According to 
IWRM, prevention measures are essential to avoid these ecological prob-
lems, which have a very negative impact, especially on agricultural pro-
duction. 
In traveling through the rural landscape of Kyrgyzstan, one gets the im-
pression that a large part of Kyrgyzstan’s arable land is affected by soil 
degradation. However, this impression cannot be verified on the basis of 
current and reliable data, a fact due to a lack of monitoring of environ-
mental problems in Kyrgyzstan. The existing data appear to underestimate 
the seriousness of the situation. According to the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE), only about 7 % of irrigated land is 
affected by soil erosion (2000, 115). Yet other sources, including 
interviewed experts, estimate that up to 75 % of all agricultural land suffers 
from different degrees of erosion (International Fund for the Aral Sea 2003). 
The national report on the state of the environment states that already in 
1990 10 % of irrigated arable land was salinized, and 20 % of the total area 
of Kyrgyzstan was affected by degradation of soils and vegetation (Kyrgyz 
Republic/Ministry of National Environment Protection 2000). 
According to experts from the Kyrgyz organization ‘Central Asian Moun-
tain Partnership’ (CAMP), the intensity of the above-mentioned indica-
tions on agricultural land differs from one field location to another. Based 
on the data collected, we can distinguish three zones: 
— In lowlands with a very high groundwater level, waterlogging and 
salinization are pressing problems. 
— Few problems occur in the middle stream area of rivers and canals. In 
the areas covered by our research, the most fertile fields are situated 
in this zone. 
— In slope lands situated in the upstream areas of rivers and canals, the 
groundwater level is generally deep. Erosion is the most pressing 
problem in this zone, while waterlogging and salinization do not oc-
cur. 
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In the Kyrgyz context, soil degradation is mainly related to unsuitable land 
use practices. In most cases, such practices lead to a significant reduction 
of yields or even to total crop failure. As a consequence, revenues from 
agriculture decline and become highly unreliable. This is one of the rea-
sons why Kyrgyz farmers have recently tended to invest more in livestock 
breeding, which in turn leads to overgrazing of pastures and thus to further 
soil degradation. 
An expert from the Kyrgyz Institute for Irrigation explained that the 
above-described problems in water-land interaction have existed since the 
introduction of large irrigation systems in Soviet times. This legacy is the 
reason for the present alarming situation. It is for this reason that the fol-
lowing assessment of water-land interaction as regards IWRM goes be-
yond a mere investigation of the status quo, analyzing whether water 
managers are taking initiatives to prevent waterlogging, salinization, and 
erosion. 
3.3.1 Waterlogging and salinization 
All actors involved in Kyrgyz water management perceive waterlogging as 
the most pressing ecological problem. According to an expert from 
International Water Management Institute (IWMI) Tashkent, on average 
about 15 % of the arable land in the Ferghana Valley is waterlogged.1  
The most important causes of waterlogging are inadequate irrigation and 
drainage practices. In Kyrgyzstan, surface irrigation by controlled flooding 
or furrow irrigation is the most common watering practice. It involves 
excessive water consumption compared with more efficient irrigation 
practices. In addition, surface irrigation encourages topsoil erosion and 
nutrient leaching, both of which result in reduced soil fertility. During 
Soviet times, sprinkler irrigation was a common technique, but nowadays, 
only a very small portion of irrigated land is equipped with this technique. 
This is due to the fact that the sprinkler systems were adapted to the large 
                                                          
1  Waterlogging occurs when the groundwater level rises, and this has negative impacts on 
plant growth and yields. Only complicated rehabilitation work can reverse the process 
of waterlogging, especially when reeds have started to grow on the surfaces affected. 
Waterlogging moreover contributes to the contamination of wells and corrosion of 
building foundations. 
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farm structure introduced in Soviet times. They are unsuited for the small, 
fragmented land plots which have developed since the land reform. Wa-
terlogging is often exacerbated by water losses, which are due to the bad 
state of the existing irrigation infrastructure (damaged canals, earthen 
canals). 
The practice of flooding fields implicitly requires adequate drainage to 
conserve soil quality and avoid waterlogging and salinization. Drainage is 
especially indispensable in arid climates such as in Central Asia, where 
high evaporation promotes the accumulation of minerals and salts in 
topsoils. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) estimates for 
Kyrgyzstan that more than two thirds of irrigated areas are in need of 
drainage. In practice, however, only a small portion, about 14 %, of irri-
gated land is equipped with appropriate drainage facilities. The most 
common practice is surface drainage through ditches and trenches. Subsur-
face drainage also exists, but it is less frequent and often broken down 
since it involves more complex structures and higher costs (FAO 
AQUASTAT 1997). 
The final result of waterlogging may be salinization. Kyrgyz soils gener-
ally feature high contents of mineral salts. These are mobilized by irriga-
tion water and transported to the topsoil through evaporation, especially 
when groundwater levels are high. Frequently, the water used for irrigation 
is already saline, and this leads to further accumulation of salt in the soils. 
The consequence for agriculture is crop damage and reduced yields. In 
extreme cases, agricultural production becomes impossible, a situation 
which, fortunately, is by far less worrying here than in Uzbekistan or 
Turkmenistan. In Kyrgyzstan, 13 % of soils are affected by salinization, 
compared to 50 % and 96 % in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, respectively 
(Bucknall et al. 2003, 9). One remedy for salinization is the practice of 
leaching the affected soils by applying large volumes of water. Leaching is 
not always successful, depending again on the salt content of the water, 
and it furthermore leads to an excessive increase in water consumption. 
Initiatives to reduce overwatering 
One useful countermeasure to prevent waterlogging and salinization is to 
reduce water use in agriculture. This presupposes availability of detailed 
information of water needs of soils and crops. Yet almost everywhere in 
Kyrgyzstan, farmers and water managers continue to use standards dating 
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from early Soviet times, even though during the past 50 years, the situation 
of soils and especially groundwater has changed. The Soviet norms were 
developed for the state and collective farm structure with fields of over 
500 ha. Different norms are needed for the current farming structure, with 
its small land plots. 
In one of the WUAs investigated – it is located in the south of Kyrgyzstan 
– a new system of irrigation standards is being developed. ‘Farm pass-
ports’ have been introduced, containing data about water and fertilizer 
needs of specific soils. This optimization has led to an increase in yields 
by more that 20 %. Additionally, an effective means of erosion prevention 
has been devised. Furthermore, farmers are advised by water managers on 
how much water they should use. These practices led to a reduction of 
water use by 37.5 % between 2002 and 2004 (Masumov 2005, 7). The 
WUA described has received special support as a pilot WUA of the 
Ferghana IWRM Project, and it can therefore not be regarded as a typical 
example of Kyrgyz WUAs. A more ‘realistic’ situation was found in a 
WUA in Batken Oblast whose managers and staff are aware that different 
watering norms should be used for different soil types. Here, the develop-
ment of new standards failed for lack of financial means and know-how. 
The main constraint regarding the gathering of information that might help 
to prevent waterlogging and salinization is, according to specialists from 
the Agrarian University, the fact that the necessary data are very compre-
hensive and thus difficult and expensive to collect. In spite of these diffi-
culties, Kyrgyz research institutes, such as the Institute of Irrigation or the 
Institute of Water Problems (both situated in Bishkek), have started to 
develop databases and maps containing most of the needed data. Unfortu-
nately, the will and/or the financial means to make use of these data does 
not exist, either in governmental water management organizations or in 
NGOs or WUAs. As a consequence, the institutes themselves are now 
suffering from financial constraints, which are a threat to the continuation 
of their research. 
Another promising approach to reducing water losses and thus also the 
problems linked to water-land interaction is canal rehabilitation, which is 
financed by several donor programs. These programs give credits only to 
WUAs that are quite ‘advanced’ according to donor criteria because of 
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their assumed higher creditworthiness.2 In regions where WUAs have only 
recently been created and donor credits are therefore not available, canal 
rehabilitation often fails because of lack of financial means. Furthermore, 
there were reports of cases where agreement was reached with WUAs that 
only parts of canals would be rehabilitated, because this reduced borrow-
ing requirements, and thus also repayment rates. This approach of course 
conforms neither to IWRM principles nor to the former engineering ap-
proach to water management (cf. Box 1). 
The existing drainage systems were constructed during Soviet times to 
meet the needs of huge state and collective farms. They are not adapted to 
the fragmented peasant farm structure that has developed since independ-
ence. On average, drains are in even worse condition than supply canals. 
Many of them are not sufficiently deep or are congested by sediments or 
reeds (Bucknall et al. 2003, 5 f.). An increasing length of canals is 
reported to be no longer operational at all (UNECE 2000, 76). 
Nevertheless, in some WUAs the importance of drainage systems has 
already been recognized. But unfortunately, in many cases the 
rehabilitation of drainage infrastructure fails for lack of financial means, a 
situation which is supposed to be alleviated by the donor-financed 
rehabilitation projects. 
High speed of the land reform process 
Another factor contributing to aggravating the problem of waterlogging 
and salinization in Kyrgyzstan was the high speed of the land reform pro- 
cess. In the great rush no one thought of involving hydro-technicians in the 
process. This has led to a difficult situation for water managers, since the 
land plots next to the canals, which were to serve as repair banks, have 
been distributed to farmers in the course of the land reform process. To-
day, the land concerned is cultivated, and the canals are no longer accessi-
ble for maintenance work. 
                                                          
2  The World Bank has identified seven milestones to assess the functioning of WUAs. 
They comprise (1) the WUA establishment, including legal registration and bank 
account, (2) recruitment of WUA staff, (3) preparation and approval of an operation and 
maintenance (O&M) plan, (4) payment of O&M costs and ISF, (5) identification of 
alternatives for rehabilitation, (6) selection of an alternative for rehabilitation, and (7) 
majority vote for rehabilitation measures and application for a credit (Johnson III / 
Stoutjesdijik / Djailobayev 2002).  
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In the same context, another problem arises from the fact that the irrigation 
and drainage infrastructure has only recently been transferred to the own-
ership of WUAs. This led to a feeling of non-responsibility during the time 
prior to transfer, often resulting in the destruction of the drainage systems. 
Instead, people often preferred using the land to cultivate crops. When 
irrigation and drainage systems were finally transferred to the ownership 
of WUAs, they in some cases refused to accept them. The main reasons 
are first the high maintenance costs and second the fact that WUAs are 
sometimes not aware of the need for drainage systems. 
Lack of know-how  
According to most of the interviewees, local irrigation management suffers 
from a serious lack of know-how regarding irrigation techniques and water 
needs of soils and crops. Many farmers appear to tolerate the progressive 
salinization and waterlogging of their plots, as they tend to overirrigate 
and do not maintain or rehabilitate adequate drainage facilities. Possible 
explanations include lack of knowledge about water-land interaction, and 
economic constraints. The problem is aggravated by the fact that even 
WUA managers and mirabs are not always specialists in their field and 
thus not always able to fulfill their duty in providing farmers with infor-
mation and advice on irrigation techniques and water needs. 
Several interviewees stated that in the south of Kyrgyzstan agricultural 
expertise is far better founded than in the north. The reasons for this are 
land scarcity and the resulting need to cultivate in more intensive ways as 
well as a longer tradition of agriculture in the south. Also, the farmers in 
the south seem to be more interested in training programs, as stated by an 
expert from an NGO in Osh: “In general, farmers in the south have at-
tended more training than northern farmers. […] People are interested in 
water-saving technologies even, if they do in general not have problems or 
little problems with water scarcity.” 
These different levels of knowledge in north and south Kyrgyzstan are 
confirmed by answers given by farmers regarding irrigation techniques: In 
Osh and Batken Oblasts, the information was much more detailed and 
proved to be better rooted in knowledge than the information given by 
farmers in Chui Oblast. 
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Training measures 
Knowledge deficits are addressed in the trainings provided to WUAs. 
However, rehabilitation measures concentrate mainly on water supply 
infrastructure, and ecological questions play only a minor role in WUA 
trainings. This weakness has been recognized by the World Bank, which 
has started to develop training materials for WSUs concerning environ-
mental questions. Trainings designed to increase farmer’s knowledge of 
water-land interaction were mentioned only in some rare cases, and such 
information seems at present to be provided only by a few NGOs. In this 
context, one representative from an NGO mentioned a high level of moti-
vation of farmers during the off-season, a potential that could help to over-
come the knowledge gap. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Increase farmers’ 
interest in maintaining the long-term productivity of their land. 
Efforts to develop a land market should be stepped up, as this moti-
vates farmers to invest in the fertility of their soils, even if they do not 
intend to cultivate their land themselves in the long run. Additionally, 
it is necessary for the Kyrgyz government to support the ayil okmotus 
in providing farmers occupying canal repair banks with equivalent 
replacement land plots. 
— Recommendation to WSUs and donors: Provide training for farm-
ers and water managers about water-land interaction and irriga-
tion techniques. 
Considering the serious lack of know-how, training for farmers and 
water managers about environmental issues and irrigation techniques 
is absolutely necessary. The sustainability of agriculture can only be 
ensured if proper heed is paid to water-land interaction. The most ap-
propriate approach seems to be training for trainers. In Osh Oblast, 
NGOs like RDC-Elet have started trainings for WUAs concerning 
sustainable land use and prevention of erosion, waterlogging and 
salinization. They should be further encouraged, i. e. by integrating 
their activities into existing donor programs. 
— Recommendation to WUAs: Increase water fees for water users, 
and require them to participate more in terms of labor. 
 Elke Herrfahrdt et al. 
88 German Development Institute 
Lack of financial means at all levels of the water management hierar-
chy is the most pressing constraint impeding the rehabilitation of the 
irrigation infrastructure. Since the government as well as the WUAs 
are highly indebted, the only way to overcome the financial con-
straints that are obstructing canal and drainage rehabilitation is 
greater participation of water users in terms of labor and cash. The 
fact that water fees are too low even aggravates the problem of over-
irrigation, because it induces people to use too much water. Raising 
water fees might thus have the positive side effect of reducing water 
use. 
3.3.2 Soil erosion 
In mountainous countries like the Kyrgyz Republic, steep terrain encour-
ages soil erosion caused by the rapid flow of (irrigation) water. Livestock 
breeding, especially in the mountainous regions, has contributed to the 
degradation of grasslands as well as to deforestation. In the areas under 
consideration here, the slope land in the upstream zones is used as pas-
tures. According to an expert from CAMP, 70–80 % of the pastures in 
Kyrgyzstan are affected by soil degradation, due to overgrazing. In most 
of the villages under consideration, the hilly upstream areas and lower 
mountainous zones are clear of bushes and trees. On these bleak slopes, 
landslides pose a considerable risk. In recent years, this most dangerous 
form of erosion occurred both in the north and in the south of Kyrgyzstan, 
claiming human lives, destroying the livelihoods of entire villages and 
threatening industrial sites. Tailings of uranium mines in particular can 
turn into serious threats to human health and the ecosystem, if nearby 
rivers are blocked by mudslides, leading to flooding of radioactive waste.3 
According to several interviewees, erosion and overgrazing already oc-
curred during Soviet times. Although livestock numbers have decreased 
since 1991, on average the status of the pastures situated in the surround-
ings of human settlements has not improved. This is due to the fact that 
farmers tend to concentrate livestock around the villages, a practice that 
seriously overstrains the land’s carrying capacity. Only rich farmers can 
                                                          
3  This nearly happened when, on 13 April 2005, a landslide carrying 300,000 m3 of mud 
came down near Mailuu-Suu in Jalal Abad Oblast and almost damaged a nearby 
uranium tailing (Khamidov 2005, 2).  
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afford to transfer their livestock to pastures higher in the mountains, where 
the livestock density is lower. According to the national environment re-
port, 
“(…) at present, due to sharp reduction of cattle on distant and remote 
pastures, the process of natural rehabilitation has begun. However, on 
pastures located close to residential settlements the process of degra-
dation is going on” (Kyrgyz Republic/Ministry of National Environ-
ment Protection 2000).  
Furthermore, erosion by irrigation water leads to a loss of fertile topsoil 
and therefore has a negative impact on plant growth and productivity. 
Additionally, it impairs soil stability, which leads to further and deeper 
erosion. Although the irrigated land in Kyrgyzstan is located almost en-
tirely in relatively flat areas of valleys and basins, the prevailing practices 
of surface irrigation are stimulating topsoil erosion. 
Erosion brings with it increased sediment loads in rivers, which constitutes 
a severe problem for irrigation infrastructure in downstream areas. Some 
farmers complain that irrigation water does not reach their fields because 
sediments block the canals. Besides this, removal of the soil cover of fields 
dissolves salts, fertilizers, and other agrochemicals contained in it. Via the 
drainage systems they are transported back to the rivers. This adds to the 
above-described problems concerning water quality (cf. 3.2.1). 
Lack of problem awareness 
The ‘Agrarian Policy Concept of the Kyrgyz Republic to 2010’ makes soil 
erosion a subject of discussion: 
“The most actual problem is land degradation. At present about 100 
thousand ha of land are outside of agricultural activity. Extraction of 
nutritive components from the soil exceeds by four times their 
application along with fertilizers. Reclamation systems are declining, 
areas of soil corrosion are increasing” (Kyrgyz Republic 2004a, 12).  
But, unfortunately, the new Water Code lacks a clear statement concerning 
promotion of measures to prevent erosion. This gives a first hint as to the 
existing lack of problem awareness regarding the interaction between 
water and land use. This assumption is reinforced by the fact that the gov-
ernmental officials interviewed only rarely mentioned water-land interac-
tion. A clear statement underlining this impression was made by an expert 
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from IWMI Tashkent: “The loss of soil and the deepening erosion is not 
perceived as a problem by the authorities even though the soil is their 
major productive resource.” As a consequence, neither reforestation 
measures nor initiatives to decrease livestock density were encountered in 
the surroundings of the villages covered by the present study. 
At local level, due to a lack of training and education campaigns, both 
WUAs and farmers are not aware of the causes and consequences of soil 
erosion. Again, in the north of Kyrgyzstan, farmers are less aware of the 
problems related to water-land interaction than in the south of the country, 
an observation that tallies with the different levels of knowledge on farm-
ing issues already referred to. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the MAWMPI, MEES, and ayil okmotus: Re-
duce the number of livestock or intensify livestock breeding and 
take reforestation measures. 
For the hilly upstream zone, it is strongly recommended to reduce the 
number of livestock, and to launch a program of reforestation. The 
ayil okmotus should think about introducing fees for the use of pas-
tures around the villages, in order to encourage farmers to use the 
pastures in the mountains, which are still intact. Another solution 
would be an intensification of livestock breeding. First signs of a 
change of farmer preferences towards fodder crop production have al-
ready been noted. 
— Recommendation to WSU / WUAs / NGOs: Launch awareness 
raising campaigns. 
In order to raise the problem awareness of water users, it would be 
important to launch measures such as sensitization campaigns 
through local radio or flyers. Water-land interaction could be inte-
grated into school and university curricula. Additionally, all training 
programs for Kyrgyz water managers should be enlarged to include 
an awareness-raising component. 
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4 Sectoral integration 
The aim of this chapter is to analyze Kyrgyz water management with re-
gard to sectoral integration, the second pillar of the IWRM Pyramid. Sec-
toral integration is the objective of IWRM, maximization of societal 
benefit through internalization of existing externalities. These may occur 
as ecological externalities (e. g. in the form of unsustainable water use 
patterns, cf. 4.1), as economic externalities (e. g. unjustified subsidies, cf. 
4.2), and as social externalities (e. g. neglect of the poverty and health 
impacts of water management, cf. 4.3).  
4.1 … of ecological externalities 
In order to bring water management into line with IWRM, water managers 
need to take into account eco-systemic interdependencies such as up-
stream-downstream linkages, both water quantity and water quality, and 
interactions between water and land resources. The preceding chapter has 
analyzed the extent to which this ‘ecological integration’ has already been 
realized in Kyrgyz water management. Yet the answer to this question tells 
us nothing about the objectives of Kyrgyz water management, since eco-
logical integration, as defined above, could also be justified by purely 
economic considerations – safeguarding soil productivity, for instance. 
However, IWRM demands that the entire set of societal preferences be 
integrated into water management. Besides economic and social progress, 
societal preferences could e. g. also include safeguarding nature as an 
objective of its own. Good water governance should make inclusion of this 
objective possible by ensuring that ‘ecological externalities’ of human 
water use are taken into account. In line with this reasoning, the degree to 
which Kyrgyz water management integrates ecological externalities will 
be analyzed. 
4.1.1 Legal responses to environmental problems 
The challenges raised by nature conservation and the global environmental 
discourse have led to the incorporation of environmental provisions into 
Kyrgyzstan’s new water legislation. However, analyzed in detail, en-
forcement regulation turns out to be weak, and provisions for environ-
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mental protection are driven more by an economic rationale than by a 
concern for nature itself. 
Conservation of nature is enshrined as a prime objective in the new Water 
Code. Article 1 states:  
“This Code shall regulate water relations in the area of use, protection 
and development of water resources for guaranteed, adequate and safe 
supply of water to the citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic, for the protection 
of the environment and the promotion of the rational development of 
the country’s water fund” (emphasis by the authors). 
Reflecting the importance of this objective, about a fourth of the Code’s 
99 articles explicitly address environmental concerns. Most interestingly, 
Article 64 contains a minimum ecological flow requirement, a key demand 
of environmentalists regarding basin management. Other articles deal with 
the MEES’s competencies in Kyrgyz water management (Art. 12), pollu-
tion permits (Art. 49f.), and the creation of different types of water protec-
tion areas (Art. 65f.). 
However, the legislative framework for translating these ecological provi-
sions into practice is in some ways underdeveloped: 
“The Kyrgyz legislation in the area of protection and rational use of 
water resources envisages low amounts of fines and suits for violation 
of the established norms, as well as payment for discharge of pollutants 
into water objects, which does not compensate for the real costs of the 
organization [of] sewage water cleaning measures, and does not 
stimulate water users to change their attitude or introduce clean tech-
nologies” (Development Gateway 2005). 
It will prove to be a challenge to realize the stated objectives of nature 
conservation with the aid of legal provisions for enforcement that pre-date 
the new Water Code. As these regulations are more concrete and thus 
more relevant for everyday water management, they may prevail in prac-
tice over the more programmatic Code. 
In addition, the new Water Code’s environmental provisions appear not 
always to be driven by a genuine interest in nature conservation. Instead, 
economic and public health concerns seem to be the driving forces. For 
instance, the “health of fish stocks” (Kyrgyz Republic 2005, Art. 64) is the 
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first rationale to be named for the ecological flow requirement.4 Further-
more, the preliminary list of water use priorities to be respected by the 
future Basin Water Plans completely omits nature as a legitimate water 
user (Art. 24). Despite the thrust of the declaration in Article 1 of the new 
Water Code, environmental protection thus appears to seen rather as an 
instrumental means for advancing economic or social aims. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
To improve the water-related legislative and regulatory provisions for the 
conservation of nature, the following initiatives could be taken: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh): 
Amend the new Water Code in order to grant nature conserva-
tion even higher priority. 
Although environmental concerns feature prominently in several 
rather general articles of the new Water Code, they are not adequately 
reflected in its more detailed provisions. More emphasis on environ-
mental concerns should be used to make it clear that nature conserva-
tion is a value as such. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and the Kyrgyz Parlia-
ment: Improve enforcement mechanisms for environmental pro-
tection. 
The spirit of the new Water Code will be difficult to translate into re-
ality as long as mechanisms for enforcing environmental provisions 
remain basically toothless. Regulations on fines and accountability as 
well as practical monitoring and control thus need to be strengthened. 
4.1.2 Nature conservation in practice 
The instrumental approach towards environmental protection is also re-
flected in practical decisions of water managers. For instance, the Issyk 
Kul regional development plan – regarded as exemplary by the water ad-
ministration – embraces environmental concerns solely in order to safe-
guard the region’s potential as an important tourist destination. Whether 
the environment would matter in the absence of a sizable economic moti-
                                                          
4  For a critical comment on this issue, cf. Siganshina (2005, 6). 
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vation is rather questionable. Corresponding to this order of priorities, 
water managers no longer ensure minimum ecological flows in natural 
water courses as soon as it becomes technically feasible to abstract more 
water for agriculture. Sometimes, 100 % of the available water flow is 
used for irrigation purposes, causing whole rivers to run dry.  
Integration of environmental externalities into water management is fur-
ther complicated by organizational insufficiencies, as already observed in 
relation to water quality aspects (cf. 3.2.1). In general, the gap between 
legal provisions and the reality on the ground is considerable, since or-
ganizational monitoring and enforcement capacities are lacking. Severe 
lack of funds has led to a worrying decay of water quality monitoring, a 
large proportion of measurement stations being out of use now. The new 
Water Code, however, foresees the creation of a State Water Cadastre 
containing information on water quality and quantity of surface and un-
derground waters (Art. 94) as well as a State Ameliorative Cadastre with 
information on soil degradation (Art. 95). As far as enforcement is con-
cerned, the new Water Code puts particular emphasis on water inspection 
(Art. 88f.). But it remains to be seen whether and to what extent the newly 
created water inspections will be able to fulfill their role (Amankanov / 
Bekturova 2005). 
In addition, responsibilities for water-related ecological questions are 
marked by overlaps, the MEES, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of 
Geology, Gidromet, and the DWM being the main institutions concerned. 
Initiatives conceived to pull together the corresponding responsibilities 
under the new State Water Administration have failed, and it remains to be 
seen whether the new coordinating bodies (the National and Basin Water 
Councils) will succeed in overcoming departmental egoisms. Furthermore, 
most ministries seem to focus on micro-management, i. e. to lack a strate-
gic perspective. Their missions thus run the risk of being lost sight of, and 
everyday decisions are disconnected from agreed-upon national policy, 
which appears to be more favorable towards the conservation of nature. 
Lack of pressure from donors does not contribute to changing this situa-
tion: Although the international lending institutions engaged in the Kyrgyz 
water sector do not completely neglect ecological questions, they do not 
put particular emphasis on nature conservation either. Donor definitions of 
sustainability are biased towards economic sustainability. According to an 
employee of the MEES, “ecological problems figure only in the last place 
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in their list of priorities.” Like the Kyrgyz administration, donors appear 
to lack a strategic vision, focusing instead on the practical implementation 
of their projects. However, it should be obvious that recovery of irrigated 
agriculture, assisted by donor-financed rehabilitation measures, will have 
decisive impacts on the environment both in Kyrgyzstan and downstream 
countries.5  
The general order of priorities in Kyrgyz water management – denying 
nature the status of a legitimate water user – is understandable in view of 
the economic hardship presently endured by Kyrgyzstan’s population. The 
current approach may reflect society’s actual preferences: Ecology is still 
secondary in public discourse, although ecology classes have been intro-
duced at university, and donors have initiated awareness-raising cam-
paigns covering water-related ecological aspects (notably with the well-
known slogan ‘Water is life’). 
However, the neglect of ecological concerns contradicts the principle of 
sustainable development, since today’s (in)action could irrevocably dam-
age Kyrgyzstan’s ecosystem. Thus future Kyrgyz generations – possibly 
placing more value on nature – may no longer be able to satisfy their spe-
cific preferences. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In consideration of the preceding assessment, the following actions could 
be undertaken in order to better integrate ecological externalities into Kyr-
gyz water management: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Enable the MEES to 
strategically mainstream environmental protection throughout 
Kyrgyz water policy. 
Since responsibility for water-related environmental issues will not be 
transferred completely to the new State Water Administration, all 
further ecological competencies regarding water management should 
be concentrated within the MEES. This would help overcome the 
                                                          
5  Most rehabilitation projects aim at water saving, which induces positive environmental 
effects if the water saved is used to augment the natural flow of rivers. However, this 
water can also be used to open up new agricultural lands. Moreover, a dynamic recovery 
of Kyrgyz agriculture will cause the use of agro-chemicals to increase again, and it is 
thus a threat to water quality.  
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parallel structure which currently hampers the up-scaling of environ-
mental concerns in Kyrgyz water management. The ministry should 
also be strengthened and focused on strategic policy formulation to 
enable it to assure that due attention is given to environmental con-
cerns by the National and Basin Water Councils as well as by the new 
State Water Administration. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Increase the influence 
of economic actors with a particular interest in a healthy ecosys-
tem – such as the tourist industry – in policy-making bodies. 
As long as Kyrgyz society does not consider the conservation of na-
ture as an objective of its own, sustained interest in protecting the en-
vironment can nevertheless be articulated by economic actors that 
heavily rely on a beautiful landscape, clean water, etc. The tourist 
sector could be a key actor in this regard. Thus care should be taken 
to ensure that tourism is sufficiently represented in the governing 
bodies to be set up under the new Water Code, in particular in the 
National and Basin Water Councils. 
— Recommendation to donors: Grant higher priority to ecological 
considerations in irrigation rehabilitation projects and political 
conditionality. 
As international donors finance most of the rehabilitation work 
undertaken in Kyrgyzstan, their influence on Kyrgyz water manage-
ment cannot be overestimated. Due to the dependence of the Kyrgyz 
government on international funds, donor leverage on national policy 
formulation is also considerable. Donors should use this factual influ-
ence in a responsible manner, trying to convince and enable the Kyr-
gyz authorities to give more consideration to ecological externalities 
in water management. 
4.2 … of economic externalities 
This section deals with the question of whether and to what extent Kyrgyz 
water management contributes to or contravenes economic efficiency. 
Both water allocation between irrigation and other economic uses and the 
cost structure of irrigation service provision will be scrutinized. 
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4.2.1 Inclusive water allocation 
Economic water use 
In Kyrgyzstan total water consumption amounts to about 9 km³/year, ap-
proximately 2 km³/year less than the country is entitled to consume ac-
cording to regional agreements (UNECE 2000, 74).6 This total amount is 
shared very unequally between different economic sectors. The latest data 
from the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee indicate that agriculture 
accounts for 95 % of total water consumption, whereas industrial and 
domestic water uses claim only 3 % and 2 %, respectively (Kyrgyz Re-
public/National Statistical Committee 2004b, 16–17). Domestic water 
consumption seems to have risen in recent years, by about 25 %, espe-
cially in the capital Bishkek and other urban centers (UNECE 2000, 74 f.). 
The countrywide rehabilitation projects on rural water supply infrastruc-
ture, financed by the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), contribute to increasing access to drinking water outside the cities. 
Industrial water consumption declined by almost 80 % between 1991 and 
1998, reflecting the general deindustrialization process in Kyrgyzstan. It 
can, however, be assumed that industrial water consumption will increase 
again in the years to come as a result of economic recovery.  
It should be noted that the numbers cited on water consumption do not 
include water use for hydropower generation, as the latter is non-con-
sumptive. Energy generation has become a key concern in Kyrgyz water 
management since external supply with gas and coal grew expensive and 
barter agreements with downstream countries (water for coal and gas) 
became unreliable following independence. With its storage capacity of 
19.5 km3, the Toktogul reservoir on the Naryn River provides the lion’s 
share (97 %, according to Antipova et al. 2002, 506) of Kyrgyz hydro-
power. While this and other Kyrgyz reservoirs were constructed primarily 
to serve agriculture in downstream countries, their flow regime has pro-
                                                          
6  For 2003, the Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee records total water consumption of 
7.55 km³ (Kyrgyz Republic/National Statistical Committee 2004b, 15). All these 
numbers are highly unreliable, however, as measurement is wholly inadequate. 
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gressively been turned towards the satisfaction of domestic energy demand 
since the dismantling of the Soviet Union.7  
Allocation mechanisms and problems 
As mentioned above, power generation has become a major concern for 
water management in Kyrgyzstan. As regards absolute distribution, there 
is no competition between hydropower generation and other water uses, 
since the former is not water-consuming. However, competition over rela-
tive distribution – seasonal distribution of water flow – is a key issue in 
Central Asia. Irrigation requires that reservoirs release water during the 
crop-growing season, i. e. in summer, whereas electricity demand peaks in 
winter, i. e. in the non-cropping season. While this conflict dominates 
‘hydropolitics’ between Kyrgyzstan and its downstream neighbors, in the 
Kyrgyz Republic priority is clearly given to power generation. Responsi-
bility for the regulation of the Naryn River, the source of most of Kyr-
gyzstan’s hydropower, is with the Ministry of Energy. In addition, the 
hydropower-producing companies, legally private entities but in public 
ownership, directly address their requests for additional water releases to 
the country’s first vice prime minister. This priority granted to electricity 
production in the management of the big reservoirs results from the fact 
that energy is more politicized than irrigation in Kyrgyzstan. In addition, 
the negative consequences on agriculture barely affect Kyrgyz farmers, 
since absolute water scarcity in summer (and winter flooding) mostly 
occur in downstream countries. 
Industrial users need to address the DWM or its decentralized branches, 
the OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes, for water allocation if they do not 
have wells of their own. The DWM, however, is exclusively focused on 
irrigation. This is underlined by the fact that the OblVodKhozes and Ray-
VodKhozes comprise own melioration units, which are responsible for 
monitoring the quality of cultivated soils. They also host the WSUs, which 
deal exclusively with improving agricultural water management. However, 
                                                          
7  Following independence, the Toktogul reservoir’s releases for power generation in non-
vegetation periods rose from 2.8 km3 to 8.5 km3 (Antipova et al. 2002, 507). The 
increased winter releases from Kyrgyz reservoirs cause severe flooding problems in 
downstream Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These problems were discussed intensively in 
spring 2005 (cf. The Times of Central Asia 2005a and 2005b). For a general discussion 
of the region’s water conflicts, cf. ICG (2002). 
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competition between agricultural and industrial water uses seems to play 
only a minor role in Kyrgyzstan, as industrial water consumption has 
fallen to negligible amounts.  
Provision of households with drinking water is separate from this system, 
since drinking water is (or ought to be) taken from different sources, 
mainly from groundwater. The former central organ responsible for man-
aging rural drinking water supply, the Kyrgyz Ayil Suu (KAS), has been 
dissolved and replaced by the Department of Rural Water Supply, which 
focuses on policy-making. Responsibility for the management of individ-
ual drinking water systems has been transferred to Drinking Water Unions 
(DWUs), which are patterned on the model of WUAs. Urban drinking 
water is supplied by municipal service providers, legally private compa-
nies but for the most part owned by the state. 
Despite the usual separation of drinking and irrigation water systems and 
the negligible amounts of water consumed by households compared to 
agriculture8, conflicts between both sectors do occur locally. The existing 
rural drinking water systems were set up during the 1970s and 1980s for 
drinking and firefighting purposes. However, due to the deterioration of 
irrigation infrastructure after independence, farmers in some places started 
abstracting drinking water for irrigation purposes. Current drinking water 
supply rehabilitation projects thus face fierce resistance from farmers 
when the DWUs attempt to take back boreholes or pipes. Since rehabilita-
tion, water theft for agricultural use has occurred occasionally, threatening 
the sustainability of drinking water schemes. 
These problems result from lack of enforcement of property rights and of 
coordination of donor projects in drinking water supply and irrigation 
water supply. As rehabilitation measures are not undertaken simultane-
ously, there is competition between the two uses. In addition, administra-
tive responsibilities for the management of drinking water and irrigation 
water are strictly separate, as described above. While this is unproblematic 
in most cases thanks to the different water sources and separate supply 
                                                          
8  The Department of Rural Water Supply assumes a water consumption of 50 liters per 
capita per day. Consequently, a household composed of five members consumes 91,250 
liters or 91.25 m3 of water per year, whereas one hectare of wheat consumes 5,000 m3 
on average per cropping season. 
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systems, a more integrated approach to water management could be advis-
able wherever linkages between both sectors seem appropriate.9 
Changes induced by the new Water Code 
The new Water Code takes up the challenge of insufficient institutional 
integration of different water use sectors. Although a completely inte-
grated structure of water management with all relevant actors and minis-
tries assembled in one body has been vetoed by the line ministries con-
cerned, the new National Water Council (Art. 9) aims at improving effi-
ciency and transparency of water allocation between different uses. The 
creation of the new State Water Administration (Art. 11), which is sup-
posed to replace the DWM, pursues the same objective. The State Water 
Administration will be independent of the Ministry of Agriculture, to 
which the DWM is currently subordinate, a fact which partly explains its 
focus on irrigation water use. Thus more attention might be given to water 
uses, like tourism, that are at present currently largely neglected. Similar 
inter-sectoral management structures will be created at basin level, with 
the Basin Water Councils (Art. 10). They already exist, on a smaller scale, 
in the IWRM Ferghana Project’s pilot canals, where Canal Water Man-
agement Units (upravleniye kanala) and Canal Water Committees (vodo-
komitet kanala) have been set up. 
However, first experience shows that these new structures still tend to be 
dominated by the old, irrigation-focused water administration from the 
OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes. A water management specialist with 
the IWRM Ferghana Project complained that 
“the Canal Water Management Unit does not feel responsible for water 
supply to other sectors. They care only for irrigated agriculture. In re-
ality, the water is also used for many other purposes such as drinking 
water, for animals etc., and the water managers don’t keep that in 
mind.” 
                                                          
9  Similar problems of lacking inter-sectoral integration can be observed vis-à-vis fishing 
and agriculture, although only anecdotal evidence is available. For instance, people 
using reservoirs for fish farming sometimes release water in order to facilitate their fish 
harvest. This can cause waterlogging on agricultural land downstream. 
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Possible improvements / Recommendations 
Bearing the above assessment in mind, action should be taken to improve 
the integration and coordination of all water-using economic activities in 
Kyrgyz water management: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Create and empower 
the new inter-sectoral management bodies provided for in the 
new Water Code as soon as possible. 
The management structure laid down in the new Water Code (Art. 
9f.) is a promising instrument to achieve better integration of all wa-
ter-using economic activities. However, care has to be taken that the 
implementation of these provisions is not delayed by the recent po-
litical turmoil. It should also be ensured that the National and Basin 
Water Councils’ roles are not limited to merely consultative func-
tions. As there is a certain risk that the new State Water Administra-
tion may take over the agricultural bias from the DWM, special ef-
forts should be addressed at ensuring that all forms of water use are 
equally represented. 
— Recommendation to the ayil okmotus: Take steps to ensure appro-
priate communication and coordination between WUAs and 
DWUs. 
Although the ayil okmotus do not have formal authority over WUAs 
or DWUs, they do hold a key position for all questions of local de-
velopment. Although, in general, it will not be appropriate to merge 
WUAs and DWUs into one structure, a high level of communication 
and coordination between the two is needed in order to avoid prob-
lems such as theft of drinking water for irrigation purposes or pollu-
tion of drinking water by drainage water. The ayil okmotus could 
provide appropriate forums for coordinating irrigation and drinking 
water supply, even though service areas of WUAs and DWUs fre-
quently do not exactly match ayil okmotu boundaries. 
4.2.2 Financial sustainability 
Underfunding of irrigation services 
A general shortage of funds is one of the sector’s key problems, one that 
decreases the economic benefits of irrigated agriculture. Deterioration of 
irrigation infrastructure in particular results from a severe lack of resources 
 Elke Herrfahrdt et al. 
102 German Development Institute 
for maintenance and rehabilitation, severely affecting the productivity of 
irrigated agriculture: Irrigation water is distributed through a complex 
system of reservoirs, diversion works, canals, pumping stations, and water 
control structures, which decayed rapidly following independence. Almost 
all Kyrgyz reservoirs face serious problems of sedimentation, leading to a 
reduction of their storage capacity (UNECE 2000, 72 f.). As regards the 
distribution network, the lower hierarchies within the system have suffered 
the most serious deterioration. An increasing length of canals is reported 
no longer to be operational at all (UNECE 2000, 76).10 In addition, most of 
the secondary and tertiary canals are earthen and not lined with concrete, a 
circumstance that serves to further increase water losses (Koshmatov 
2004, 22). A report by the International Water Management Institute 
(IWMI) estimates that the total losses of primary and secondary canals 
range between 26–45 %, while the subsequent losses at the tertiary level 
can account for up to 50 % of the remaining water (Ul Hassan / Starkloff / 
Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2004, 39). This leads to serious water shortages, 
especially in the tail sections of the system. 
Due to the post-independence economic crisis and the drying up of Soviet-
era transfers to Kyrgyzstan, the government has not been able to maintain 
the former levels of funding. Due to pressing problems in other sectors and 
socially oriented spending priorities (IMF 2005a, 13), less than 2 % of the 
national budget is currently spent on irrigation. These funds are clearly 
insufficient to manage and maintain the irrigation system: Budget alloca-
tions cover only about a third of expenses (World Bank 2004a, 43). Ac-
cording to an expert at the IWRM Ferghana Project, “with state money it is 
not working. Everything is postponed every day.” The government’s fi-
nancial constraints are also decreasing the reliability of budget transfers to 
the DWM’s local branches. One RayVodKhoz employee complained: “The 
problem with the Government money is that it fluctuates and could end 
anytime.” State funding appears to be erratic, provided only in response to 
the most urgent needs: “Governmental money comes only in emergency 
situations such as flooding etc.”, according to the expert quoted above. 
This complicates decentralized budgeting and makes long-term planning 
for infrastructure development by OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes 
impossible. It can further lead to forced inactivity of OblVodKhoz and 
                                                          
10  Since independence, the total capacity of primary and secondary canals has decreased 
by 25 % (Koshmatov 2004, 23). 
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RayVodKhoz staff when even basic inputs required for their work (such as 
electricity, paper, or gasoline) are not available. 
However, this does not mean that the limited amount of public funds 
available for irrigation could not be used more efficiently. In 2004 the 
DWM spent 242 million som (€ 4.6 million). Of this, only about 3.5 million 
som (€ 67,000) were allocated to the central apparatus in Bishkek, all the 
rest going to the OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes (data provided by the 
Ministry of Finance). Except for the resources allocated to the oblast and 
rayon WSUs, which establish and support WUAs, the funds for 
OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes are used to pay the administrative staff 
responsible for water allocation and fee collection as well as for the salaries 
of line staff employed for maintaining and operating the infrastructure 
under oblast and rayon responsibility. It appears that these funds are not 
spent very efficiently, as they are used either for administrative tasks that 
appear in part redundant and could relatively easily be handed over to 
water users’ organizations, or for technical tasks that could be performed 
better and more cheaply by private sector companies. At the same time, 
the DWM itself lacks resources, staff, and thus policy-formulation ca-
pacity. 
International donors, most prominently the World Bank and the ADB, are 
attempting to alleviate this problem of underfunding by providing consid-
erable means for irrigation rehabilitation (cf. Box 11). The World Bank 
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (IRP, US $ 42 million) aims at rehabilitat-
ing the primary and secondary infrastructure. It is currently being phased 
out. The more recent On-farm Irrigation Project (OIP, US $ 26 million) 
targets on-farm infrastructure. Together with the Asian Development Bank’s 
Agriculture Area Development Project (AADP, US $ 36 million), it is 
expected to be completed in 2007. In spite of the considerable amount of 
funds the two institutions have already invested in Kyrgyz irrigation, their 
rehabilitation projects have not been able to cover more than 20–30 % of 
irrigation infrastructure (World Bank 2004a, 42). The World Bank is cur-
rently preparing a new (‘Water Management Improvement’) project, sup-
posed to be launched in 2006, in order to narrow the investment gap and to 
provide further institutional strengthening in line with the new management 
structure. However, it will by no means be sufficient to complete the 
rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure. In any case, the Kyrgyz debt 
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Box 11: Selected donor-financed projects  
World Bank 
Irrigation Rehabilitation Project (IRP), 1998–2005, countrywide  
The objective of the project is to increase the productivity of irrigated agriculture 
through improved water supply. It includes the following components:  
− rehabilitation and/or completion of up to 12 irrigation dams,  
− rehabilitation of sections of primary and secondary irrigation canals, in 
order to improve operational capabilities, and  
− capacity-building for the DWM within the MAWMPI. In the framework of 
the IRP, irrigation infrastructure serving about 300,000 irrigated hectares 
has already been rehabilitated. 
On-Farm Irrigation Project (OIP), 2000–2007, countrywide 
The project aims to promote sustainable water distribution on irrigated land. Its 
components are as follows:  
− support for the establishment, and training of WSUs at all administrative levels, 
− strengthening of the ‘Project Implementation Unit’ established for the 
implementation of the IRP,  
− support for the rehabilitation of on-farm irrigation systems managed by 
WUAs. Priority is given to farms within the area of irrigation systems, 
which have been/will be rehabilitated under the IRP.  
WUAs are expected to repay 25 % of the on-farm irrigation infrastructure reha-
bilitation costs. 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
Agriculture Area Development Project (AADP), 1999–2007, Chui Oblast
The project aims to promote agricultural productivity, thereby increasing 
farmers’ incomes. It is based on four pillars:  
− farm development,  
− drainage and irrigation, including rehabilitation of on- and off-farm infra-
structure and the introduction of new irrigation techniques,  
− development of private sector market and input supply services, and  
− project management.  
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The project addresses the need for capacity building through the provision of 
training to farmers. It aims to enhance farmers’ skills in the field of water and 
land management techniques, soil protection, and water management software. 
The project has also promoted the establishment of WUAs, which are expected 
to repay 25 % of the on-farm irrigation infrastructure rehabilitation costs. 
Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) / IWMI / ICWC 
Integrated Water Resources Management in the Ferghana Valley, 2001–
2005, transboundary 
The main goal of the project is to improve rural population livelihoods by 
demonstrating on a pilot scale the advantages of IWRM. More specifically the 
project aims  
− to establish a new institutional framework for water management through 
the involvement of all relevant stakeholders,  
− to support the formation of WUAs,  
− to build the capacity of water managers at all levels, including at the WUA 
level,  
− to promote the introduction of a legal base, regulating the implementation 
of water management, and  
− to introduce a measurement system, ensuring sustainable and equitable 
water supply.  
A field office and an ICWC ‘Training Center’ in Osh (Kyrgyzstan) have been set 
up to provide support for the implementation of activities in pilot areas. In the 
framework of the project, three pilot WUAs (one in Uzbekistan, one in 
Tajikistan, and one in Kyrgyzstan); a ‘Water User Federation’ in Kyrgyzstan 
(managing the Aravan Akbura Canal); and ‘Canal Committees’ (managing both 
the South Ferghana and Gulya-Kandoz Canals) have been established.  
Source: Various Internet sources 
reduction strategy, adopted on the advice of the IMF in consideration of 
Kyrgyzstan’s already critical debt burden, will not permit the government 
to raise any more loans (IMF 2005a, 16). It must also be kept in mind that 
a considerable amount (almost 45 %; data provided by the European 
Union’s Food Security Program) of the DWM’s budget is already financed 
via direct budget support from the European Union. While these transfers 
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are not supposed to end abruptly, they cannot be relied on indefinitely.11 
As a national program officer with the Swiss-financed Natural Resource 
Management Project stated, the crucial question is “What happens if the 
donors go?” 
Water fees and continued subsidization 
Considering the problem involved in the funding of irrigation services, the 
donors – together with the Kyrgyz Ministry of Finance – have exerted 
pressure for increased financial participation from water end users in order 
to ensure the long-term financial sustainability of irrigation management. 
In fact, the transfer of tertiary infrastructure to WUAs seems to have been 
motivated primarily by these financial considerations. The WUAs are 
supposed to cover their expenses for operating and maintaining the on-
farm infrastructure themselves by levying service fees. However, these 
fees generally appear to be too low (about 1–3 tyiyn/m3 of irrigation wa-
ter), which does not permit payment of proper salaries to WUA employees 
or the purchase of needed equipment. For instance, WUA directors are 
frequently paid no more than 1.000 som (less than 20 euros) per month, 
mirabs much less. The latter also lack basic transport facilities (like bicy-
cles) and other equipment (measurement or communication devices) they 
need to adequately execute their tasks. 
Even before the transfer of tertiary infrastructure to WUAs, regulations at-
tached to the 1994 Law on Water introduced a public irrigation service fee 
(ISF) for water provided by the RayVodKhozes. The ISF currently 
amounts to 3 tyiyn/m3 during the crop-growing season (April–September) 
– with a reduced fee of 1 tyiyn in remote areas like Naryn or Batken 
Oblast – and 1 tyiyn/m3 in the non-cropping season (October–March).12 
This money contributes to the RayVodKhoz budgets and is supposed to 
finance part of their operations and maintenance work. However, it is far 
from sufficient to cover the corresponding costs. As an example, a Ray 
 
 
                                                          
11  In parallel to the increase in outstanding debt, new disbursements have already shown a 
marked downward tendency since 1999 (IMF 2005b, 26). 
12  On national average, total irrigation fees (WUA service fee + ISF) rose from 0.95 
tyiyn/m3 in 2000 to 2.73 tyiyn/m3 in 2001, 2.82 tyiyn/m3 in 2002, 3.28 tyiyn/m3 in 2003 
and 3.81 tyiyn/m3 in 2004 (data received from the Ministry of Finance). 
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Table 2: World Bank estimates of indirect transfers associated with water 
use for irrigation 
Item Unit Current 
transfers 
Hypothetical transfers 
(if all costs were covered and 
the level of ISF maintained) 
Water use for irriga-
tion 
(average water use 
1999–2002) 
Million m3  5,100  5,100 
Unit water cost som/m3  0.06  0.20 
Total DWM budget 
expenditure 
(2003) 
Million som  314,122  1,020,000
Water use payments    
   Unit payment som/m3  0.03  0.03 
   Total assessed  
   payment 
Million som  153.0  153.0 
      less non-
payment 
Million som  34.1  34.1 
   Net payment by 
   farmers 
Million som  118.9  118.9 
Net transfer to 
farmers 
Million som  195,222  901,100
 Million €  3.7  16.8 
Source: Adapted from World Bank (2004a, 44) 
VodKhoz in Chui Oblast receives 5,000 som in ISF annually, while its 
payroll already amounts to 200,000 som. In addition, WUAs are fre-
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quently indebted with RayVodKhozes, further aggravating the underfund-
ing of the latter. 
However, stating that funding for irrigation services is insufficient does 
not mean that public spending should be increased in this sector. In fact, 
the subsidization of irrigation already has questionable consequences in 
Kyrgyzstan, if it is assessed with regard to IWRM. Increasing subsidies 
instead of moving towards cost recovery from beneficiaries would risk 
worsening this situation. 
The World Bank has assessed the level of current transfers to farmers from 
the national budget on the basis of the DWM’s expenses as well as the 
transfers that would be needed to cover all capital and operating costs if 
the current level of ISF was maintained. The results indicate real transfers 
to irrigation of about 200 million som, or € 3.7 million, in 2003. Factoring 
in the roughly 120 million som of beneficiary financial contributions 
through the ISF, Kyrgyz irrigation is still subsidized at more than 60 %.13 
What is more, DWM staff estimates the adequate expenses for operation 
and maintenance at approximately 20 tyiyn/m3.14 This means that real 
transfers would have to increase to more than 900 million som, or € 16.8 
million, annually, if cost recovery were not improved (cf. Table 2). Con-
sidering the financial constraints the Kyrgyz government will continue to 
face in the near future, it is unconceivable that the national budget will be 
able to cover these additional costs. 
Moreover, an increase of public transfers to irrigation is not desirable 
either. According to the Dublin Principles, water supply is to be regarded 
an economic good. This particularly applies to water used for generating 
private economic benefit – like irrigation water – compared to drinking 
                                                          
13  The real amount of transfers is even higher, as the calculations exclude donor loans to 
WUAs. No more than 25 % of the loans are to be paid back by the WUAs themselves, 
the rest being borne by the national budget. In addition, the government – as the lending 
institutions’ direct debtor – is the final guarantor, including the WUAs’ 25 % share. If 
these loans are taken into account, subsidies to irrigated agriculture are nearer to 90 % 
of actual expenses, instead of the 60 % indicated by the World Bank calculations. 
14  The World Bank states that the true costs might be significantly lower, since the 
DWM’s estimates are based on the current structure of irrigation management, not 
accounting for possible improvements in efficiency thanks to the ongoing reforms 
(World Bank 2004a, 44). However, the Ministry of Finance also considers annual 
expenses of one billion som as necessary to finance irrigation services. 
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water, for example. As taxation of agriculture is very light in Kyrgyzstan 
(World Bank 2004a, 43), public financing of irrigation infrastructure can-
not be justified as a possibly more efficient way of providing collective 
goods in the agricultural sector. On the contrary, compared to other eco-
nomic sectors, the transfers represent subsidies to irrigated agriculture as 
such or, more precisely, subsidies to farmers who have access to arable 
land and public irrigation infrastructure. These transfers weaken the gov-
ernment’s ability to finance essential public goods (such as health and 
basic education, a properly functioning juridical system, transport infra-
structure etc.), and social transfers to the poorest segments of the popula-
tion, including smallholders in rural areas.  
Expectations of external help – be it from the government or from donors 
– also undermines water users’ self-initiative. According to a Bishkek-
based legal consultant for water issues, “farmers still hope that the state 
will repair canals, clean canals, care for everything.” Indeed, “the Gov-
ernment should try to solve these problems” is a typical statement heard 
from farmers. Alternatively, people concentrate their efforts on attracting 
funds from donor projects. A survey conducted by the Technical Exten-
sion Service (TES) Center for Agricultural Training and Extension in 
Kadamjay Rayon, Batken Oblast, revealed that almost 30 % of the farmers 
who saw a need for change expected help from donors to promote that 
change (TES 2005, 4–16). Even if it is rational – from the beneficiaries’ 
point of view – to apply for donor funds given the current availability of 
grants and cheap loans, the predominant reliance on external financial 
support risks undermining the development of self-financing and self-
governing structures in the future. 
It has to be underlined, however, that the lack of a coordinated approach 
among donors contributes to this situation: “There is competition and 
sometimes no coordination between donors. Many projects represent a 
waste of money. People are getting spoiled and are only willing to take 
grants,” a donor’s employee noted. United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), for instance, applies rather lax standards for the 
choice of WUAs to be supported in the south – possibly out of political 
considerations (tensions over water and land frequently occur in the south, 
i. e. the Ferghana Valley). The development banks, in contrast, put more 
emphasis on the financial sustainability of irrigation services. For 
example, WUAs have to qualify on a scale of seven ‘milestones’ to 
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receive loans, they are requested to pay back 25 % of the funds received 
within the OIP, and the World Bank’s financial support to the WSUs 
within the OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes is gradually being phased 
out. 
Increasing cost recovery 
In order to end both unjustified subsidies to irrigated agriculture and the 
rent-seeking orientation of water end users, movement towards full cost 
recovery seems imperative. However, this implies additional burdens for 
farmers. Thus the crucial question is whether and how soon farmers will 
be able to bear these costs. On the one hand, when asked directly, many 
farmers already complain about the current level of irrigation fees, which 
they perceive as too high. Raising the ISF 
“would be a catastrophe for us. Everything would break down, because 
farmers could not afford the water, and the deterioration of the infrastruc-
ture would proceed even faster. Then the yields are lower and the profits 
go down. Farmers would not be able to sustain their farms. They would 
abandon them, as it is already happening.” 
On the other hand, quantitative research usually comes to contrasting re-
sults: An IWMI study concludes that, taking into account overall produc-
tivity, farmers could afford to pay cost-covering fees, as long as they are 
able to sell their products (Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 
2004, 31).15 And agricultural output as well as market access have contin-
ued to improve in the course of the last years, including in disadvantaged 
areas (World Bank 2004b). Investigating three WUAs in Batken, the 
above-quoted TES study found that “despite the outstanding importance of 
irrigation water for crop yields, the ISF only makes up generally up to 3 % 
of the crop production costs” (TES 2005, 3–14). In one particularly poor 
Batken WUA, people managed to build a canal with a length of more than 
ten kilometers without any external support, only to avoid water theft 
upstream (cf. Box 14). In order to finance the work, a contribution from 
each benefiting household was collected, indicating some room for in-
creasing irrigation fees even in this region. In general, experts tend to 
believe that irrigation water supply is economically profitable in Kyr-
                                                          
15  An additional study commissioned by the Asian Development Bank is to be published 
in late 2005. 
Water governance in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector 
German Development Institute 111 
gyzstan and could thus become financially self-sustaining over the long 
run. 
However, cost recovery should be aimed for not at the aggregate level but 
with a view to differences in the real supply costs of the respective irriga-
tion systems. Up to now, tariffication is unitary: 3 tyiyn per cubic meter, 
with the exception of reduced fees for disadvantaged areas and the non-
cropping season. Thus the effective subsidization inherent in this fee 
structure is uneven, being higher for less efficient irrigation systems and 
lower for more efficient irrigation systems. If fees were increased towards 
cost-covering levels, a unitary fee structure would lead to considerable 
cross-subsidization from better performing irrigation systems to more 
poorly performing irrigation systems. This would decrease economic effi-
ciency by slowing down the reallocation of factors of production as a 
function of relative benefits. Thus donors have been demanding a differ-
entiation of the fee structure according to real supply costs. Consequently, 
cost-covering fee levels have been calculated for 20 pilot irrigation 
schemes until September 2005. A differentiated fee structure is to be in-
troduced in 2006.  
Most difficulties in moving towards cost recovery appear to result from 
the persistent reluctance of farmers to pay, a situation, though, which may 
be changing. Mind change vis-à-vis the costs of water services has only 
just begun, and the non-payment of water fees is not always consistently 
sanctioned by cutting water supply.16 Problems also exist concerning the 
time and regularity of payments. Some WUAs try to collect the money in 
advance or at least after every watering, others receive monthly payments 
or perhaps only two or three installments per year. The bulk of the fees is 
paid in late summer and autumn after the harvest, when farmers have most 
cash. 
It seems that the unsatisfactory reliability of water services decreases 
farmers’ willingness to pay. Due to past underfunding, the infrastructure is 
in such a bad state that irrigation water is not always delivered in time, or 
even not delivered at all. Thus farmers are not willing to pay the fees that 
                                                          
16  WUA staff may be reluctant to fully cut water supply, not only for social considerations, 
but also because they need to collect the total amount of fees fixed in the annual 
contract with the RayVodKhoz. If mirabs do not cut water supply, they may still be able 
to collect the fees after the debtor’s next harvest.  
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would be needed precisely to improve irrigation services (cf. Figure 8). In 
addition, the poorest farmers may face real difficulties in paying, in par-
ticular those who have only small land plots (cf. 4.3 for a discussion of 
social aspects). 
In spite of this, fee collection is already improving, as the farmers´ will-
ingness and ability to pay increase step by step. In the Chui Oblast, for 
example, 65 % of all fees were collected by WUAs in 2001, 74 % in 2002, 
99 % in 2003, and 105 % in 2004, and farmers as well as WUAs were 
starting to repay their debts.17 This seems to be a general tendency 
throughout the country, although the persistence of payments in kind de-
                                                          
17  These – indeed very positive – numbers are based on interviews. Other sources indicate 
lower rates. For instance, Alymbaeva specifies a 53 % total average collection rate for 
WUAs (quoted in Sehring 2005, 31). However, data obtained in southern rayons 
indicate a general tendency towards rising collection rates. 
Figure 8: Vicious circle in Kyrgyz irrigation services 
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preciates the value of fees collected. In 2004, on national average, 60 % of 
total fees (ISF and WUA fees together) were paid in kind, 30 % in cash, 
and 10 % in labor (data received from the Ministry of Finance).18 Yet in-
kind payments are decreasing as well as market access improves, and 
donors are pressuring for fee collection in cash. In sum, WUAs will need 
additional time until they become financially viable. WUA federations 
cannot be expected to be financially self-sustaining right from the begin-
ning either. But within the next 15–20 years, chances are good that cost 
recovery – at least at tertiary and secondary levels of the irrigation system 
– can be achieved. 
A further problem involved in achieving financial sustainability for Kyr-
gyz irrigation services are the high taxes to which WUAs are subject. They 
have to pay taxes on profits, on wages, a special tax to the MEES as well 
as contributions to the social fund. In addition, WUAs pay a local tax and 
a road tax to the ayil okmotus. In particular the profit tax is difficult to 
justify, as – according to the law of 2002 – WUAs are non-profit organi-
zations.19 However, an early tax exemption expired in 1999, and needed 
changes in the Tax Code have not been made. This significantly under-
mines the capacity of WUAs to become financially self-sustaining. 
Kyrgyz policy makers are generally convinced that there is no alternative 
to moving further towards cost recovery. However, the March ‘Revolu-
tion’ may slow down the pace of reform. Since it was mostly the rural 
poor who participated in the events (ICG 2005, 12), one might expect 
growing reluctance on the side of the new government to further reform 
steps that would additionally burden farmers. The government might adopt 
                                                          
18  Thus WUA and RayVodKhoz employees frequently receive part of their salary in kind 
(sometimes even in form of reduced water fees for their own fields). This is likely to 
decrease staff motivation, further diminishing efficiency of irrigation management. For 
some time, the persistence of in-kind payments seems to have been partly motivated by 
rent-seeking on the part of water officials: Originally fees from water end users were 
collected in cash. WUA managers then converted these funds into products at market 
prices, which were significantly below the official equivalents for in-kind payments. 
Fees to the RayVodKhozes were paid with these products. The rents gained from this 
mechanism seem to have been shared across the water management hierarchy. Losses in 
the form of bad infrastructure were borne by the water end users. 
19  WUAs do not distribute profits to their members. In conceptual terms, it would not 
make sense either to transfer irrigation water supply to profit organizations, as the canal 
system automatically creates constellations of natural monopolies. 
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a more populist policy to avoid new civil unrest emanating from rural 
areas. The donors could also become more conciliatory towards the new 
government in order not to destabilize the country further. However, first 
indications do not support these expectations: The new government has 
explicitly confirmed the former government’s pledges to donors. The latter 
are also sticking with their earlier conditionalities, while deliberate non-
compliance by the Kyrgyz government is difficult to imagine considering 
its dependence on international funds. However, the continuing replace-
ment of staff within the Kyrgyz administration (Freitag-Wirminghaus 
2005, 10) will decrease the government’s ability to implement agreed-
upon reforms in a timely manner. Finally, according to the new Water 
Code (Art. 48), the Kyrgyz Parliament (Jogorku Kenesh) will have to 
confirm ISF increases on request by the DWM. Thus deputies could slow 
down the reform process in the water sector, as happened with the adop-
tion of the new Water Code in the past. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In consideration of the key challenges identified above, the following 
actions should be adopted to improve the financial sustainability of Kyr-
gyz irrigation management: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Move further towards 
full-cost pricing of irrigation water supply. 
Increased cost recovery is without realistic alternative in the Kyrgyz 
irrigation sector if water provision is to be improved. While farmers 
frequently oppose fee increases – as would be expected – they suffer 
even more from unreliable water supply. The government is and will 
not be able to bear the necessary capital and operational expenses. In 
addition, it is difficult to justify why the national budget should sub-
sidize an economic sector that is supposed to be one of the main pil-
lars of the Kyrgyz economy.20 Thus the real issue is not if but how 
fast water user fees should be increased. ISF should be augmented 
slowly to really set a strong incentive to save irrigation water and use 
efficiently the quantities abstracted. It can be assumed that the ISF is 
the best trigger for such a development as it could also lead to private 
investment in small-scale water-saving infrastructure at farm level. In 
                                                          
20  Agriculture accounts for more than 35 % of the country’s GDP as well as for slightly 
more than half of its labor force (IMF 2005b, 4 and 16). 
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consideration of continuing agricultural growth in Kyrgyzstan,21 
chances are good that farmers will soon be able and increasingly 
willing to bear a larger share of water supply costs. One possibility is 
also the introduction of progressive fees that would require large con-
sumers to pay more than small peasant farmers. However, special 
care should be taken to avoid social hardship for the poorest segments 
of farmers (cf. 4.3.1). 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and donors: Focus sup-
port for agriculture on improving farms’ profitability in order to 
demonstrate that increased irrigation fees can be more than off-
set by increased profits. 
Realization of the full economic potential of Kyrgyz agriculture is 
hampered not only by bad irrigation services but also by insufficient 
availability of other inputs (fertilizer, pesticides, high-quality seeds, 
veterinary services, etc.) and know-how. Further improving access to 
output markets offers some potential for increasing farm profitability 
as well. Thus support programs for improving agriculture’s institu-
tional and market environment, including demand-oriented extension 
services, might ease the burden of increased tariffs for farmers and 
strengthen their ability and willingness to pay: “Focused programs to 
improve crop production and marketing among emerging WUAs 
would provide strong support for increasing water fees, and help to 
demonstrate that the increased costs of an improved irrigation system 
can be more than offset by the benefits” (World Bank 2004a, 45–46). 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and donors: Continue 
supporting the rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure in order 
to facilitate its transfer to users. 
As the transfer of irrigation infrastructure to water users’ organiza-
tions (WUAs and future WUA federations) is slowed down by its 
general state of disrepair, continued support for infrastructure reha-
bilitation is needed. This will also help to break the vicious circle of 
irrigation services. Preferably, donors should provide funds in the 
form of grants, as the government’s debt burden has already reached 
critical levels. WUAs that receive funds for infrastructure rehabilita-
tion should nevertheless be asked to pay back (part of) the funds re-
                                                          
21  It is too early to predict the exact economic consequences of the revolutionary events of 
March 2005. Until now, negative fallout has been limited. In addition, possible negative 
effects are likely to affect urban services much more than agriculture. 
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ceived. This money could then be used to set up a ‘National Irrigation 
Rehabilitation Fund’ that would provide rehabilitation loans to further 
WUAs. Donors and water managers at all levels should also encour-
age the introduction of new water-saving irrigation techniques. Eco-
nomic incentives such as tax deductions or reduced water fees could 
be a strong stimulus for private water users to invest in such meas-
ures.  
4.3 … of social externalities 
According to IWRM, water management has to integrate not only ecologi-
cal and economic externalities but also the social implications it may have. 
This includes consequences of water management for poverty and human 
health, but also for issues like gender relations and conflict resolution.  
4.3.1 Poverty 
Thanks to a rapidly growing economy, the Kyrgyz poverty headcount 
index has decreased rapidly in recent years, from 52 % in 2000 to an esti-
mated 35 % in 2004 (IMF 2005a, 5–7). However, extreme poverty contin-
ues to be a concern in Kyrgyzstan. Rural areas are especially poor, with a 
poverty headcount significantly above the national average (World Bank 
2004a, 31, cf. Box 12).22 Considering the predominance of agriculture in 
the rural economy, irrigation management thus has a particular importance 
for the incidence of poverty in these areas (Bucknall et al. 2003, iii f.): 
“The highest indices of extreme poverty can be found in those areas that 
have suffered severe soil degradation and water shortages. This shows 
that there is a direct link between improved water management (especially 
at the local level), poverty reduction and sustainable development” (Spoor 
2004, 37).  
Potential positive consequences of the ongoing reforms in Kyrgyz irriga-
tion management on the incidence of rural poverty include a more reliable 
provision of irrigation water to poor farmers. Better irrigation services 
could enable them to increase their yields and to take higher risks to im-
prove the profitability of their farms. Second-order effects on rural poverty 
                                                          
22  70 % of the Kyrgyz poor live in rural areas (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2005, 4). 
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could emanate from the general upswing of the rural economy resulting 
from increased overall productivity of irrigated agriculture: As the poorest 
of the poor have only small land plots and therefore depend on additional 
income to secure their food supply (World Bank 2004a, 34), they will gain 
significantly from additional job creation in on- or off-farm activities. 
Risks of exacerbated poverty, in contrast, could result from increased ISF 
and WUA fees on the one hand and the factual discrimination of poor 
farmers in decentralized water management on the other. Although it 
seems both unavoidable and desirable to raise water fees (ISF and WUA 
service fees) to cost-covering levels in the long run, a key question is how 
best to mitigate social hardships for poor farmers. Currently, there is no 
 
Box 12: Causes and consequences of rural poverty in Kyrgyzstan 
Extreme poverty among farmers mainly results from lack of agricultural knowl-
edge, low food prices, high input costs, and still underdeveloped (even though 
improving) markets. The cultivation of profitable cash crops in particular de-
mands a higher range of inputs like fertilizer, pesticides, and machinery, which 
many poor farmers cannot afford. Also, poor farmers are not able to upgrade 
their farming and irrigation knowledge in order to increase yields, because they 
cannot afford the trainings offered by extension services. Thus they miss the 
chance to improve their agricultural knowledge and consequently their income: 
“What farmers grow depends on what they can afford. Poor farmers grow what 
they have grown forever and what they are familiar with. They cannot adjust 
their production to the market. The richer ones are able to grow what is profit-
able and can be sold on the market,” as a WUA director in the north explained. 
Due to these obstacles and a rather risk-adverse approach towards agriculture, the 
poorest tend to remain subsistence farmers. Alternatively, young and middle-
aged men in particular migrate to urban areas, to the capital Bishkek or even to 
neighboring countries (mostly Kazakhstan and Russia) in order to find alternative 
employment. An estimated 600,000 Kyrgyz are working abroad, almost 12 % of 
the country’s population. 
Source: Bucknall et al. (2003, 15–16), own field research  
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differentiation of fees between poor and non-poor farmers as such, the 
only possible exception being the above-mentioned reduced ISF of 1 tyiyn 
in remote areas. This actually constitutes an additional – although badly 
targeted – subsidy to poorer water users, as the poorest segments of farm-
ers tend to be concentrated in these areas. A recent World Bank study 
suggests that subsidization of irrigation services in disadvantaged regions 
could be an appropriate instrument of social policy: “Many areas, how-
ever, appear not to be inherently profitable, and millions of people rely on 
agriculture in these areas. […] This initial analysis indicates that in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, rehabilitation would be cheaper than the simplest option 
for reducing the social tension – providing cash transfers” (World Bank 
2004a, 35). However, this suggestion becomes questionable if the limited 
room for maneuver in the national budget and the ecological externalities 
of a broad and long-term subsidization of irrigation water supply are taken 
into account. Furthermore, additional subsidization of remote areas is 
already scheduled to be phased out when the expected differentiation of 
irrigation fees based on the real supply costs of irrigation schemes comes 
into effect (cf. 4.2.2). 
The poorest farmers already face difficulties in paying their fees in time, 
and sanctions against debtors now increasingly appear to be enforced by 
WUA staff: Allocation of the full amount of water ordered by farmers, and 
especially its timely delivery, is often conditioned on the punctual pay-
ment of water fees. This leads to factual privileges for better-off farmers in 
water allocation. Although kinship ties and respect for elders prevent 
sanctions against debtors from being enforced draconically, the ‘first pay – 
first serve’ principle seems to have gained ground within WUAs. Even 
though debtors normally receive a minimum amount of irrigation water, 
they usually have to wait for their turn until everybody else is served. This 
can be a significant burden for poor farmers: Without sufficient amounts 
of irrigation water, their yields are at risk of declining, diminishing these 
farmers’ chances to escape from poverty. 
Thanks to their financial autonomy, WUAs are free to handle these prob-
lems internally as they deem appropriate. Thus in some WUAs exceptions 
are made for very poor farmers, who enjoy reduced WUA fees. This, how-
ever, risks further diminishing the total budget of the usually cash-strapped 
WUAs. In addition, poor farmers are sometimes granted the right to pay 
their fees in the form of labor. This work has to be carried out in addition 
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to ashar activities – a traditional form of collective work – which are 
compulsory for all WUA members.23 But payments in kind have a limited 
potential to ease financial burdens of poor farmers, as possible tasks are 
mostly limited to earthen, tertiary infrastructure. In contrast, the ISF due to 
the RayVodKhoz can in most cases not be paid in labor, as most work on 
the primary and secondary infrastructure has to be done by specialists with 
heavy machinery. 
Particularly in times of water scarcity, bribery and personal contacts seem 
to play a major role in decisions on water allocation. Generally, mirabs 
have fairly large discretionary powers in the day-to-day allocation of irri-
gation water. Taken together with their extremely low salaries, they are 
vulnerably to bribery. In fact, bribery seems to be a customary tool used to 
gain access to irrigation water. Thus better-off farmers generally have the 
means to gain preferential access to irrigation water: “It is just the elites, 
the ‘crème of the community’, who get water easily, those who have 
enough money. Simple people do not get water this easily,” a group of 
farmers in the south complained. The better-off farmers are also likely to 
be the most influential persons in the local community, adding further to 
their privileged access. In addition, kinship plays an important role in 
water delivery: Family ties with WUA staff can provide guarantees for 
water supply. All these informal mechanisms decrease the transparency of 
allocation decisions and risk contributing further to the disadvantaged 
position of the poor. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
Integration of effects on the incidence of poverty should be a priority for 
decision makers in the Kyrgyz irrigation sector. The following actions 
seem advisable in order to minimize negative social consequences of 
further reforms: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Raise and better tar-
get social transfers in rural areas. 
Cost recovery from the beneficiaries for irrigation services should be 
an aim in the long run (cf. 4.2.2). This will, however, be associated 
with considerable hardship for poor farmers. It is difficult, though, to 
                                                          
23  Only farmers who are able to contribute with machinery to ashar work receive 
reductions in their water fees in return. 
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exempt the latter from (part of) their fees, because this might impair 
the willingness to pay of other farmers. The best long-term solution to 
this problem would be to raise and better target public transfers to the 
poor within the system of social assistance. The European Union is 
currently assisting the Kyrgyz government in reforming the system of 
social transfers in line with this suggestion. As the implementation of 
reforms will take time, however, other solutions have to be found in 
the short run in order to alleviate the payment problems of poor irri-
gation farmers (cf. below).  
— Recommendation to WUAs: Create internal mechanisms of cross-
subsidization.  
Unless the system of social transfers is improved, another – politi-
cally challenging – possibility to support poor farmers would be to 
establish some kind of ‘social fund’ within WUAs in order to exempt 
selected beneficiaries from payments of ISF and WUA service fees. 
This fund would function as a mechanism for cross-subsidization 
from rich to poor farmers and could be introduced individually by 
every WUA. Better-off farmers would pay irrigation fees above sup-
ply costs. These additional funds would then be used to pay the fees 
of poor farmers, thereby avoiding net losses to WUA budgets, which 
would occur if poor farmers received water for free or paid reduced 
fees. In addition, there should be special regulations allowing poor 
farmers to pay their WUA fees in labor (canal cleaning etc.). Clear-
cut criteria for the eligibility of poor farmers for these social mecha-
nisms should be developed by the WUAs.  
— Recommendation to WUA members and Councils: Facilitate the 
smooth functioning of WUAs by increasing salaries and upgrad-
ing equipment of WUA employees with a view to making water 
allocation more transparent and equitable.  
WUA employees and, in consequence, WUA irrigation services suf-
fer from low levels of salaries and insufficient equipment. This un-
dercuts WUA staff motivation and makes mirabs vulnerable to brib-
ery. More rewarding salaries and better equipment (measurement, 
transport, and communication equipment, office space) – both to be 
financed by increased WUA fees – could boost employee motivation 
and thus the quality and equity of water allocation. This would reduce 
discrimination of the poor and decrease the frequency of conflicts 
between water users.  
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— Recommendation the Kyrgyz government and donors: Focus exten-
sion services on poor farmers in order to raise the profitability of 
their farms.  
Agricultural knowledge is concentrated among a limited number of 
people who were educated in Soviet times (former kolkhoz managers, 
hydro-technicians etc.). Poor farmers are mostly those with insuffi-
cient agricultural know-how. To help these farmers improve their ag-
ricultural knowledge, extension services should be further developed 
and focused on the needs of the poorest, e. g. with trainings on the 
cultivation of cash crops. Funds should be made available to subsi-
dize the attendance of poor people at such trainings.  
4.3.2 Health 
The key issue bearing on the interaction of irrigation management and 
human health is drinking water supply. Links between the two sectors 
have gained significance in connection with the degradation of both irri-
gation and drinking water infrastructure since independence. While in the 
cities households have individual taps and drinking water supply is reli-
able, rural piped water supply mostly consists of taps in the streets, which 
tend to break down regularly.  
In the course of the last 15 years, 95 % of rural piped systems have broken 
down, as the now dismantled Kyrgyz Ayil Suu was not able to uphold pre-
vious levels of maintenance and repair. Pumped drinking water supply is 
particularly vulnerable, as power cuts and high electricity costs impede the 
proper functioning of pumps. Thus the rural population is forced to shift to 
other – less secure – sources of drinking water. Accordingly, drinking 
water is often taken from irrigation canals, as the latter are the most readily 
available and accessible source of water.24 
The fact that irrigation water is frequently polluted by drainage water and 
organic pollutants from livestock breeding and human settlements has led 
to a significant increase in gastrointestinal diseases, epidemics of viral 
                                                          
24  However, there are regional differences in rural drinking water supply. The situation 
seems to be better in the north than in the south of the country. Particularly the Chui 
Oblast has relatively better water supply infrastructure. There are piped systems in 
many villages and people are thus less often dependent on irrigation canals for their 
drinking water supply. 
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hepatitis and typhoid fever during recent years (UNECE 2000, 77f.). 
These diseases occur especially in the south of the country, where the 
provision with safe drinking water is worst.  
Besides health problems linked to drinking water, inappropriate irrigation 
techniques also favor the spread of disease vectors. In particular, the inci-
dence of malaria has risen in the south of the country during the last dec-
ade. In addition to the deteriorated public health system, this development 
can be traced back to additional mosquito breeding grounds provided by 
reservoirs and waterlogged areas.  
These interactions between irrigation and public health do not seem to 
receive adequate attention from authorities. At the national level, health 
problems are barely considered by the water administration. Drinking 
water supply in particular does not come in for consideration by the 
DWM, as it was – and continues to be considered – separate from irriga-
tion water supply. Accordingly, the different spheres of water management 
are more or less divided: Drinking water is under the overall responsibility 
of the Ministry of Health, while the DWM is in charge of providing irriga-
tion water. The interconnections between irrigated agriculture, drinking 
water, and health risks thus cannot be taken into account systematically. 
However, this inadequate institutional arrangement has been improved 
with the creation of the Department of Rural Water Supply within the 
MAWMPI, which guides and oversees the donor-funded rehabilitation of 
rural drinking water systems. Still, there tends to be very little commu-
nication or coordination between the ministries and departments concerned 
(cf. 5.1.1).  
This division of labor between the different line ministries and other or-
ganizations involved in the monitoring of water quality and disease control 
thus adds to the obstacles to implementation of IWRM. This is also re-
flected at the regional and local levels: The OblVodKhozes and Ray-
VodKhozes are mainly concerned with delivering water to agricultural 
users. They have no competence regarding health problems. WUAs as 
well are mono-sectoral, exclusively dealing with irrigation water supply 
(Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2004, 18f.; Wegerich 2000, 
16f.). Despite the above-described factual links between drinking water 
and irrigation, WUAs work separately from the newly created Drinking 
Water Unions (DWUs). Water users themselves are sometimes unaware of 
water-health interactions and not informed on how to protect themselves. 
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In addition, neither are concrete initiatives taken nor are there efforts made 
to raise awareness at the local level concerning health impacts of irrigation 
management like the spread of disease vectors due to waterlogging or 
consumption of irrigation water as drinking water.  
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In consideration of the above-mentioned shortcomings in integrating irri-
gation and public health, the following improvements could be made:  
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Put more emphasis on 
health issues in irrigation management by ensuring appropriate 
coordination between the authorities concerned. 
Health aspects of irrigation management are not adequately repre-
sented in decision-making within the DWM and its regional branches, 
thereby contributing to the spread of water-borne diseases. In order to 
improve the integration of health aspects, better cooperation between 
the Ministry of Health, the DWM and the Department of Rural Water 
Supply should be aimed for. One important step in this direction will 
be the formation Water Councils with representatives of all water use 
sectors and concerned authorities, as provided for in the new Water 
Code. 
— Recommendation to ayil okmotus: Raise awareness among the local 
population regarding health aspects of irrigation management. 
Local water managers and water users should be better informed 
about health hazards and risks arising from inappropriate water use. 
Awareness raising could be concentrated on older people and aksa-
kals, because they have the particular leverage needed to change peo-
ples’ minds. Apart from this, the topic of water pollution and water-
borne disease vectors could be included in school and university cur-
ricula. 
4.3.3 Gender 
Social externalities of water management may also arise from gender-
related issues, like the neglect of women’s water needs or the underrepre-
sentation of women in decision-making organs. In rural Kyrgyzstan, there 
has been a considerable rollback in women’s emancipation since the end 
of the Soviet Union (Freitag-Wirminghaus 2005, 2–3). Concerning irriga-
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tion management, water issues are perceived as men’s business. Tradition-
ally, women do not deal with these questions at the farm level. “It is a 
shame for a woman to go out to work in the field and care about the wa-
tering. It is the father who talks to the mirab and cares about the watering 
together with his sons,” as a farmer’s son in the south stated. Usually, 
women engage in irrigation management only if there is no man left in the 
family able to do so. Nevertheless, many women depend on irrigation 
water, as they are responsible for the small garden plots of their families. 
At present, owners of these plots are not regarded as ordinary water users 
and therefore not included in water use plans. As garden plots are mainly 
cultivated by women, they thus seem to be systematically disadvantaged in 
water management. Therefore, it appears that women are frequently re-
sponsible for breaking holes in irrigation canals to irrigate their garden 
plots. 
Looking at women in water management at administrative and WUA 
level, they, if at all, occupy subordinate administrative positions. Most 
often, women are accountants, which is historically rooted, as this was a 
women’s domain in Soviet times. Women are rarely elected as representa-
tives to the general assembly, WUA Council members or even recruited as 
WUA directors. The same applies to WUA membership. Women are un-
derrepresented as WUA members (and even as members of DWUs, al-
though the topic of drinking water is of the highest relevance to their daily 
lives). Usually, household heads become WUA members, a circumstance 
which explains the fact that most female members are widows. 
Although women are generally underrepresented in Kyrgyz water manage-
ment, there is still a considerable divide between the north and in the south 
of the country. In the more ‘Sovietized’ and ‘Russified’ north, one can find 
at least a few female WUA directors (5 directors of 102 in Chui Oblast, 
for example). This is not the case in the south. Here, women are even less 
active and leave water management at all levels almost entirely to men, 
even though they have a huge share in fieldwork. This divide is also rooted 
in different cultural backgrounds: While the originally nomadic north was 
less permeated by Muslim thought, the predominantly Uzbek and tradi-
tionally sedentary south is more rooted in Islam. 
Donor projects also tend to overlook gender issues: Women are in most 
cases neither recognized as a group of stakeholders nor properly involved 
in water management. Components focusing especially on women or 
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measures to encourage their participation are often lacking. Even the 
IWRM Ferghana Project, with IWRM in its project title, has only recently 
begun to think about including gender issues. By contrast, one can find 
many women active in NGOs working in the field of agriculture and water 
management.  
Even though agriculture as such and irrigation management in particular 
are perceived and handled as a men’s task in Kyrgyzstan, it seems not to 
be as difficult to increase the involvement of women as it is in some of the 
more conservative neighboring countries. At least in the north of the 
country, women are often not so much prevented from taking part in water 
management, as they themselves perceive it as being none of their busi-
ness. “Women often say: ´Water is up to men.´” as a representative of 
USAID put it. Men tend to be relatively unemotional about this topic. “It 
is their own choice, they could participate, if they wanted to,” a farmer in 
the north said. Therefore, ‘leaving the path’ and making women participate 
might not be too difficult to accomplish. Once women are persuaded of the 
relevance of their participation, they should be able to make themselves 
heard. In the course of our research, we met women who were quite en-
gaged and emotional on the topic of water management. In places where at 
least some women already participated in WUA general assemblies, they 
proved to be active and outspoken in public, illustrating the potential for 
increased women’s participation.  
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In order to better integrate gender issues into Kyrgyz water management, 
the following measures could be undertaken: 
— Recommendation to donors, ayil okmotus and WUA staff: Increase 
women’s participation in water management. 
Encouraging women to participate in water management has neither 
been on the agenda of donor projects nor have local water admini-
strations or WUA staff taken corresponding initiatives so far. Women 
should, however, participate more actively in order to make their spe-
cific needs heard. Therefore, women’s participation should be in-
cluded in donor programs focusing on the establishment and promo-
tion of WUAs. The gender balance might even become one of the 
‘milestones’ for WUA-formation put forward by the World Bank to 
evaluate WUA performance. WUA staff and ayil okmotus should en-
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courage women to become WUA members and invite them explicitly 
to WUA foundation meetings, general assemblies, etc. 
— Recommendation to WUAs: Integrate garden plots into ordinary 
water allocation procedures. 
Owners of small garden plots – mostly women – should be included 
in water management and become ordinary members of WUAs to en-
sure that their water needs receive consideration to prevent conflicts 
over water stealing. Should this additional number of members over-
burden WUAs, representatives could be elected, as is already prac-
ticed in WUAs in the south of Kyrgyzstan. As full WUA members, 
and in order to strengthen their position within the WUAs, owners of 
garden plots should be fully liable for fees for water abstraction. 
4.3.4 Conflict management 
Negative social externalities of water management are induced by a lack 
of conflict management mechanisms, a circumstance which can lead to 
social unease and escalating tensions. Conflicts occur among farmers, 
between farmers and WUA staff, as well as between WUAs. The reasons 
for conflicts include:  
— Water scarcity, leading to insufficient provision with irrigation water. 
Scarcity mainly occurs in spring, during the first irrigation period, 
and in hot summers, but also when irrigation infrastructure is unable 
to deliver enough water to all farmers due to the opening up of new 
land or disrepair of canals. Lack of coordination of planting patterns 
among neighboring farmers also leads to water scarcity. 
— Water stealing, a widespread tool for gaining access to irrigation 
water in times of water scarcity. “Water theft is so common, that it 
can be described as a local institution itself as it represents a widely 
not confronted rule of behavior” (Sehring 2005, 33). Division points 
are frequently guarded in order to prevent the manipulation of flood-
gates. Water theft most often occurs in lower regions with higher 
population pressure, more users, and less water availability.  
— Unequal water distribution: Both between different WUAs and be-
tween farmers within one WUA, water allocation can be perceived as 
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Box 13: Dispute management organizations and their relevance 
There are different organizations involved in irrigation-related conflict 
management. Formal organizations include the DWM and its regional branches, 
that is the OblVodKhozes and RayVodKhozes, as well as the ayil okmotus. In 
addition, WUAs and their staff play a key role at the local level. Furthermore, there 
are other, ‘traditional’ organizations like the aksakal sotu (court of elders) involved. 
The aksakal sotu does not have any primary responsibility for the management 
of water conflicts. Whether aksakal sotus become active in conflict management 
appears to depend both on the circumstances and on the individual members of 
the courts. The influence of aksakal sotus can be traced back to their moral 
power, which is rooted in traditional deference to elders.  
The RayVodKhoz is not heavily involved in conflict management, even though 
RayVodKhoz staff mostly point to this role when asked directly. In practice, very few 
cases of conflict management by the RayVodKhoz were found. On the contrary, the 
poor performance of RayVodKhozes frequently is itself a cause of conflicts.  
Even though the ayil okmotu is legally not responsible for irrigation, it is widely 
regarded as highly relevant for solving conflicts among water users. Especially in 
drought periods, the ayil okmotu is highly involved in conflict management. 
Farmers address the ayil okmotu and its agriculture and water specialists when 
they are faced with a particular water problem or conflict. Sometimes ayil 
okmotus establish special committees to deal with these issues. The ayil okmotu 
represents a rather neutral instance, able to solve conflicts not only between 
farmers but also between farmers and WUA staff or the RayVodKhoz.  
The WUAs do not at present play an important role in conflict management. 
Their Conflict Resolution Committees, which are supposed to be set up in 
every WUA, do not function properly in most cases, sometimes only existing on 
paper. They are unknown to most farmers, who mainly address the ayil okmotu 
or ayil bashis (village heads) in cases of conflict. Since WUAs are still weak and 
many conflicts occur between farmers and WUA staff, farmers seem as yet 
unwilling to accept a WUA body to settle such conflicts.  
The mirabs are involved in conflict prevention mostly because they are the ones 
farmers address with their water supply problems in the first place. This mainly 
concerns conflicts between different farmers over water. The mirabs may, for 
instance, resolve these problems according to the ‘avran’ method of water 
distribution (cf. 5.3.2). This method appears to be respected by the farmers, as it 
operates along clear criteria. However, mirabs sometimes seem to be reluctant to 
engage in water conflicts, leaving conflict management to the farmers 
themselves. 
Source: Own field research 
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unequal and unjust. Indeed, poor and less influential farmers seem 
frequently to be discriminated, and some WUAs may have preferen-
tial access to water thanks to the upstream location of their service ar-
eas. 
The management of these and other conflicts appears to be problematic in 
many places, making of irrigation management a sensitive area. Arbitrari-
ness regarding conflict resolution, further aggravated by technical con-
straints, exacerbates conflicts. Farmers report that fights flare up when too 
many people queued up waiting for their irrigation turn. Designed for 
sovkhoz and kolkhoz farms, irrigation systems are often technically inca-
pable of delivering agreed-upon amounts of water to small plots. Further-
more, the lack of water measurement devices makes it difficult to resolve 
disputes on the basis of reliable data (Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedink-
hodjaeva 2004, 21; DFID 2003, 3–5). 
While the Law on WUAs explicitly calls for the set-up of Conflict Reso-
lution Committees, formal dispute settlement mechanisms are usually 
absent or inactive (Sehring 2005, 32). In addition to this, farmers often do 
not regard WUAs as organizations capable of resolving water conflicts. 
Various other stakeholders become involved, mainly ayil okmotus and 
aksakal sotus, for lack of conflict management mechanisms within the 
irrigation sector (for an overview of dispute management organizations, cf. 
Box 13). 
However, this rather spontaneous organization of conflict management 
appears to be suboptimal. One key problem is the lack of rule enforce-
ment. The juridical system is supposed to be the last instance for settling 
water conflicts, but it is not accessible for ordinary people. Even if com-
petent bodies take formal decisions, they can still be circumvented by 
bribing water managers or simply by stealing water. The result is a lack of 
trust in the equity and reliability of conflict management, and this in turn 
leads to excessively high transaction costs in conflict resolution. 
Trust is further undermined by the fact that conflict settlement is fre-
quently achieved on the basis of ‘victory’ of one party over the other, an 
approach that does not allow for mutually rewarding win-win solutions. 
Farmers tend to concentrate their efforts on getting enough water for their 
individual fields, regardless of effects on other farmers’ needs. Attempts to 
reaching solutions agreed-upon by consensus are rare. Thus farmers can 
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Box 14: Case study: suboptimal solution to water theft from the 
Nurgaziev canal 
The Nurgaziev canal is part of Kyrgyzstan’s primary irrigation infrastructure, ab-
stracting its water from the Shahimardan river. The latter originates in the 
Kyrgyz Kara-Shoro mountains and runs through Kadamjai Rayon towards the 
Ferghana Valley, where it crosses the border to Uzbekistan. In the course of the 
decentralization process in the Kyrgyz water sector, two WUAs were set up 
within the service area of the Nurgasiev canal, roughly corresponding to the 
territory of upstream ayil okmotu Khalmion on the one hand and the territory of 
downstream ayil okmotu Alga on the other. The former is the bigger (3,120 ha) 
and richer one, whereas Alga is smaller (750 ha) and is faced with more difficult 
agricultural conditions. 
Conflicts over irrigation water seem to constitute a real problem in the service 
area of the Nurgaziev canal. In particular, the inhabitants of Alga ayil okmotu 
have accused the inhabitants of Novgardan village in Khalmion ayil okmotu of 
unsanctioned water abstraction (locals avoid speaking of “water stealing”). Their 
Uzbekistani neighbors – situated just a few hundred meters downhill from the 
Nurgaziev canal near Novgardan village – are also suspected of water stealing. 
The apparent impossibility to solve this problem in a consensual way has led to 
the construction of a second, earthen canal by the inhabitants of Alga ayil okmotu 
in 1999. This canal starts at kilometer 12 of the intake structure and stretches 10 
km parallel to the lined Nurgaziev canal. Water losses from this earthen canal 
amount to more than 40 %, but inhabitants of Alga ayil okmotu regard it as a 
rational solution to the water stealing problems. In their opinion, it is also a cost-
rational way of dealing with the issue, as it makes it possible to save supervision 
staff that would be needed to prevent water stealing on a 24-hour basis. In 
addition, even these expenses would not provide guarantees against water 
stealing, in consideration of recurrent problems involving guard reliability 
(bribery, alcohol abuse etc.). 
This ‘solution’ to water-stealing problems, i. e. the new earthen canal, is 
certainly not an optimal one, as the associated water losses would be avoidable if 
a universally accepted agreement between the affected water users were found. 
Such an agreement would constitute a win-win solution, as total water 
availability along the Nurgaziev canal would increase, thus reducing the problem 
of regular water scarcity Alga already suffers from. However, a supply-side or 
‘physical’ approach towards water provision appears to prevail in the area. 
“Despite existing schedules, receiving water for irrigation means to ’run after the 
water’ and to ‘drive it’ […] to the plot. […] Because of existing and seemingly 
unchangeable power relationships, people prefer infrastructure solutions that 
physically prevent water abstractions and increase the total amount of water” 
(Bichsel 2005, 58). Farmers try to physically ensure their own water supply, 
unwilling to rely on the RayVodKhoz, the upstream WUA, or others. In essence, 
the difficulties in finding a better solution thus seem to arise out of the non-
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reliability of formal institutions (RayVodKhoz, militia, courts) in combination 
with insufficient social capital linking the two ayil okmotus. Both functioning 
legal enforcement mechanisms and inter-community social linkages would 
facilitate the development of trust, which is indispensable for finding and 
implementing common agreements. However, if both formal control mechanisms 
and social capital are lacking, problems involving cheating are difficult to 
overcome and, in consequence, win-win solutions hard to achieve. 
Source: Christine Bichsel, NCCR North-South researcher on local water con-
flicts in Central Asia (personal communication), own field research 
not trust in the future willingness of their neighbors to abide by water 
distribution arrangements. This means that guards frequently have to be 
deployed to control distribution points, which significantly raises the costs 
of conflict settlement. However, even guards do not seem to provide guar-
antees for water supply, since they can be bribed or physically over-
whelmed by competing water users. In consequence, physical solutions to 
conflicts are preferred, even though such ‘solutions’ further raise transac-
tion costs. In one WUA in Batken Oblast, for example, people decided to 
dig a new, costly canal in order to prevent water stealing by others (see 
case study in Box 14). 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
In light of the problems analyzed above, the following recommendations 
can be made for better conflict management in the Kyrgyz irrigation sec-
tor: 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Increase the transpar-
ency of decisions on water allocation at all levels. 
In order to avoid conflicts, the transparency of water management has 
to be assured. This includes clear criteria for water distribution and 
water delivery in times of water scarcity and publication of water 
distribution plans. 
— Recommendation to WUAs and WSUs: Strengthen the WUA Con-
flict Resolution Committees and turn them into the key instance 
for conflict settlement in local irrigation management. 
In order to increase the authority of the Committees and of WUAs in 
general, not only for the farmers but also for the aksakal sotu, some 
aksakals could be included in its staff. In general, the Conflict Reso-
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lution Committees should aim at facilitating consensual agreements 
between the parties with a view to strengthening mutual trust and fa-
cilitating enforcement of decisions, even in absence of a well-per-
forming juridical system. 
5 Regulatory integration 
The following chapter deals with the managerial dimension of IWRM. The 
first part will assess the extent to which the principle of ‘decentralization 
and participation’ has been translated into reality in the Kyrgyz context 
(5.1). The rationale behind this principle is to bring water management 
nearer to the users. The following section will examine the principle of 
‘information and communication,’ which considers the availability of 
adequate data as a central prerequisite for efficient water management 
(5.2). In a last step, the focus lies on aspects regarding ‘demand manage-
ment’ (5.3). The latter constitutes a shift away from the traditional supply-
side perspective to water management aiming at enhancing water use 
efficiency and promoting water-saving behaviors and technologies.  
5.1 Decentralization and participation 
Decentralization requires water management to be organized according to 
the principle of subsidiarity. Achieving an appropriate division of labor 
between different administrative levels requires competencies to be trans-
ferred to the lowest appropriate level. The first part of this section will deal 
with the question of whether and to what extent the principle of subsidiar-
ity has been realized in Kyrgyz water management.  
The main idea underlying the transfer of competencies to the lowest ap-
propriate level is to bring water management nearer to the users. An 
important instrument to reach such an ambitious objective is to strengthen 
bottom-up approaches to water management. The second part will thus 
deal more specifically with questions of Kyrgyz water users’ attitudes 
towards participatory water management and their actual influence on 
decision-making.  
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5.1.1 Division of labor according to the principle of 
subsidiarity 
As Kyrgyz water management is characterized by a multitude of involved 
organizations, it is not always easy to clearly define their respective tasks 
and functions. To gain insight into how Kyrgyz water management actu-
ally works, a closer look will be taken at the functions assigned to the 
different administrative levels, their ability to perform those functions, and 
the relations between them. The analysis will begin with the national level. 
It will then move on to the oblast and rayon levels before dealing in fur-
ther detail with the local level, i. e. with WUAs and other stakeholders.  
National level 
Including the DWM, the currently most important organization dealing 
with water management is the MAWMPI. With water management con-
sidered institutionally as part of agricultural policy, the DWM suffers from 
internal divisions between dominant agricultural experts and less influen-
tial water specialists. Further stakeholders at national level are, inter alia, 
the Ministry of Ecology and Emergency Situations (MEES), the Ministry 
of Health, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Geology, and the State 
Agency for Hydrometeorology (Gidromet). 
At present communication between these organizations is rather deficient. 
The consequences of this situation become manifest, for instance, in the 
relationship between the DWM and the MEES: While the first is responsi-
ble for water abstraction, the second is in charge of regulating water pol-
lution. However, compared to the DWM, the MEES is of minor impor-
tance. The strict separation of tasks and the resulting need for cooperation 
and coordination between both ministries – or more precisely: its lack – 
tend to further marginalize the MEES. The effectiveness of environmental 
protection is therefore at risk of being undermined. 
The general lack of horizontal communication seems to be partly due to 
top-down management traditions inherited from Soviet times. The prob-
lem becomes even more obvious when we take a closer look at the dis-
semination of information between state bodies. Interestingly, Kyrgyz 
water management does not really seem to suffer from a lack of informa-
tion, but rather from an insufficient information transfer between different 
stakeholders. This is well illustrated in the example of two national re-
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search institutes in Bishkek, which produce similar GIS maps on water 
resources and water quality. Both reportedly base their maps on data 
which they receive from the same state employee. Yet none of these maps 
seem to be used by water managers due to their high costs. 
Path dependency in terms of top-down management traditions is also ap-
parent in the Kyrgyz bureaucracy’s tendency towards ‘micro-manage-
ment’. This goes hand in hand with a lack of strategic vision often criti-
cized by international donors, and it can be seen as a result of the weak 
policy-making competencies among the ministries. In contrast, the presi-
dential administration, which acts in parallel to the line ministries, is of 
major importance for decision-making. The fact that even minor decisions 
are apparently taken by the presidential administration is in clear contra-
diction to the principle of subsidiarity. At the same time, the ministries, for 
their part, also tend to interfere in the everyday work of lower administra-
tive levels. 
The description of the division of labor at national level has made clear 
that the principle of subsidiarity is regularly breached. Competencies are 
fragmented and organizations are at the same time powerless and keen to 
control everything. This mixture constitutes a considerable obstacle to the 
realization of a demanding new concept like IWRM. The fact that no 
fewer than seven state bodies are responsible for the management of 
drinking water wells gives an indication of how high transaction costs are 
for water users in their interactions with the state administration. 
Overlapping responsibilities in combination with regulation-free spaces 
are a clear sign for a strong organizational nestedness (i. e. highly compli-
cated organizational structures). Not only does this render water manage-
ment slow and costly, it also makes it difficult for organizations to adapt to 
new ideas. Under such circumstances, the institutional setup is itself be-
coming more and more a reason for change.  
Yet at the national level there is a clearly visible political will to reorgan-
ize water management according to IWRM principles. This is first and 
foremost manifest in the recent adoption of the new Water Code, which 
brings about two major changes in the organizational landscape:  
First, the Code aims at unifying regulatory competencies in one new body, 
namely the State Water Administration. This new body will be the quasi-
successor of the DWM, which has more executive functions and compe-
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tencies at present. The fact that the new State Water Administration will 
be institutionally independent of the agriculture-dominated MAWMPI will 
also prepare the ground for an improved inter-sectoral integration of water 
management. However, doubts remain concerning the effectiveness of the 
new State Water Administration: Due to the resistance of other ministries, 
both monitoring capacities and considerable competencies with regard to 
policy formulation and advice to the different levels of the water admini-
stration will in fact remain within these competing ministries. This brings 
about the risk of a de facto separation between policy formulation and 
execution. 
Second, the new Water Code provides the basis for the introduction of Na-
tional and Basin Water Councils. Their potential for inter-sectoral integra-
tion on the one hand and the realization of the basin approach on the other 
have already been mentioned in previous chapters (cf. 4.2.1). The question 
of whether and how Water Councils will be able to contribute to the reali-
zation of IWRM beyond these aspects is still open.  
Oblast level 
In assessing the role of the OblVodKhozes, two points have to be high-
lighted: First, and most importantly, their competencies remain vague. One 
interviewee stated that: “the oblast level of water administration plays no 
role – only administration with no real functions.” Second, their relation 
to the DWM is strictly hierarchical. It seems that their work is dominated 
by reporting-back mechanisms, with a strong tendency to focus on good 
news – a tendency that donor representatives explain with reference to 
persisting Soviet legacies. 
While located at the top of the information chain on water needs and 
available water quantities, their current functions within the institutional 
setting can at best be described as supervising lower levels of water ad-
ministration and reporting to the uppermost one. The nevertheless existing 
potential of the OblVodKhozes for implementation of IWRM results 
mainly from the fact that they are already working more or less in accor-
dance with hydrological boundaries (cf. 3.1).25 
                                                          
25  It is not clear, whether the recently announced abolition of the oblast level will have 
implications for the future of OblVodKhozes since they have already been renamed and 
reshaped into basin administrations in accordance with the new Water Code.  
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The WSUs within the OblVodKhozes are of particular relevance for the 
decentralization of water management. These special units, which have 
identical counterparts in each RayVodKhoz, assist interested farmers in 
founding WUAs and provide training to WUA management and executive 
bodies. The fact that they are currently financed at a rate of 40 % by the 
World Bank gives them advantages over other departments within the 
OblVodKhoz. The WSUs at oblast level carry out training for three WUAs 
each year, reportedly choosing WUAs from remote areas where the rayon 
WSUs have not yet provided any training.26 
Yet it is not clear what the comparative advantages of the oblast WSUs are 
in comparison to those at rayon level. One employee described the tasks of 
his organization as follows: “Our tasks are mainly the monitoring of the 
rayon WSUs and the regulation of the work of rayon WSUs. Actually we 
do the same work as the rayon WSUs.” This quotation underlines the dif-
ficult position of the OblVodKhozes – between carrying out regulatory and 
executive functions.  
Rayon level 
The relationship between the RayVodKhozes and upper levels of the water 
administration brings to mind a principal-agent constellation. While theo-
retically integrated within a strong hierarchy, with the OblVodKhozes as 
controlling body, RayVodKhozes have considerable room for maneuver: 
As in practice supervision by the OblVodKhozes is rather lax, Ray-
VodKhozes do in fact lack real control from above. This in turn gives their 
staff the opportunity to satisfy particularist interests. At the same time, 
most money is spent at rayon level: Not only do the RayVodKhozes re-
ceive budget transfers from the central government, they also receive ISF 
from water users. Given weak monitoring, it is not astonishing that the 
RayVodKhozes’ budget transparency was frequently mentioned as a major 
problem of Kyrgyz water management.  
Taking a closer look at the relationship between RayVodKhozes and local 
level water management organizations, we find that water users’ lack of 
confidence in, and even their distrust of, the work of the RayVodKhozes 
                                                          
26  The oblast WSUs provide training on nine different topics, including technical 
equipment and infrastructure, engineering, water usage, administration, financial 
management, accounting, and conflict resolution. 
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appear to be the most striking features. The negative attitude of local level 
stakeholders towards the RayVodKhozes can be traced back mainly to 
three factors:  
First, the RayVodKhozes still hold control over strategic pieces of irriga-
tion infrastructure. Yet in the perception of many WUA managers and 
water users, WUAs carry out the lion’s share of the maintenance and reha-
bilitation work. Having taken over numerous tasks previously performed 
by RayVodKhozes, WUAs in fact make the latter obsolete: “The Ray 
VodKhozes date back from Soviet times and after independence this net-
work of institutions stayed the same while [tertiary] infrastructure was 
turned over to WUAs. The RayVodKhozes are still in place with fewer 
tasks to fulfill. Farmers think that there should be only one organization: 
WUAs or RayVodKhozes.”  
Second, retention of the ownership of parts of the irrigation infrastructure 
allows the RayVodKhozes to demand ISF. However, this is in many cases 
considered unfair by water users, who frequently criticize the fact “that 
they have to pay the fee of 3 tyiyn although they might just use one kilo-
meter of rayon canals.” Lack of budget transparency adds to this problem. 
Doubts as to whether the ISF are really used for the maintenance and re-
habilitation of irrigation infrastructure are common.  
Third, being de facto in a subordinate position, WUAs often lack the nec-
essary enforcement power to push the RayVodKhozes to fulfill their duties. 
In one case, for example, according to its contractual obligations, the Ray-
VodKhoz would have had to pay compensation for lost yields, as it was 
unable to supply the amount of water the WUA had applied for. Yet the 
RayVodKhoz simply refused to pay.  
Conflicting interests between RayVodKhozes and WUAs constitute a ma-
jor problem facing Kyrgyz water management. From an outside perspec-
tive, WUA federations are key for resolving this situation. Federating 
WUAs able to manage entire canals on their own and – at the same time – 
dissolving RayVodKhozes would constitute an important shift towards the 
realization of IWRM for two reasons: WUA federations would bring the 
implementation of the principle of hydrological boundaries forward (cf. 
3.1.1), and federations would foster self-management at higher levels of 
the water administration.  
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While international donors are actively pushing for the formation of WUA 
federations, their introduction faces several major obstacles. First, the 
government seems to be rather reluctant to decentralize and privatize a 
further level of water governance that is still dominated by the state ad-
ministration. This is well illustrated in a recent directive issued by the 
DWM, which instructed the only currently existing WUA federation on 
how its charter should be formulated. The DWM’s model of a federation is 
limited to a consultative body acting in collaboration with the Ray 
VodKhozes. It is obvious that merely assigning a consultative role to WUA 
federations would result in a duplication of functions at rayon level. The 
government’s reluctant position is further manifest in the absence of 
provisions on WUA federations in the new Water Code. Despite its overall 
progressiveness, the Code does not deal with this issue at all. It is rather 
unlikely that an amendment to the new Code will be drafted in the near 
future.  
Second, the ambiguous attitude of the RayVodKhozes towards WUA fed-
erations adds to these problems, and at the same time it helps explain the 
central government’s position. Of course – strongly supported by interna-
tional donors, such as the World Bank – the WSUs at rayon level are ac-
tively pushing for the formation of WUA federations. However, other 
departments within the RayVodKhozes do not share this positive percep-
tion, as federations would make the RayVodKhozes obsolete. Abolition of 
the RayVodKhozes would constitute a considerable threat to many of its 
employees. While a transfer of personnel to newly created federations will 
be necessary, it is in any case not a realistic perspective for all of the Ray-
VodKhoz staff.  
Third, the weak performance of many WUAs, which will be outlined be-
low, is a further impediment to the formation of WUA federations. Given 
their financial constraints and organizational weaknesses, it is of para-
mount importance to strengthen existing WUAs prior to the formation of 
WUA federations. In addition, open questions concerning the enforcement 
power of WUA federations will have to be resolved in the future, e. g. the 
basis on which WUA federations should manage conflicts between mem-
ber WUAs.  
New organizations which apparently face less resistance from the state 
administration include the Irrigation and Drainage Commissions at na-
tional, basin, and local level. The new Water Code provides the legal basis 
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for their introduction. If we take a closer look at local level Irrigation and 
Drainage Commissions (which mainly comprise representatives of irriga-
tion water users), it becomes clear why their introduction did not face the 
same resistance as WUA federations: Having monitoring and advising 
functions (Kyrgyz Republic 2005, Art. 79), they merely act as consultative 
bodies to the RayVodKhozes, and thus do not constitute a real threat to the 
latter.  
Water User Associations (WUAs) 
Aiming to overcome highly centralized Soviet water management, the 
Kyrgyz government has undertaken an important step towards decentral-
izing water management by promoting WUAs. Significant efforts have 
been made to transfer not only irrigation infrastructure but also competen-
cies and decision-making power to the local level.  
Although the existence of WUAs might already be taken as evidence that 
management structures have been reorganized according to the principle 
of subsidiarity, it has nevertheless to be questioned whether WUAs are 
currently in a position to carry out the management tasks assigned to them.  
At first sight, in comparison to other Central Asian countries, Kyrgyzstan 
is quite advanced regarding the level of WUA development, i. e. both in 
terms of WUA legislation and the transfer of irrigation infrastructure.  
Despite initial problems, many WUAs have demonstrated significant 
learning ability: By drafting water use plans and distributing water to end 
users, they have step by step taken over tasks previously carried out by the 
RayVodKhozes, which in many areas did not work properly shortly after 
independence.  
Most importantly, WUAs have enhanced the overall efficiency of Kyrgyz 
water management. Confronted with a rapidly increasing number of water 
users following land reform, the RayVodKhozes were overburdened by the 
tasks assigned to them. With the RayVodKhozes no longer having to deal 
with individual water applications, the work of privatized WUAs has sig-
nificantly contributed to the reduction of the transaction costs of the Kyr-
gyz water administration. Efficiency of local water management is further 
enhanced by current WSU initiatives to promote the amalgamation of 
WUAs sharing one canal. In terms of economies of scale, this step pre-
pares the ground for a more rational and effective organization of WUAs, 
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as it goes hand in hand with staff reduction and reportedly also with the 
transfer of RayVodKhoz equipment. 
It is thus not surprising that several interviewees agreed that “WUAs are 
the only way to manage on-farm irrigation systems in Kyrgyzstan” – a 
statement which clearly demonstrates the general acceptance of decentral-
izing water management among the water administration and experts in 
the field of irrigation. By promoting greater security of water provision, 
WUAs also have good chances of increasingly gaining acceptance among 
irrigation farmers.  
However, notwithstanding the potential that Kyrgyz WUAs undoubtedly 
have, experts frequently criticize their poor performance and the fact that 
many WUAs only exist on paper (Chemonics International 2003, 29). 
Before discussing the constraints WUAs face in more detail, it is worth 
briefly recalling two central objectives usually underlying the transfer of 
irrigation management. The aim is first and above all to establish finan-
cially self-reliant water service providers responsible for the operation, 
maintenance, and rehabilitation of the system, which can gradually replace 
the public agency in the management of irrigation systems; a second aim is 
to enhance the transparency and accountability of water management 
(Vermillon / Sagardoy 1999, 19). Yet suffering as they do from financial 
constraints, many WUAs are at risk of failing to perform their tasks in a 
satisfactory way. At the same time, organizational weaknesses are under-
mining the aim of increasing the transparency and accountability of local 
water management.  
As outlined in 4.2.2, the reasons for financial constraints facing WUAs 
must mainly be sought in two factors: the low level of WUA fees, which 
does not adequately reflect the financial needs of the associations, and the 
low willingness of water users to pay fees. Although collection rates have 
improved during the last years, many WUAs are still indebted with the 
RayVodKhozes.  
Lack of financial resources impair the WUAs’ capacity to perform their 
tasks in the following fields: First, lacking the necessary equipment (trans-
port, communication, data processing, excavation equipment etc.), WUAs 
are often unable to adequately operate, maintain, and rehabilitate the irri-
gation systems transferred to them (DFID 2003, 3–5, 10–9 f.; Ul Hassan / 
Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2004, 30). Second, their weak financial 
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basis also negatively impacts the WUAs’ ability to take over all relevant 
infrastructure. If drainage infrastructure is in many cases still in the hands 
of the RayVodKhozes, it is not because the latter are reluctant to transfer it, 
but rather because many WUAs are financially not in a position to main-
tain the drains within their service areas. Third, with salaries generally 
low, WUA management has difficulties in hiring qualified staff. As a 
consequence, WUA staff often lacks the necessary know-how. Sometimes, 
far from being irrigation specialists, it is to be questioned whether WUA 
staff are able to adequately fulfill their duties, such as drafting plans on 
budgets, water use, and operation and maintenance. While WSUs, donors, 
and NGOs aim at bridging this knowledge gap by providing training, fre-
quent staff rotation resulting from low salaries often undermines the sus-
tainability of these efforts.  
Organizational weaknesses seem to be most widespread in remote areas, 
which have been rather neglected with regard to training and capacity 
building. Nevertheless, even WUAs in Chui, the “backyard of the capi-
tal,” and in Osh, one of the most popular regions for pilot projects, suffer 
from weak organizational structures.  
Lack of monitoring mechanisms turns out be the most important deficit. 
Insufficient control not only negatively affects the accountability of WUA 
management and executive bodies but also contributes to the overall poor 
performance of many associations. In combination with the low level of 
salaries, it also prepares the ground for moral hazard and corruption of 
WUA staff, manifest, inter alia, in the misappropriation of money and 
staff vulnerability to bribery (Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 
2004, 33 f.; DFID 2003, 10–6). This in turn brings about the risk of a loss 
of water user confidence in the WUAs’ work (cf. Figure 9).  
In poorly performing WUAs, the WUA Council, which ideally coordinates 
the association’s activities and controls the work of the executive organs, 
is often nonexistent or works poorly. In some associations, there is only a 
head of Council. This is due to a lack of economic incentives, as Council 
members work on a voluntary basis. In addition, the Audit Commissions, 
which should monitor the WUAs’ financial activities, are often not yet 
integrated into the institutional setup of WUAs. However, efforts are cur-
rently being undertaken by the WSUs to strengthen the role of the Coun-
cils and to establish Audit Commissions.  
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As regards the work of mirabs, principal-agent constellations not only 
promote moral hazard, rent seeking, and/or favoritism, they also often 
render water allocation arbitrary and inefficient. Yet some WUAs have 
addressed these problems, i. e. by urging water users to demand receipts 
for each amount paid to mirabs or by introducing a system of mirab rota-
tion.  
Other stakeholders at local level 
Apart from WUAs, several other organizations, which are not primarily in-
volved in water management issues, engage in this field at the local level. 
The interference of these stakeholders in the WUAs’ sphere of responsi-
bility has to be understood as a consequence of the above-described finan-
cial constraints and organizational weaknesses faced by many WUAs. The 
ayil okmotus, ayil bashis, and aksakal sotus lack the legal basis to carry 
out tasks that, ideally, should be in the hands of WUAs.  
At municipal level, the ayil okmotus have a strong stake in water manage-
ment. Providing support and assistance to WUAs in a number of different 
fields, their activities include the following: monitoring the reliability of 
water provision, assistance in water allocation, conflict management, 
provision of equipment, assistance in application procedures for grants, 
and credits and support in coping with debts with the RayVodKhozes (e. g. 
by making ALRF land available to WUAs). In addition, the ayil okmotus 
actively support WUA creation.  
Given the financial constraints the ayil okmotus are themselves facing, the 
question arises, what motivations are underlying their commitment to 
support and assist WUAs. Three aspects are worth mentioning: First, the 
ayil okmotus act as guarantor for credits given to WUAs within the 
framework of the World Bank financed On-farm Irrigation Project and 
have thus understandably a interest in properly performing WUAs. Sec-
ond, agriculture is by far the most important source of income of the rural 
population and thus crucial for the tax generation of the ayil okmotus. 
Third, facing financial and administrative burdens, the ayil okmotus – to 
which irrigation infrastructure was transferred prior to the creation of 
WUAs – are fairly keen on ridding themselves responsibility by pushing 
WUA formation.  
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As recently created or poorly performing WUAs which do not yet meet the 
criteria defined by the World Bank most often lack financial support and 
capacity building, the assistance offered by the ayil okmotus is clearly 
positive. However, the fact that the latter in some cases take over tasks 
assigned to WUAs could lead to an overlap of responsibilities, which in 
the long term entails the risk of negatively impacting the effectiveness of 
local water management in general and of WUAs in particular. 
At village level, the ayil bashis and aksakal sotus are the most important 
stakeholders in water management. While rather insignificant in the north-
ern part of the country, the ayil bashis play an active role in the work of 
southern WUAs. Their tasks range from the collection of fees to assistance 
in drafting water use plans and informing villagers on the work of WUAs 
as well as on decisions taken in WUA general assemblies. Aksakal sotus 
mostly emerge as relevant stakeholders when it comes to the settlement of 
conflicts which many WUAs are unable to deal with given the absence of 
functioning conflict management bodies (cf. 4.3.4).  
As to the motivation of the ayil bashis and aksakal sotus, behavioral fac-
tors seem to be a driving force: The rationale underlying their engagement 
in local water management is to increase social capital “by making own 
actions visible to other people in the village”.  
On the one hand, ayil bashis and aksakal sotus can draw on their social 
capital to either mobilize and inform farmers on WUA meetings or to 
enforce WUA rules and regulations, thereby contributing to the reduction 
of transaction costs of water users. On the other hand, their interference in 
the WUAs’ sphere of responsibility bears the risk of weakening existing 
bodies and hindering the introduction of new bodies.  
Possible Improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and donors: Promote 
the creation of WUA federations. 
As outlined above, among the major problems facing Kyrgyz water 
management are the conflicting interests between RayVodKhozes and 
WUAs. WUA federations are key for resolving this situation. Aiming 
at promoting self-management at higher levels of the water admini-
stration and avoiding duplication of functions, their introduction 
should be strongly supported. Taking into account that the new Water 
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Code does not include any provisions on WUA federations, consid-
eration should be given to amending it.  
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and donors: Create 
perspectives for RayVodKhoz staff.  
As the establishment of WUA federations will make the Ray 
VodKhozes obsolete in the long run, both the government and inter-
national donors should open up new perspectives for RayVodKhoz 
staff. Some staff should be prepared to take over management tasks in 
WUAs and WUA federations. Nevertheless, the work currently per-
formed by the WSUs at rayon level is vital for the functioning of lo-
cal water management organizations. Rayon WSUs should therefore 
not be closed but upgraded by integrating them into the OblVodKho-
zes. Local branches at rayon level should nevertheless be maintained, 
in order to enhance their responsiveness to the needs of WUAs and 
newly created federations. 
— Recommendation to WUAs: Increase WUA fees (cf. 3.3.1).  
With the aim of improving the financial basis of WUAs, WUA Coun-
cils should work for an increase of WUA fees. Higher fees would 
both allow WUAs to carry out operation, maintenance, and rehabili-
tation work more efficiently and enable them to provide the economic 
incentives needed to hire qualified staff, thereby avoiding staff rota-
tion.  
— Recommendation to donors and WSUs: Widen the scope of train-
ings on technical issues and infrastructure.  
In order to compensate the low level of know-how among WUA 
staff, continuous capacity building is of paramount importance. Con-
sideration should therefore be given to widening the scope of already 
existing trainings on technical issues and infrastructure for WUA 
management and executive bodies. Given frequent staff rotation, it 
should be ensured that trainings are provided on a regular basis.  
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government, donors and WSUs: 
Carry out organizational development measures. 
As many WUAs suffer from organizational weaknesses, there is a 
need to carry out organizational development measures to render 
WUAs more efficient and to avoid any interference of other stake-
holders in the WUAs’ sphere of responsibilities. Efforts should par-
ticularly be undertaken in the following fields:  
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— Strengthen and promote monitoring mechanisms. To improve 
the monitoring of the WUAs’ overall activities and the work of 
executive bodies, it is essential to further strengthen the presently 
rather weak role played by the WUA Council and to promote the 
integration of Audit Commissions into the institutional setup of 
WUAs. Current efforts of the WSUs in this regard should be 
strongly supported. Regarding the work of mirabs, the introduc-
tion of control mechanisms should be promoted. Best practices 
should be replicated; these would include e. g. handing out 
money for fees only against receipts as a means of preventing 
misappropriation and rent seeking as well as regular rotation of 
mirabs to avoid favoritism in water allocation. 
— Widen the scope of trainings on managerial issues. Given the 
rather low level of know-how on the part of both WUA manage-
ment and staff, the present study recommends widening the scope 
of trainings on managerial issues for WUA management and its 
executive bodies. Best practices could, inter alia, be drawn from 
a joint project carried out by the GTZ and RDC-Elet in the Bat-
ken Oblast, which aimed at improving data collection and pro- 
cessing on the needs of different water users within the WUA 
service area and at rendering budget management more 
transparent to water users. 
5.1.2 Bottom-up approaches to water management 
With the active promotion of WUAs, the Kyrgyz government has under-
taken an important step towards enhancing the participation of water users 
in local water management. Aiming at enforcing the principle of partici-
pation, the right of water users to participate in the management of water 
resources was enshrined in the 2002 Law on WUAs.  
In addition, the recently adopted new Water Code has significant potential 
to further foster water user participation. Its relevance can be inferred from 
the fact that it provides the legal basis for both Irrigation and Drainage 
Commissions comprising representatives of irrigation water users, and 
Basin Councils in which all relevant stakeholders, including WUA dele-
gates, will be represented (Kyrgyz Republic 2005, Art. 10; Art. 79). The 
new Water Code thus promotes participation even above the local level. 
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However, with water users often not sufficiently involved in management 
decisions in practice, many WUAs are at risk of being mere ‘water supply 
organizations’ rather than real ‘water user associations.’ Yet the idea un-
derlying the IWRM principle of participation is to bring water manage-
ment nearer to users. The following subchapters thus deal with the ques-
tion of whether Kyrgyz WUAs currently meet this aim. The analyses will 
focus on three issues: first, water users’ attitudes towards WUAs, second, 
their willingness to participate, third, the role of information for water 
users’ participation, and fourth, their factual influence on decision-making.  
Water users’ attitudes towards WUAs 
Aiming at explaining farmers’ willingness or lack of willingness to get 
organized in WUAs, interestingly, indicators for both path dependency 
and mind change were found. The north of the country tends to be more 
strongly influenced by Soviet legacies (path dependency). There is a 
general lack of understanding among farmers of why the state no longer 
cares for the rehabilitation of infrastructure and why it no longer provides 
water for free. Under such circumstances, the easiest way to push forward 
the formation of WUAs is to adopt a top-down approach. Indeed, WUA 
creation was promoted more by external actors (such as ayil okmotus, 
RayVodKhozes, WSUs and donors) and/or individuals wishing to access 
external funds than by water users themselves. The question is thus how 
meaningful participation of water users can be realized in regions where 
farmers have not been and are not interested in getting organized in 
WUAs.  
Still, mind change is already taking place among the rural population. 
Several interviewees agreed on the fact that “at the beginning, the intro-
duction of WUAs was a top down process. But now farmers begin to un-
derstand the sense of WUAs.” Seeking to explain this process of mind 
change, the present study identified three main factors: First, social mobi-
lization efforts have been undertaken, first and foremost by WSUs at 
different levels of water administration as well as by donors and NGOs; 
their aim should be to sensitize farmers to the advantages of smoothly 
functioning WUAs. Yet given the top-down approach adopted in Soviet 
times, continuous social mobilization is key to achieving bottom-up forms 
of water management. Second, confronted with an institutional vacuum at 
the local level following the collapse of the Soviet Union, farmers are 
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becoming aware that the government will not take back the responsibility 
for secondary and tertiary irrigation systems. In this vacuum, water man-
agement has in many cases been organized from the bottom. Informal 
WUAs initiated by the farmers themselves were often created shortly after 
independence, in remote areas or in areas where people were discontent 
with water provision by the RayVodKhozes. Third, mind change is closely 
linked to positive experience made with the work of WUAs, e. g. with 
regard to rehabilitation measures, technical developments of irrigation 
infrastructure, and overall improvements regarding water provision. While 
the ability of WUAs to meet water users’ needs is essential for the accep-
tance of WUAs, bad performance due to financial constraints and organ-
izational weaknesses puts many WUAs at risk of loosing water user sup-
port.  
Besides these rather psychological factors which constitute normal prob-
lems facing countries in democratic transition, farmers’ willingness to get 
organized in WUAs depends on three ‘hard factors’: the availability of 
water resources, the state of irrigation infrastructure, and the complexity of 
irrigation infrastructure.  
Water users are more likely to support WUA formation in those regions 
where they face water scarcity. In contrast, in areas with abundant water 
supply (such as in mountainous regions) water users often do not see any 
need for WUAs. The mere prospect of being able to participate in deci-
sion-making on water management is not sufficiently attractive to farmers. 
Often, economic considerations add to farmers’ reluctance to support the 
creation of WUAs, since they fear that fees will rise.  
The deterioration of irrigation infrastructure is clearly a driving force for 
WUA creation, last but not least because WUAs are a prerequisite for 
access to external funds. This is well illustrated by the quite typical state-
ment of a WUA director in the Chui Oblast: “Maybe our territory would 
need no WUA, but we have heard about grants given by the ADB for reha-
bilitating the canals. For receiving such grants the creation of a WUA is 
necessary.” Economic incentives thus act as a central motivation for 
establishing WUAs (Wegerich 2000, 12). Yet this overemphasis on eco-
nomic incentives and technical developments in the process of WUA 
formation reinforces the impression that WUAs are perceived more as 
supply organizations than real water user associations. In addition, the 
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question is what is going to happen when donor projects are phased out 
and external funds are no longer available.  
In areas with complex irrigation networks, people are more likely to sup-
port WUA creation, whereas in areas with less sophisticated networks 
farmers may maintain the canals by themselves. Thus economies of scale 
influence positively the acceptance of WUAs among the rural population. 
When WUA formation from the bottom is supported in areas with water 
scarcity, deteriorated infrastructure, and complex irrigation networks, this 
means a very difficult starting position for such WUAs. This constellation 
on the one hand adds to water users´ expectations for WUA performance 
and on the other hand at the same time increases the risk that these expec-
tations will not be met. This in turn may lead to reluctance to accept this 
new form of water management.  
Water users’ willingness to participate 
With underdeveloped markets and lack of access to agricultural inputs 
constituting the main obstacles to agricultural production, irrigation is 
often not a priority issue for farmers. Understandably, their interest in the 
work of WUAs is thus sometimes limited, especially in areas with abun-
dant water supply (Ul Hassan / Starkloff / Nizamedinkhodjaeva 2004, 34; 
Wegerich 2000, 12f.).  
Consequently, water scarcity, not only in geographical but also in seasonal 
terms, appears to be the driving force for the degree of activity of WUA 
members. Quite a few interviewees pointed out that farmers’ willingness 
to participate tends to be limited to those months of the year where the 
need for water and – consequently – also problems with water delivery are 
most acute. According to one WUA development specialist, lacking 
experience with bottom up approaches to water management, farmers tend 
to look at participation only from a short-term perspective: “The problem 
is that when there is no water, farmers run to get it, but when they have 
enough water they forget about everything connected to water manage-
ment.”  
In terms of water users’ participation, WUAs are more advanced in the 
more water-scarce south (particularly in Osh and Jalalabad Oblasts). With 
a view to explaining these regional differences in further depth, two addi-
tional push factors were identified: First, the speed and the scope of land 
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reform was more far-reaching in the south. Due to private land ownership, 
farmers in the south have developed stronger feelings of ownership for 
their land. Second, and most importantly, land scarcity is more acute in the 
south. Both factors significantly enhance farmers’ interest not only in 
having functioning WUAs on which they depend for production but also 
in participating in WUA decision-making. A study carried out by the TES 
Center in Osh Oblast even reveals that farmers are interested in having 
more participatory forms of WUA organization (TES 2005, 13–2). 
However, strong tendencies towards top-down leadership were found, and 
these impede the involvement of users in the management of water re-
sources. “The former formal rules of top-down approaches have shifted to 
informal arrangements, which are stronger than the new formal rules in 
place” (Wegerich 2002, 28). Two features of WUA leadership are typical 
in the Kyrgyz context: First, many WUA directors and Council members 
previously had leading positions in former kolkhozes, e. g. as hydro-tech-
nicians. This seems to be even more often the case in the north of the 
country. Following the break-up of kolkhozes, these old elites managed to 
retain influential positions – due both to their know-how and their personal 
networks. Second, farmers often prefer to delegate responsibilities to their 
leaders (Wegerich 2000, 12f.). This becomes apparent in the following 
statement of a WUA director in Chui Oblast: “But people have not yet 
changed their mind and decided to rule on their own. My position is com-
pletely autocratic. I think we need a strong hand and a strong will.”  
Several interviewees working in WUA development expressed resignation 
about Kyrgyz farmers’ passiveness and unwillingness to become more 
active in WUAs. Consequently, the success of a WUA depends first and 
foremost on its leaders. Given farmers’ reluctance to participate, top-down 
leadership should not automatically be considered as negative, as strong 
leaders or personalities also have the potential to motivate members and to 
push forward the work of the association. However, autocratic leadership 
entails the risk of moral hazard. Most importantly, there is a question as to 
the degree to which autocratic leaders really represent the interests of 
water users.  
The role of information for water user participation 
While it is obvious that information for water users is a central prerequisite 
for participation, marked deficits have been identified in this regard.  
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Knowledge about the existence and functioning of WUAs seems to be 
slightly stronger in the north, most probably because the WUA service 
areas there are generally smaller. In southern WUAs, farmers often do not 
even know about the existence of their WUA – sometimes even though 
they are listed as WUA members. There is a clear information deficit 
among farmers with regard to the functioning and setup of WUAs, e. g. the 
possibility to become active in GAs.  
While interest in functioning WUAs is higher in the south of the country, 
the large size of WUAs in this part of the country (in terms of both mem-
bers and service areas) makes information transfer to water users difficult. 
The mirabs who interact face-to-face with water users play an important 
role in informing people on WUA activities, meetings and decisions. Fur-
thermore, the ayil bashis are important stakeholders as they arrange village 
meetings during which water users are informed about WUA activities. In 
other words, as information transfer is rather informal, very much depends 
on commitment of individuals. 
There is a lack of information not only on WUAs but also on water users’ 
rights and obligations as well as on new legal developments relevant to 
local water management, e. g. the future role of Basin Councils as well as 
Irrigation and Drainage Commissions. Given the Water Codes’ relevance 
for enhancing water users’ influence in decision-making bearing on water 
resources management, informing water users appears to be crucial for 
translating its potential into reality. 
Water users’ involvement in decision-making  
A functioning general assembly (GA) has the potential to bring water 
management nearer to the needs of water users, as it allows for their 
participation in decision-making. In addition, the GA serves as an impor-
tant information platform, as staff reports on the WUA’s activities, thereby 
both enhancing water users’ ability to take adequate decisions and top-
down accountability.  
The findings regarding the influence water users have on decision-making 
were mainly positive. During the GA meetings, annual budgets and work 
plans are usually discussed and approved, decisions on sanctions and 
ashars are taken, and WUA Council members are elected. Quite surpris-
ingly, the water users themselves also sometimes elect directors and other 
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staff – a task which is normally assigned to the members of the WUA 
Council and the directors, respectively. In cases of bad performance, the 
GA is also used by members to dismiss WUA staff. 
Again, WUAs in the south seem to be better developed in terms of func-
tioning GAs. In order to address the problem of the high number of mem-
bers, a system of representatives has been introduced in southern WUAs. 
The water users usually elect these representatives during village meet-
ings. They table proposals for GA meetings, communicate the needs of 
water users, take decisions on future activities of the association, and ap-
point or dismiss WUA staff. During village meetings, water users are then 
informed about decisions taken in the GA. These representatives in fact 
quite actively use the GA as a discussion and decision-making platform. 
Despite this rather positive picture, some weaknesses were identified, 
which will now briefly be outlined. The organizational weaknesses en-
countered included poorly functioning and in some rare cases even non-
existent GAs. Sometimes meetings were not formalized, took place only 
on a irregular basis, or members did not have a real voice in decision-
making.  
Another factor that hinders the participation of all water users in decision-
making is that aksakals (elders) traditionally play a strong role in Kyrgyz 
society. This is particularly true for rural Kyrgyzstan. This tendency seems 
to be slightly more marked in the south, where most of the above-men-
tioned WUA representatives are aksakals. Although entailing a risk of 
undermining democratic principles, this cultural pattern should not be 
considered as too negative, as aksakals can draw on their social capital in 
order to enforce WUA rules or to mobilize people. It is nevertheless im-
portant to bear this specific feature of rural Kyrgyz society in mind in 
carrying out trainings and social mobilization measures. 
While quite successful, one weakness of the southern system of represen-
tation has nevertheless to be highlighted: At present, very much depends 
on the willingness of individual representatives to report back to the vil-
lagers and inform them about decisions taken in GAs. Thus information 
transfer to water users is not always ensured. At present it is either the ayil 
bashis or the mirabs who inform villagers about WUAs activities – as the 
latter do interact face-to-face and (during irrigation periods) on a daily 
basis with water users.  
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Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to donors and the Kyrgyz government: Further 
strengthen and support WSUs. 
As regards the support provided to WUAs, an overall positive picture 
was gained of the work done by the WSUs at the different levels of 
administration. We would therefore recommend that WSUs be further 
strengthened and supported with the aim of enabling them to widen 
their activities, i. e. to develop and provide more training and to cover 
larger areas, including remote and underserved areas.  
— Recommendation to WSUs, donors and NGOs: Target water users 
through trainings: 
At present, there is a clear tendency to focus trainings on WUA staff, 
with water users usually not receiving sufficient training. In order to 
enhance water users’ ability to actively participate in local water 
management, we suggest that specific trainings for water users be de-
veloped in the following fields:  
— Provide information to water users. Taking into account current 
information deficits among water users, trainings should be pro-
vided on the aims and functioning of WUAs, water users’ rights, 
and obligations and implications of the new Water Code for local 
water management. In addition, consideration could be given to 
using local radio stations, newspapers, and agricultural extension 
services to disseminate information. 
— Strengthen WUA general assemblies. Given the potential of 
GAs to enhance water users’ participation in decision-making 
and to turn WUAs into real associations of water users, a special 
focus should be placed on organizational development measures 
aimed at strengthening the role of GAs. Trainings should deal 
with issues such as the functioning of GAs, correct voting proce-
dures, frequency of meetings, reporting mechanisms within the 
GA, and the rights of members. 
— Recommendation to donors and the Kyrgyz government: Widen 
WUA activities wherever feasible. 
Access to agricultural inputs often constitutes a more pressing prob-
lem to farmers than irrigation. In order to enhance the acceptance of 
WUAs among water users, consideration should be given to widening 
WUA activities wherever feasible. Using economies of scale, activi-
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ties could include bulk purchasing of fertilizers, pesticides, and seeds, 
but also provision of agricultural machinery.  
5.2 Information and communication 
The availability of information and communication of it between different 
levels of the water administration and especially between water users and 
water managers is a prerequisite for integrated water resources manage-
ment. Decisions have to be taken under consideration of the water needs of 
different users, and at the same time water users must be able to rely on 
water quotas they have applied for. 
5.2.1 Information on individual water use 
Information on individual water use is an essential precondition for in-
creasing efficiency in water use. Only if individual consumption is meas-
ured and controlled can destructive behavior like water theft be prose-
cuted. At the same time, this would permit water managers to better plan 
water allocation to all users and to reward water saving. 
There is accurate measurement of water only at the higher levels of the 
water supply network. Measurement is mainly carried out by the Ray-
VodKhozes for all primary canals and most secondary canals. Water is 
generally also measured when it is delivered to WUAs. Below this level, 
exact measuring of quantities is rare. Some WUAs or large collective 
farms have their own measurement devices, but individual farmers usually 
cannot determine their water use precisely. At this level, mirabs control 
water distribution, sometimes by eye, sometimes with the help of simple 
portable measuring gadgets. The reliability of these methods is a matter of 
dispute. In any case, these methods are subjective in nature and can thus 
easily be contested by water users.  
A common problem in Kyrgyzstan is the deterioration of existing meas-
uring devices, as the whole of infrastructure is in the midst of a general 
process of decay. Today, many measurement facilities from Soviet times 
are out of order. Cases involving unlined earthen canals render precise 
water measurement additionally difficult, since great losses occur before 
the water reaches the fields. 
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Given that exact measurement at the farm or field level is largely inexist-
ent, water managers calculate theoretical water use according to crop type 
and cultivated area. Average water flows in small ditches and frequency of 
watering turns for different crops are taken into account as a means of 
coming up with optimal approximations of actual water consumption. As a 
consequence, farmers mostly know how much they pay for water overall, 
but they are often unaware of the volumetric quantities they are using. 
Nevertheless, they make use of their experience to control the water sup-
ply. The method of calculating water use via crops and cultivated areas 
seems to be the most practicable and rational approach, even though it is 
not absolutely precise. At the moment, it may be seen as a satisfactory way 
to ensure that water supply continues to function until the financial con-
straints obstructing more detailed measurement have been overcome. 
Yet there are some negative effects involved in the actual situation: Lack 
of exact measurement does not encourage water-saving behavior and may 
additionally tempt water users to withdraw more water than allowed, as it 
is difficult to prove such irregularities. This constitutes a free-rider prob-
lem which could be avoided by better control. Of course, effective meas-
urement is also needed, as control mechanisms alone do not guarantee that 
rules will be observed. As confirmed by several WUA directors, better 
measurement would mean fewer conflicts. 
In general, measurement seems to be perceived as more important nowa-
days, since water has become a costly resource. Some canal rehabilitation 
projects, mostly financed by donor organizations, already include new 
measurement devices even at secondary and tertiary canal level. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the DWM, i. e. the future State Water Adminis-
tration, and donors: Promote investment in measurement infra-
structure. 
In the context defined by lack of information on individual water use, 
the main aspects that need to be addressed are technical in nature. 
There is a need for better and more widespread measurement. For this 
reason, investment in measurement infrastructure is just as necessary 
as canal rehabilitation. Measurement at the tertiary canal level or 
even at every farm gate would be a desirable though at present more 
or less unrealistic condition. Nevertheless, it should be the long-term 
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goal of Kyrgyz water managers. The different donor organizations 
and all levels of Kyrgyz water administration should take the initia-
tive in this field because it is in their interest to achieve greater effi-
ciency in water use. Credits from donors for public investment in 
measurement infrastructure are a practical proposal in this regard. 
5.2.2 Information on needs of all users affected by 
management decisions 
Inclusion of all users’ water needs in management decisions means that 
information about these needs must be available. At present, small-scale 
users such as cultivators of garden plots are neither surveyed nor consid-
ered in decision-making. But not only the availability of information, its 
consideration by decision makers is also crucial for good water manage-
ment. Only if all different users’ needs are given due consideration will it 
be possible to arrive at a just distribution of resources according to agreed 
criteria. The present section therefore takes a look at both the availability 
of information itself and its influence on management decisions. 
Information about water needs of individual water users is taken into ac-
count in a bottom-up planning process for water application. Farmers 
communicate their crops and the areas they wish to cultivate to the WUA 
or the RayVodKhoz before the growing season starts. Then, depending on 
their capacities, either the WUA or the RayVodKhoz calculates water 
needs for each field and each farmer. This data is aggregated for WUAs, 
for canals, and further upwards, extending across the water hierarchy, and 
thus water managers at the different levels (WUA, rayon, oblast) are fa-
miliar with the total water needs of the different subunits and are able to 
take decisions accordingly. This application system is in principle still the 
same as it was in Soviet times. 
Contrary to this theoretical planning, it was found that in practice the 
needs of all water users are not always properly reflected by management 
decisions. The yearly application process serves to assess and coordinate 
the water supply for the whole irrigation season. It has to take into account 
the different water needs and the capacities of the different parts of the 
irrigation network. The process is necessary to provide to everyone the 
service requested. However, the targets are not always met in reality, as 
farmers order water during the growing season, whenever they see a need. 
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Mostly, they tend to apply for more water than they would really need, and 
water managers do not consistently monitor their requests. Sometimes 
water allocation only follows the principle of distributing the amounts 
available and does not really abide by water needs of specific crops or 
water users. Under such circumstances, it is obvious that the information 
gathered before the season is not consistently considered by either water 
managers or water users. There are still strong indications of a supply 
management approach in Kyrgyz water management. 
In recent years, the whole process of water allocation has become far more 
complicated since there are no more collective state farms and land plots 
are extremely fragmented. It is thus one of the merits of WUAs that they 
act as intermediate institutions, collecting and sometimes also coordinating 
different water needs. In some cases, though, WUA members seem to be 
reluctant to hand in their applications on time, perhaps because they do not 
fully understand the need for planning. Other farmers simply lack agri-
cultural know-how concerning their own water needs. Often WUA staff 
are also not able to calculate water needs with the help of the sophisticated 
tables dating back to Soviet times, and the RayVodKhozes have to fulfill 
this task. Generally, it does not always seem easy for water managers to 
get the information they need on all users’ water needs. And of course 
neither farmers nor water managers can predict precipitation and weather 
conditions, which have a significant impact on irrigation needs. In conse-
quence, it is difficult to precisely determine future water needs. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Ensure transparency 
in decision-making and information flows for all water users (cf. 
4.3.4). 
Even though it appears that except for small garden plots most users’ 
water needs are included in the planning process for water allocation, 
the planning is not always implemented when it comes down to ac-
tual practice. It is therefore important that water user needs be prop-
erly reflected by water managers’ decisions. It should be ensured that 
information flows are accessible to all water users and water manag-
ers at different levels. This could be achieved through measures such 
as public information boards in villages or WUAs and monthly 
meetings for filing complaints. These measures could contribute to 
better communication in both directions. Additionally, control 
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mechanisms should be introduced in order to secure top-down ac-
countability and transparent decision-making. Possible ways of real-
izing this would include, for example, regular joint meetings of dif-
ferent administration levels with WUAs and periodic newsletters 
within the administration as well as for water users. 
5.2.3 Reliability of water quotas to be delivered by 
authorities 
Water users need to be sure of water delivery in order to take their 
entrepreneurial decisions. Therefore, the trustworthiness of water quotas is 
an important aspect in efficient water management. This fosters invest-
ment and helps limit water overuse in that it makes it possible for water 
users to rely on sufficient and timely supply. 
As regards the reliability of individual water provision, many Kyrgyz 
water users complain about late or insufficient water delivery by authori-
ties. In frequent cases, this seems to have led to losses for farmers. The 
general decay of irrigation infrastructure contributes to water losses and 
makes water provision more difficult and less reliable. Water scarcity is 
another reason for problems concerning the reliability of water supply. In 
very dry years or months, there appear to be serious problems in some 
regions. These difficulties tend to be greater in tail-end sections of canals. 
Generally, this leads to a situation in which water users are unwilling to 
pay for the water they receive because they are not satisfied with the sup-
ply service. This vicious circle has already been described in Figure 8. 
In cases of water scarcity, special mechanisms are used to decide on water 
allocation. Often, water is allocated on a ‘first come first serve’ basis. In 
other places, needs play a more prominent role: Criteria such as crop water 
needs or sun and shade conditions in mountainous areas are taken into 
consideration in coming to decisions on water allocation. A mirab, a WUA 
director, or an ayil okmotu representative might then take the final deci-
sion. Frequently, these persons take rather informal measures, allocating 
water to people on a clan or friendship basis, or just on spontaneous de-
mand. All these informal mechanisms decrease the transparency and 
efficiency of allocation decisions, as the latter are not made according to 
rational criteria like payment of fees, crop water needs, relative benefits, or 
others, and are often based on personal preferences and bribery. 
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As stated above, water distribution within WUAs and between different 
land plots is often not precisely measured. This impedes the availability of 
information on actual water quotas and is the basis for conflicts on water 
provision and quantities delivered. Another problem is that WUAs and 
individual water users have until now not had long-term rights for water 
abstraction. Farmers had to rely on yearly contracts with their WUA or the 
RayVodKhoz and could not be sure whether they would receive the same 
amount of water in the following year. This persistent unreliability is 
further due to climatic variations, frequent infrastructure breakdowns, and 
insufficient network storage capacities. It is obvious that this lack of 
security leads to uncertainty among water users and amounts to a substan-
tial obstacle to investment. 
At present, according to contracts between the WUAs and the Ray-
VodKhoz, the latter is responsible for supplying a fixed amount of water to 
certain division points in the irrigation system. The RayVodKhoz and the 
WUA administration sign a receipt for the quantity delivered, and it is 
measured at this point. If the RayVodKhoz cannot supply the request be-
cause it lacks sufficient water, the WUAs pay only for the amount they 
actually receive. As already mentioned, there was until recently no legal 
basis for compensation for losses induced by late or insufficient water 
supply. This has changed with the new Water Code, which provides for 
long-term water supply contracts (15 years) and also establishes that com-
pensation have to be paid if the water supplier is unable to meet the con-
tractual arrangements (Kyrgyz Republic 2005, Art. 34; Art. 39). However, 
in situations of drought, water shortage, or emergency, water permits can 
be suspended without compensation. Unfortunately, provisions referring to 
the point of time of water supply remain unclear in the new Code. This is 
highly regrettable since irrigation times are crucial for crop growth. 
One positive aspect of recent developments is that water users who pay for 
water are increasingly insisting on timely and adequate provision. This 
could further contribute to the improvement of the system by putting pres-
sure on water managers. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Take steps to swiftly 
implement the new Water Code as well as additional regulations. 
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As regards information on reliability of water quotas, the introduction 
of long-term water supply contracts, as provided for under the new 
Water Code, is already an important step. The legal provision that 
water suppliers may be held liable for insufficient supply also points 
in the right direction. With reference to these aspects, it is highly rec-
ommendable that the new Water Code be implemented soon. Never-
theless, further regulations designed to implement the Code should 
include the time dimension of water supply, as this is absolutely vital 
for irrigated crops. 
5.3 Demand management 
Demand management seeks to provide mechanisms that promote water 
saving and water use efficiency, sometimes based on selection between 
competing demands. The main points of departure for demand manage-
ment are investment in water-saving infrastructure and technology or 
provision of incentives for to encourage water-saving behavior, e. g. 
volumetric water fees. 
5.3.1 Volumetric water fees 
Calculating water fees calibrated to actual water use is one of the main 
principles of IWRM, one aimed at increasing water use efficiency. The 
introduction of volumetric fees requires measurement of quantities used; 
its aim is to provide an important economic incentive for users to save 
water. 
In Kyrgyzstan, water is provided against payment. Irrigation service fees 
(ISF) have been in place in the agricultural sector since 1995, which 
means that they are not a completely new institution. Willingness to pay 
for irrigation water is a critical issue for this incentive. There are frequent 
cases of water users not paying their bills or even cases of water theft, as 
enforcement continues to be a difficult task for Kyrgyz water mangers. 
However, according to most experts, the situation has recently been im-
proving. 
Water fees in Kyrgyzstan are volumetric in nature because they reflect the 
principle of quantitative payment. Still, since individual water use cannot 
be measured precisely in most cases, these are not exact volumetric fees. 
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Approximation to actual water abstraction based on crops and cultivated 
area is therefore a viable alternative that at least serves the purpose of 
stimulating the cultivation of less water-intensive crops, and thus also of 
saving water. Total water use has decreased in recent years, a development 
that could at first sight be seen as an initial success of the economic incen-
tive that has been introduced. At the same time, however, the reduction in 
water consumption has gone hand in hand with a decline in cultivated area 
from 1,212,200 ha in 2000 to 1,093,900 ha in 2003 (FAOSTAT 2004). 
There is thus reason to doubt whether the fees have in fact led to more 
efficient water use.  
Generally speaking, water fees are still relatively low, and thus economic 
benefits are not linked to efficient water use. Big losses in the overall 
system are detrimental to the goal of water saving by individuals. Water 
managers are aware of the inefficiencies but complain about a lack of the 
resources needed to prevent them. To sum up, quasi-economic incentives 
have been introduced by requiring payment for water use, but they have 
only begun to produce real change in the minds of water users and water 
managers. One expert from an international donor organization comments 
that the actual ISF is a “rather symbolic, small fee, aiming at making the 
people used to pay for water.” The traditional perception of water as a free 
and God-given good, and the fact that during Soviet times as well water 
was not paid for, are the main reasons why water pricing is difficult to 
enforce. As this represents an example of institutional path dependency, it 
will take some time to achieve any real change in the minds of water users 
and managers. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
— Recommendation to Kyrgyz government and donors: Improve meas-
urement of water, especially at the level of water users (cf. 6.2.1). 
Only by the long term aim to install measurement facilities through-
out the system will it be possible to charge real volumetric fees and to 
monitor the amounts of water delivered, because then supply will be 
transparent for all concerned. This should have a positive influence 
on the willingness to pay of water users and put an end to problems 
concerning the perception of equity in water distribution.  
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— Recommendation to Kyrgyz government and the Parliament: Execu-
tive authorities should strictly enforce valid regulations and wa-
ter payments. 
Enforcement is generally still low in the Kyrgyz water sector. Water 
theft is common and farmers who do not pay for their irrigation water 
usually receive water anyway thanks to clan structures and social 
concerns. Even if the latter may sometimes be desirable from a social 
point of view, it has to be rejected since it undermines the growing 
willingness to pay on the part of other water users. Policy-makers and 
executive authorities should therefore ensure that both the law is and 
payment of water fees are properly and strictly enforced. 
5.3.2 Recognition of different crop water needs 
The specific water requirements of different crops are especially important 
in irrigated agriculture as a means of determining the total water needs of 
irrigated areas. They consist basically of three dimensions: the water 
quantity, irrigation time, and number of turns. Of course other aspects such 
as soil quality, soil humidity, and climatic factors have to be taken into 
account as well. Acknowledgment and use of crops water needs by water 
users and water managers is an important indicator for the rational use of 
water. 
As already described, crop water needs are used in Kyrgyz water man-
agement for planning the total water requirement of given areas and the 
respective parts of the irrigation network. The water users communicate 
their cropping plans to the WUA or the RayVodKhoz, and they calculate 
the individual and aggregated water needs of all users under their jurisdic-
tion. These cropping plans also allow WUAs and administrative bodies 
(ayil okmotu, RayVodKhoz) to advise farmers concerning their decisions to 
cultivate specific crops. They in this way seek solutions in cases in which 
water scarcity is likely to occur or when the capacity of canals does not 
permit all riparians to grow the same (water-intensive) crops. Occasionally 
agronomists working for the ayil okmotu or the RayVodKhoz also provide 
advice in such cases concerning the choice of alternative crops or alterna-
tive locations, if possible. However, in most WUAs this does not seem to 
be the rule. 
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In acute situations of water scarcity, the water requirement of specific 
crops is also used to determine the sequence of irrigation turns. Water-
intensive plants like cotton or sugar beets that are at greatest risk in such 
situations have priority over more resistant crops such as wheat or sun-
flowers. Some stakeholders in southern Kyrgyzstan referred to this process 
as the avran method. 
One problem concerning the recognition of crop water needs is strong 
adherence to old irrigation norms that were used in Soviet times. These 
norms are generally considered to be too high and no longer adequate for 
the new context defined by small land plots and use of low technology and 
low-input agricultural techniques. Nevertheless, these norms are fre-
quently used to determine crop water needs and they are therefore a factor 
contributing to resource waste. Additionally, many Kyrgyz farmers lack 
agricultural know-how and are therefore not aware of the specific water 
needs of their crops. Inexperienced farmers tend to think that using more 
water will raise their yields. Overirrigation seems to be quite common in 
Kyrgyzstan, sometimes leading to problems with waterlogging and salini-
zation (cf. 3.3). Additionally, the point of time of watering and the 
amounts used are often simply a matter of experience and not a process 
based on calculations and measurement. One expert from an international 
NGO working in the Kyrgyz water sector articulated the crucial point as 
follows: “The farmers are poor farmers, they do not know how much 
water is needed for their crops. They do it the Soviet way. But not every-
thing is rice – it does not have to swim!”  
Usually, crop selection is determined by a farmer’s knowledge and experi-
ence as well as by market prices. In some cases, crop rotation is also im-
portant as a technique for conservation of soil fertility. Yet only in ex-
tremely water scarce areas some farmers had shifted their production to 
less water-consuming crops like sunflower or oil seeds. 
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
The analysis makes it quite clear that Kyrgyz water users and water man-
agers in principle recognize crop water needs. Unfortunately, this does not 
generally imply more efficient water use, as other aspects are more im-
portant for crop choice and planning still relies on Soviet norms. 
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— Recommendation to WSUs, agricultural extension services and do-
nors: Improve water user knowledge and awareness concerning 
crop water needs. 
The main recommendation derived from the assessment is that it is 
water users in particular that should become more aware of specific 
crop water needs. This could be accomplished on the basis of train-
ings and information campaigns designed to enable them to assess the 
water needs of their crops and to use water more rationally. Crop di-
versification in terms of varying water needs could also serve as a 
guarantee for many farmers, especially in areas with insecure water 
supply. Thus crop water needs should be included in farmers’ deci-
sions bearing on economic profitability. This can only be achieved if 
farmers are properly instructed about such issues and if appropriate 
economic incentives, such as water fees, have been set. Some NGOs 
are already providing trainings in this respect, but they have not yet 
reached the majority of water users. There is still a lot of scope for 
improvement, and the importance of key persons as multipliers has 
not yet fully been stressed. 
— Recommendation to WSUs, scientific institutes, and donors: Develop 
new water norms adapted to real crop water needs. 
A second proposal concerns the old water norms from the Soviet era 
that are still in use but now seem outdated. New water norms are be-
ing developed in pilot projects, e. g. in the Ferghana Valley, and the 
first results confirm that considerably less water would be needed. 
However, correct application of these norms calls for sophisticated 
methods that are not practicable for individual water users. The 
WSUs should assist WUAs and farmers in trying to adapt the old So-
viet norms to new circumstances, based on the results from the pilot 
projects mentioned. This should be done with the help of academic 
research institutes and donor support. The Institute for Irrigation in 
Bishkek has already gathered scientific data on water needs for spe-
cific crops and areas that could serve this purpose. 
5.3.3 Public initiatives to reduce water losses 
Public initiatives are important measures for the goal of providing incen-
tives to save water, because water sector infrastructure is mostly in public 
hands. Private initiatives could become more and more important in the 
future if cost recovery of investments is guaranteed. Other measures to 
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prevent water users from wasting water – such as legal regulations or 
attempts to raise public awareness for this topic – are just as important. 
The existence of such initiatives and incentive measures indicates that 
water management is on its way to a demand oriented approach, as pro-
posed by IWRM. 
The question of who is to pay for water losses has still not been resolved 
in a satisfactory manner. Infrastructure-induced water losses at higher 
canal levels are exempted from payment and therefore covered by the 
state. Meanwhile, it is not really clear how losses that occur within the 
service area of a WUA are covered. Information on this topic differed 
considerably from case to case. There was one example in Chui Oblast 
where losses were not passed on to farmers, which meant that the WUA 
had to cover them, and became highly indebted. In some other associations 
losses were apparently compensated for by additional water provision 
from the RayVodKhoz. Also, one special case, a WUA, was found in Osh 
Oblast in which downstream water users were required to pay a lower fee 
than upstream users because of the large losses that occurred along the 
way. In spite of these different practices, the general principle of payment 
by the responsible party seems generally accepted, and this, given ade-
quate water prices, should serve to stimulate efficient water use. 
Kyrgyz water managers and water users are well aware of the problems 
associated with the loss of water. They also understand the urgent need to 
repair the old infrastructure in order to have access to additional water. 
Rehabilitation is already the subject of several initiatives to reduce water 
losses in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector. It has generally a high priority 
among donor organizations, whose projects in this field are already 
broadly keyed to the problem (e. g. World Bank, ADB, etc.; cf. Box 11).  
Nevertheless, the old mentality from Soviet times, i. e. that the state should 
care for everything and maintain the overall infrastructure, is still fre-
quently encountered. This example of path dependency is largely respon-
sible for the general lethargy when it comes to changing the current situa-
tion. Individual initiatives are rare and appropriate economic incentives for 
such initiatives are almost nonexistent, induced only by donor-financed 
projects.  
Though people are beginning to understand the value of water, most water 
users are just now getting used to paying for water, and their only incen-
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tive to limit its excessive use is the economic one. One problem is that 
Kyrgyz farmers generally tend to apply for more water than they really 
need (estimated: 20–25 % more) in order to make sure that they receive a 
sufficient amount. This behavior is for their own personal benefit, as water 
prices do not represent real supply costs, which are covered by the state. 
As the whole system is highly defective and water losses do not have to be 
paid for in many cases, there are few incentives for individual water users 
to help reduce the losses.  
Possible improvements / Recommendations 
An important step towards increasing water use efficiency is to provide 
incentives to save water and improve irrigation infrastructure. Possible 
initiatives to reduce water losses should be pushed mainly by donor or-
ganizations and public administration, but ideally WUAs and farmers 
should also be enabled to invest in water-saving infrastructure. The fol-
lowing recommendations are meant to contribute to finding a solution for 
the problem:  
— Recommendation to Kyrgyz government and donors: Further re-
habilitate and reconstruct deficient irrigation infrastructure and 
promote water-saving irrigation techniques (cf. 4.2.2). 
— Recommendation to Kyrgyz government and the Parliament: In-
crease the level of ISF (cf. 4.2.2). 
6 Conclusion 
This final chapter wraps up the study’s main findings. Section 6.1 provides 
an overview of the progress made by Kyrgyz irrigation management to-
wards IWRM, distinguishing between the components of the IWRM 
Pyramid (cf. Figure 1). Second, concepts from institutional economics will 
be used to explain observed differences in the pace of reform in order then 
to identify obstacles to and potentials for further reform steps (6.2). Based 
on the normative assessment on the one hand and the analytical assess-
ment on the other, the next section will formulate some main recommen-
dations to various stakeholders (6.3). The chapter concludes with an over-
all resume and outlook (6.4). 
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6.1 Varying degrees of progress on different components 
of IWRM 
The study’s main objective was to assess the extent to which water man-
agement in the Kyrgyz agricultural sector is ‘on its way towards IWRM.’ 
Summing up the analyses presented in the preceding chapters, it notes 
unequivocally that Kyrgyz water management is indeed heading towards 
IWRM. However, having started no more than ten years ago, reforms are 
just at the beginning of this probably long and stony pathway. The concept 
of IWRM itself has explicitly informed only the latest steps of reform. Yet 
the progress made is already considerable, compared to most of Kyr-
gyzstan’s neighbors, and it is likely to continue with the implementation of 
the ambitious new Water Code, which was adopted by Parliament in De-
cember 2004.  
Nevertheless, progress varies considerably with regard to the different 
components of the IWRM Pyramid. There are aspects of Kyrgyz irrigation 
management that are clearly more ‘on track’ vis-à-vis IWRM than others, 
even though it is difficult to rank each of them precisely.  
Most progress has been achieved on the managerial principles of IWRM, 
i. e. regulatory integration. In particular, decentralization of irrigation 
management has advanced swiftly since the 2002 Law on WUAs and the 
transfer of most tertiary infrastructure to these bottom-up organizations. 
The principle of subsidiarity seems to be gaining ground, and merged 
WUAs – and probably future WUA federations – are expected to take over 
entire irrigation schemes. This implies the transfer of most competencies 
from RayVodKhozes to end users’ organizations, thus rendering the former 
superfluous in the middle term. Progress on other aspects of regulatory 
integration is less impressive, but nevertheless notable: As regards infor-
mation and communication, many infrastructure rehabilitation projects 
contain components aimed at improving the measurement of water flow 
and facilitating the calculation of individual water use. Transferring these 
tasks from the RayVodKhozes to WUAs has enhanced the collection and 
aggregation of data on water needs of end users. The former were over-
burdened by the task of collecting and processing water applications for 
each individual land plot that resulted from land reform. Demand manage-
ment has also improved, thanks to the introduction of volumetric water 
fees to be paid to RayVodKhozes by end users or WUAs. Adapting out-
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dated Soviet irrigation norms to current circumstances, though in still a 
pilot stage, offers some promising perspectives as well. Finally, most do-
nor-financed rehabilitation projects aim at reducing losses due to infra-
structure that has fallen into disrepair.  
Moderate progress can be observed regarding ecological integration. With 
WUAs introduced, merged, and – in the future – federated, management 
structures will be more in line with hydrological boundaries. Once the new 
Water Code is implemented, the future State Water Administration will be 
organized at national and basin levels, replacing the current oblast struc-
ture, which was recently abolished by the new government. It remains 
unclear, however, whether the rayon level of water management will be 
eliminated. For the moment, the RayVodKhozes remain the most problem-
atic organizations for the shift from administrative to hydrological units in 
management structures. The integration of water quality into irrigation 
management is far from sufficient. Although pollution standards are rather 
strict, lack of enforcement is obstructing their translation into practice. 
Consideration of water-land interaction suffers particularly from the 
underfunding of drainage facilities and lack of know-how on the part of 
peasant farmers, who still struggle to manage their privatized plots in a 
sustainable manner.  
Overall, moderate advances have occurred vis-à-vis sectoral integration, 
although there are considerable differences within this component. The 
least progress has been made in relation to the internalization of ecological 
externalities. The new Water Code does lip service to the conservation of 
nature, but there is no genuine recognition of nature as a legitimate water 
user in Kyrgyzstan. The picture regarding the integration of social exter-
nalities is more ambivalent: While health and gender issues are neglected 
and local water conflicts are still a considerable problem, the continued 
subsidization of irrigation services, particularly in remote areas, could be 
interpreted as a measure against rural poverty. However, this subsidization 
seems to result more from a general sensitivity toward raising water fees 
than from any intention to provide targeted support to the poor. Partly due 
to the subsidization of irrigation water supply, the picture regarding the 
internalization of economic externalities is ambiguous as well. Although 
water fees have been introduced and raised several times in recent years, 
they cover no more than 15 % of real supply costs, a factor that contributes 
to the severe underfunding of irrigation services. In addition, water-using 
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activities other than agriculture are clearly underrepresented in the public 
water administration, preventing reallocation of water resources to other, 
possibly more profitable uses such as tourism.  
6.2 Reasons for varying degrees of progress 
In the following sections, the ‘subjective model of change’ (cf. Figure 3) 
presented in Chapter 1.2.2 is used to analyze the main problems involved 
in shifting Kyrgyz irrigation management further towards IWRM. The 
focus lies on the reasons behind and the process of institutional change 
itself, as the actual impact of ongoing reforms is still difficult to assess.  
6.2.1 Objective reasons for change 
Viewed through the prism of the model, external ‘objective reasons for 
change’ clearly constitute the main driving forces of Kyrgyz irrigation 
sector reforms (cf. Figure 9). Two of these external reasons seem to be of 
particular importance: First, the dismantling of the Soviet Union led both 
to the end of Soviet transfers to the Kyrgyz economy, causing a severe 
lack of funds for maintaining public infrastructure, and to the fragmenta-
tion of farm land in the course of the post-Soviet land reform. This re-
sulted in a sharp deterioration of irrigation infrastructure on the one hand 
and in a misfit between irrigation management and land ownership pat-
terns on the other. Second, international donors replaced the Soviet Union 
as a source of financial assistance, introducing new thinking in water 
management and articulating demands for IWRM-inspired irrigation sec-
tor reforms. 
6.2.2 Political articulation and actual reform program 
Since independence, the serious problems of the Kyrgyz irrigation sector 
have provided an enabling environment for externally driven reforms: As 
the state lacks sufficient funds and an adequate administration to provide 
irrigation services of satisfactory quality, overall resistance to reforms at 
the national level is relatively weak. Due to this openness as well as 
considerable donor leverage on Kyrgyz policies in general, donors are able  
 
 Elke Herrfahrdt et al. 
168 German Development Institute 
to heavily influence the ‘actual reform program’ of the Kyrgyz govern-
ment. This resulted in the initiation of IWRM-inspired reforms before any 
significant mind change or genuine political demand on the side of water 
Figure 9: Subjective model of change, adapted to the Kyrgyz 
irrigation sector 
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users or other Kyrgyz stakeholders had occurred. In fact, ‘political 
articulation’ of agricultural water users and their representatives in 
Parliament is mostly limited to resistance to specific donor demands, e. g. 
raising water fees. Other veto players are line ministries, which have 
successfully opposed any consistent unification of their water-related 
responsibilities within the new State Water Administration. This ‘political 
articulation’ is purely reactive, however, while donors are pushing forward 
their technocratic, IWRM-inspired reform concepts. International 
consultants, figuring on donor financial strength have, for example, 
elaborated the new Water Code. This is why far-reaching initiatives of 
donors risk being out of touch with the inner-Kyrgyz political arena, 
complicating efforts to globally reform Kyrgyz water management, as 
would be required by IWRM. The newly created formal institutions are at 
best weakly embedded in the institutional framework and the socio-
economic environment. 
The external origin of reforms thus partly explains their half-heartedness. 
Most policy documents focus on “regulative instruments with little regard 
on institutionalization” (Baimyrzaeva 2005, 30). Donors’ demands are met 
inasmuch as new formal institutions (in the form of legislation and poli-
cies) are established, but the related reforms (in the form of organizational 
rearrangements, shifted competencies and a new strategic orientation) are 
implemented only where they appear to be politically least problematic 
and financially least costly or even profitable for the state. These areas are 
clustered in the field of regulatory integration: farmers generally welcome 
their empowerment through the introduction of WUAs. Resistance to 
decentralization by RayVodKhozes is small because of their sheer inability 
to manage water supply to the multitude of fragmented private land plots. 
At least as long as the existence of RayVodKhozes is not questioned, 
decentralization thus progresses rather smoothly. By transferring tertiary 
canals to WUAs, the government can officially cease funding this part of 
the irrigation network, a burden it was no longer able to bear in any case. 
Improving water measurement is a mainly technical issue and thus un-
problematic as well. In the short run, installing measurement devices turns 
out to be relatively cheap for the Kyrgyz government, as it is mostly do-
nor-financed. The same applies to rehabilitation projects designed to re-
duce water losses. Notwithstanding the mounting debt that is progressively 
straining the national budget, donor-financed irrigation projects constitute 
win-win constellations for Kyrgyz actors in the irrigation sector. The fact 
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that shifting management structures from oblast to basin boundaries is a 
relatively small, more organizational, and politically less sensitive issue 
also explains progress on this aspect of ecological integration. 
Politically sensitive, however, are the objectives of water management, 
i. e. the field of sectoral integration. 'Who is to benefit from water ser-
vices?' is a fundamentally political question, and this explains why little 
progress can be observed regarding the integration of formerly underrepre-
sented water needs. Since nature completely lacks voice and ecological 
concerns are only weakly embedded within the broader societal context, 
nature conservation comes in last for consideration. Cost recovery is the 
area where donor conditionalities are the strictest. This accounts for the 
fact that some progress has been made in this respect, in spite of continu-
ing resistance from the former parliament to any increases in ISF. 
These mechanisms explain the asymmetries within the ‘actual reform pro-
gram.’ The politically less problematic aspects of IWRM figure promi-
nently in the new Water Code – the reform agenda’s current key document 
– while others figure not at all or far less prominently. In addition, there 
are inconsistencies between the more programmatic Water Code on the 
one hand and legal provisions for its implementation on the other. Stricter 
regulations on water quality control would be needed, for example, to set 
the stage for realization of the Code’s environmental provisions. Again, 
these instruments for implementation are mostly lacking in the politically 
more sensitive or financially more costly areas, i. e. regarding aspects of 
sectoral integration and lack of advocacy. 
6.2.3 Institutional change 
While the ‘actual reform program’ is already biased, the implementation 
of agreed-upon reforms – i. e. the required ‘institutional change’ itself – is 
also proving to be difficult. Slow progress mostly results from particular 
features of current institutions in Kyrgyz irrigation management.  
One common problem for implementing irrigation sector reforms is lack 
of enforcement power and state administration capabilities. This includes 
aspects like fines for water pollution, which are not consistently imposed, 
or the low reliability of the water quantities delivered by RayVodKhozes. 
Although the problem of lacking enforcement power is key for the success 
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of reforms, its resolution also poses a challenge, as this affects most sec-
tors of public authority.  
Another reason for the slow pace of institutional change is the important 
role played by informal institutions and organizations originally not in-
volved in Kyrgyz water management. Because the newly introduced for-
mal rules (laws and policies) are not rooted in informal rules, they are 
much more difficult to implement and enforce. As a result, they exist side 
by side with informal rules, destabilizing the whole system. “The reforms 
neglect the informal aspects of governance, and are carried out by state 
agencies, which themselves have not fully internalized formal institutions 
and remain detached from the public” (Baimyrzaeva 2005, 31).  
Thus informal rules derived from behavioral factors tend to be at odds 
with newly introduced institutions. The IWRM principle of water as an 
economic good, for instance, contradicts the widespread perception of 
water as a gift of God as well as the commitment within rural communities 
not to cut irrigation water supply to anybody, even if he or she does not 
pay. Another example is the introduction of the WUA concept without any 
reference to former concepts of water user organizations in the country.  
The involvement of organizations like ayil okmotus is mainly due to the 
weakness of newly introduced organizations, such as WUAs. This in-
volvement has an ambiguous character, as it stabilizes water management 
in general but at the same time hinders new organizations in improving 
and fulfilling their tasks independently. In order to avoid dual structures, 
informal rules need to be taken into account when establishing new ones. 
Old institutions of water management and other forms of local self-gov-
ernance organizations should be considered, e. g. when concepts for Audit 
Commissions or WUA federations are developed and introduced. 
The fact that little progress has been made on agreed-upon reforms can 
also be explained by path dependency in Kyrgyz water governance. In 
particular, management structures inherited from Soviet times serve as a 
brake on institutional change that would disconcert the interests of stake-
holders within the administration. The reluctance of several ministries to 
consistently overcome the fragmentation of tasks in water management 
may serve as an example. 
In addition to institutional variables, there are other factors that provide 
explanations for the low and regionally different progress made on re-
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forms. One important issue appears to be the north-south cleavage in Kyr-
gyzstan. Both participatory mechanisms and knowledge about water-land 
interaction are less developed in the north. This may be due on the one 
hand to a lack in the north of any agricultural tradition other than livestock 
breeding, whereas irrigation has been practiced for several hundred years 
in the Ferghana Valley. In the south, the sense of private land ownership 
did not disappear in Soviet times, and people consider farming more con-
sistently as their private business. In the north, in contrast, command-and-
control, top-down structures remain important. On the other hand, south-
ern farmers face tougher constraints to production due to land and water 
scarcity. This might also partly explain why they pay more attention to 
good irrigation services and to the long-term productivity of their land. 
In addition, implementation of irrigation sector reforms varies in relation 
to local circumstances. One key problem involved in transferring irrigation 
infrastructure to end water users is the vicious circle of irrigation services: 
Deteriorated irrigation infrastructure leads to unreliable irrigation services, 
which reduces the willingness of irrigation farmers to pay WUA fees. This 
in turn prevents the development of properly performing WUAs, which 
would be able to improve operation, maintenance, and repair of irrigation 
infrastructure.  
Summing up, institutional change has made most progress in establishing 
formal institutions, but without considering informal rules. This has re-
sulted in the coexistence of new water institutions with old and in part 
contradictory informal rules of water management. At the same time, lack 
of political will and/or enforcement are impeding the implementation of 
several new formal institutions (e. g. the implementation of Audit Com-
missions and Conflict Resolution Committees or adherence to the concept 
of hydrological boundaries, as called for in the law on WUAs).  
6.2.4 Behavioral change and mind change 
The ‘actual impact’ of irrigation sector reforms depends on their ability to 
induce ‘behavioral change’ among all stakeholders. There is only little evi-
dence available on this change with regard to Kyrgyz irrigation farmers. 
Overall water use has decreased during the last years. But it is not clear 
whether this is due to new water-saving irrigation techniques or to more 
general developments in Kyrgyz agriculture. One fact that hints more 
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clearly at behavioral change is the rising willingness of farmers to pay 
irrigation fees, which indicates a departure from the traditional idea of 
water as a free good.  
However, most positive effects on the performance of the Kyrgyz irriga-
tion sector currently result directly from donor-financed infrastructure 
projects. Rehabilitation of canals has an immediate positive impact on the 
quality of irrigation services. It thus supports building confidence in the 
irrigation management system and encourages behavioral change, e. g. 
with regard to the willingness to pay water fees. 
But behavioral change and mind change have also not yet reached the 
higher levels of water administration. Overall, we can note a lack of con-
ceptual implementation of IWRM in form and content. The current path of 
reform is more reminiscent of patchwork, and there is no clear vision be-
hind it. This applies, for example, for social and ecological externalities as 
well as for restructuring of the institutional arrangement, i. e. water man-
agement organizations. So far, the DWM has not proven up to its task of 
developing a vision for the water sector and strategically shaping water 
management reforms. Instead, it continues to manage water distribution 
and is reluctant to hand these responsibilities over to subordinate organi-
zations. This is mainly due to a lack of knowledge and awareness, but also 
to a lack of political will and the fear of loosing authority and competen-
cies.  
The main task for Kyrgyz water managers therefore still lies ahead, 
namely translation of already achieved reforms and future aims into one 
overall concept, a national water strategy. A holistic and broadly focused 
strategy for water resource use involving all sectors and derived from a 
multi-stakeholder approach is key (GWP 2004, 27). Without such a strat-
egy and persistent support and political will to implement it, the aim of 
achieving a water management in conformity with IWRM is doomed to 
fail.  
In fact, there have already been donor projects defining water strategies, 
and they have led to reasonable results, but these water strategies seem to 
have attained only marginal awareness in society and even among water 
specialists, and they were not mentioned by any of the stakeholders inter-
viewed. This is not surprising since, again, these projects were as a rule 
not initiated by an internal need but in response to donor demands. The 
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new Water Code underlines this by neglecting the existence of these 
strategies and calling for the elaboration of a national water strategy (Kyr-
gyz Republic 2005, Art. 18).  
It is questionable, though, whether and how such a strategy and the further 
overall reform process will be developed and adopted in the future. Gener-
ally speaking, if the pace of reform towards IWRM in Kyrgyz water man-
agement is to be sustained, substantial demand for the respective reforms 
needs to be articulated by Kyrgyz water users and stakeholders them-
selves. However, most IWRM principles are weakly embedded within 
other societal rules. This is no surprise, given that the concept came from 
outside of Kyrgyz society. Up to now, reforms have concentrated pre-
dominantly on technical issues and managerial reforms. Thus far there has 
been no comprehensive adoption of the normative framework of IWRM. 
This would require a fundamental rethinking of water management and a 
shift in societal values. Otherwise chances are slim that IWRM will prove 
to be a success. What could be achieved through outside pressure and 
demands has already been achieved. Developments have come to a point 
where the initiative for the process now has to pass over to Kyrgyz stake-
holders. There are first signs of such a change detectable especially at the 
local level of Kyrgyz water management, which should be further sup-
ported through donors continuing efforts in rehabilitation and awareness 
raising.  
In the long run, ‘mind change’ is a necessary condition for continuing 
movement towards IWRM. Without such change, implementation of 
IWRM in Kyrgyzstan will become stuck or at least slow down considera-
bly. But donors, the main push factor for water reforms, have not until 
now shown any major interest in such an undertaking. At least the main 
players, the World Bank and the ADB, mostly aim at lopsided approaches 
emphasizing economic aspects. The same applies for the (former) Kyrgyz 
government. Donors should continue to underline the importance of 
IWRM for a functioning and sustainable agricultural sector to the Kyrgyz 
government and pay higher attention to ecological and social aspects of 
IWRM. They should not be content with progress on paper but demand 
progress on the ground and with implementation of reforms. This should 
not, however, include predefining results. At the same time, awareness 
should be further raised through the provision of information on sustain-
able water management and use and participation of all stakeholders en-
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couraged. Notwithstanding these constraints, ‘mind change’ cannot be or-
chestrated deliberately from above or outside but will have to develop over 
time. This may result from positive impacts of current reforms on the one 
hand and on the other from changing preferences of Kyrgyz society, like a 
sense for water scarcity or increased appreciation of nature conservation. 
Only if societal demand for the realization of further aspects of IWRM 
strengthens can a departure from the current half-hearted and asymmetri-
cal ‘way towards IWRM’ be expected.  
6.3 Main recommendations 
Specific recommendations for each aspect of the IWRM Pyramid have 
already been given in the respective chapters. Due to the holistic approach of 
IWRM, they are numerous. Thus it seems advisable to prioritize these 
recommendations in order to make it easier for decision makers to concen-
trate their limited political and financial capital on the most promising re-
form steps. The following prioritization is based on two considerations: 
first, on the need for reform – i. e. the urgency of reforms in a specific 
area – and second, on the political costs of reform – i. e. the ease or feasi-
bility of implementing corresponding policies. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and to donors: Continue 
efforts to create and strengthen WUAs. 
Further decentralization of irrigation management has a high potential 
for advancing different aspects of IWRM (cf. Box 7). Notwithstand-
ing their manifold shortcomings (underqualified staff, weak organ-
izational set-up etc.), and due to their stake in improving drainage fa-
cilities, WUAs have a high potential as change agents for realizing 
many aspects of IWRM, including currently more neglected ones like 
water-land interaction. Furthermore, WUAs are forced to achieve cost 
recovery for tertiary canal management, a circumstance that favors 
the sustainable funding of irrigation services. WUAs (and future 
WUA federations) are supposed to manage whole hydrological units, 
preferably replacing the RayVodKhozes. They bring water manage-
ment closer to end users, thus improving responsiveness to user 
needs, etc. In addition, properly functioning WUAs contribute to 
solving many of the overall problems faced by the water management 
sector. These include improved enforcement of rules (like payment of 
fees, imposition of sanctions for illegal water abstraction, etc.) and 
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enhanced accountability and thus also support mind change at the lo-
cal level.  
Considerable progress has already been made in establishing WUAs, 
and the WSUs now have experienced and qualified staff. Further re-
forms can capitalize on this asset, as resistance to decentralization of 
irrigation management seems to be limited. Besides training for man-
agement and staff, further finance for infrastructure rehabilitation 
should be provided to WUAs in order to break the vicious circle in 
local irrigation management. Strengthened WUAs are more likely to 
overcome problems posed by interference of other actors who are 
currently impeding the proper implementation of decentralization re-
forms. Preferably, donors should provide funds in the form of grants, 
as the government’s debt burden has already reached critical levels. 
WUAs that receive funds for infrastructure rehabilitation should nev-
ertheless be asked to pay back part of the funds received. This money 
could then be used to set up a ‘National Irrigation Rehabilitation 
Fund’ that would provide rehabilitation loans to further WUAs. 
In several places, the work of WUAs does at present reflect some first 
positive impacts on water management. Accordingly, farmers, as the 
main stakeholders in WUAs, have already begun to understand and 
value this work, a fact which is, for instance, reflected in a rising ac-
ceptance of water fees. In particular, appropriate incentives can be set 
if WUA creation is further linked to the availability of funds for reha-
bilitation. On the other hand, it is proving more difficult to strengthen 
WUAs, and this will require more time and capacity-building efforts. 
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government and to donors: Move 
further towards cost recovery in irrigation management, while 
assuring that social safeguard mechanisms are provided for the 
poorest. 
Proper funding of irrigation services is a precondition for advances in 
most other areas of IWRM: Drainage facilities cannot be maintained 
if funds are lacking, the profitability of irrigated agriculture suffers 
from unreliable water supply induced by underfunded infrastructure, 
and decentralized management structures cannot be expected to pros-
per if no adequate salaries are paid to WUA staff. As the resistance to 
fee increases on the part of beneficiaries of subsidized irrigation ser-
vices continues to be considerable, political efforts have to be con-
centrated on convincing water users of their long-term interest in 
better cost recovery. Both WUA fees and ISF should be progressively 
increased and differentiated in keeping with to real supply costs.  
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It is politically difficult to increase WUA fees and ISF since there has 
been considerable resistance to this topic by parliamentarians in the 
past. Given the political situation, this is likely to continue, since the 
new parliamentarians seem even more reliant on their constituencies 
in rural areas. Nevertheless, there is scope for raising ISF for several 
reasons. First, in the end these fees have been introduced because of 
massive donor pressure in the past. This pressure by relevant donors 
like the World Bank continues and there are plans to come up with 
estimates on real costs of water delivery by the end of 2005. Second, 
with the introduction of WUAs and in view of their (at least in some 
parts) growing ability to improve irrigation infrastructure and man-
agement, the acceptance among farmers of fees for water delivery has 
increased. Both donor pressure and rising acceptance among farmers 
make further fee increases a realistic option.  
But initiatives aimed at better cost recovery should not neglect nega-
tive social externalities of fee increases. Thus adequate safeguards for 
the poorest have to be provided. Better targeted and increased social 
assistance from the national budget are desirable options. However, 
additional mechanisms of cross-subsidization via ‘social funds’ 
should be created within WUAs in order to further limit risks of so-
cial hardship.  
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz government: Realize the new water 
management structure, as foreseen in the Water Code, with a 
special emphasis on integrating non-agricultural water users. 
Key provisions of the new Water Code include the reorganization of 
the water administration in accordance with hydrological units and a 
clear inter-sectoral orientation of the planned National and Basin 
Water Councils. At present, the DWM and its regional branches are 
heavily dominated by agriculture, sidelining other water uses such as 
drinking water supply and tourism. Probably, a more balanced repre-
sentation and real leverage of these two sectors on national and basin 
water policies could not only promote economic efficiency, thanks to 
a possible re-allocation of water from agriculture to other uses, it 
could also strengthen the integration of social (human health) and 
ecological (conservation of nature) externalities. This might contrib-
ute positively to sectoral integration.  
As the first steps toward implementing the new water administration 
have shown in the past, this is a task difficult to achieve given the 
reluctance of most agencies involved. The current reorganization of 
the political administration in general should therefore be used as a 
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window of opportunity to shift staff and adjust the water management 
structure at the same time.  
— Recommendation to the Kyrgyz Parliament: Amend the new Water 
Code, strengthening ecological concerns and introducing a provi-
sion on WUA federations.  
The new Water Code is an important legal tool for advancing IWRM 
in Kyrgyzstan. Nevertheless, it could and should still be improved. 
Ecological concerns, for example, feature prominently only in the 
Code’s general, more programmatic articles. They should also be in-
tegrated into the more concrete provisions, adding for example an 
ecological flow requirement to the provisional water use priorities of 
basin water use plans. Another shortcoming seems to be that WUA 
federations are not mentioned in the Code. However, in the future 
they are expected to take over the RayVodKhozes’ tasks of irrigation 
water supply. This needs to be clarified in the document. In order to 
avoid ambiguity, respective provisions should thus be added to the 
Water Code to improve the internalization of ecological externalities 
on the one hand and to press on with the decentralization of water 
management on the other.  
In particular, though, the introduction of WUA federations seems to 
be a politically sensitive issue. Most reluctance to hand over respon-
sibility to WUA federations is, however, found not at the Ray-
VodKhozes, where staff already plan to become engaged in these fed-
erations, but at the national level of administration. Therefore, in or-
der to provide for compensation in tasks and support the DWM in ful-
filling its original tasks, further measures should be taken to 
strengthen the DWM’s ability to engage in strategic planning.  
— Recommendation to ayil okmotus, extension services and donors: In-
crease agricultural knowledge among farmers.  
Insufficient integration of water-land interaction in local irrigation 
management endangers the long-term sustainability of water use pat-
terns. Many farmers, particularly in the north, lack knowledge on 
these issues. Know-how on new farming techniques and best prac-
tices in irrigation farming is also limited to a minority of farmers. 
This undermines not only the ecological sustainability of agriculture 
but also its productivity and profitability. Agricultural extension ser-
vices should thus be encouraged to offer training on these questions 
to both farmers and WUA staff. Due to their partly public-good char-
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acter, attendance at these trainings could be subsidized, in particular 
for poor and inexperienced farmers. 
6.4 Resume and outlook 
At present Kyrgyz irrigation management is proceeding on its ‘way to-
wards IWRM.’ Even though the process started out only a few years ago, 
progress towards implementing IWRM in Kyrgyzstan has been remark-
able. This is especially true if we take into account the enormous burden of 
change Kyrgyz society had to contend with since independence.  
Nevertheless, realization of IWRM-conform water management is still to 
come in Kyrgyzstan. Significant steps have been taken, and there are more 
to follow, but these steps have not been bundled through an underlying 
overall concept or vision. The current situation is more like patchwork, 
focusing on those pieces of IWRM which are easy to implement both 
economically and politically. But it is not enough to undertake mainly 
technical and organizational reforms. IWRM requires fundamental 
changes in water strategies and concepts in the water sector, which have 
not yet been undertaken in Kyrgyzstan. Reforms towards IWRM have 
been achieved mainly because donors have pushed the country into them. 
Therefore, even though reforms are leading in the right direction, so far 
they consist only of separate steps. The fact that the reforms were not 
rooted in mind change has not been crucial in that these reforms have 
mainly been of a more ‘technical’ nature. But for the further realization of 
IWRM it is crucial to develop an overall strategy based on the preferences 
and the commitment of society. As long as this has not happened, further 
steps designed to take the project of water management reforms in Kyr-
gyzstan further down the road towards IWRM are unlikely to occur.  
The revolutionary overthrow in March 2005 and the subsequent formation 
of a new government could temporarily slow down the pace of reform, as 
the political situation is unstable, staff is changing and the new govern-
ment may adopt a more populist attitude towards the rural population. On 
the other hand, these events might provide the needed window of opportu-
nity to undertake pressing changes in the water management structure and 
administration. But the new government has so far not excelled at adopting 
policy changes or developing innovative reform steps. In addition, chances 
are that the pace of reform is, (at least) temporarily, slowed down, as staff 
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is changing and the new government is adopting a more populist attitude 
towards the rural population.  
However, the analysis also raises questions about the more distant future 
of Kyrgyz irrigation sector reforms. The notable asymmetries between 
single aspects of IWRM, in particular, are problematic. Even though it is 
up to democratically elected Kyrgyz decision makers to define societal 
preferences and thus to prioritize the objectives of Kyrgyz water manage-
ment, the clear-cut neglect of sectoral integration contradicts the holistic 
ambition of IWRM. Modern water management acknowledges that eco-
logical, economic and social spheres are interdependent. Thus additional 
efforts geared to integrating ecological, economic, and social externalities 
are highly recommendable.  
WUAs play a crucial role as change agents in the reform process. But until 
now they have mainly been initiated for economic reasons – because they 
amount to an important prerequisite to apply for credits and other finance 
from donors. Once donors withdraw from this field, WUAs will have to be 
able to legitimize themselves not on the basis of the money they guarantee 
for rehabilitation measures but through the service they provide to their 
members. This point will be crucial for the further path of Kyrgyz water 
management towards IWRM.  
In view of these findings, the question is whether the concept of IWRM, as 
it exists today, is appropriate for developing countries and countries in 
transition. It has to be acknowledged that IWRM is very ambitious and, if 
taken seriously, requires many institutional and organizational changes 
and changes in thinking as well as financial inputs and commitment from 
the relevant countries. Since water management and water governance are 
not the only problems these countries have to contend with, taking IWRM 
seriously may overburden these countries and could in the end even gener-
ate counterproductive outcomes. Therefore, efforts should be made to 
identify core principles of IWRM and prioritize the relevant measures in 
order not to overburden developing and transition countries on their way 
towards IWRM.  
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Glossary 
aksakal Elder, ‘white beard’ 
aksakal sotu Court of elders 
ashar Voluntary community work 
ayil bashi Village head 
ayil okmotu  Body of local self-government 
Gidromet Hydrometeorological administration monitoring air, water 
and soil quality 
kenesh Elected representative body on all administrative levels 
ketman Traditional water user association 
kolkhoz Large-scale agricultural enterprise in the former Soviet 
Union, organized by a collective of farmers who owned the 
means of production but not the land 
mirab Water master 
mirab bashi Main water master in traditional water management 
oblast Province 
OblVodKhoz  Oblast Basin Water Management Department 
rayon District 
RayVodKhoz  Rayon Water Management Department 
Som Kyrgyz currency 
Sovkhoz The term Sovkhoz designates a large-scale agricultural 
enterprise in the former Soviet Union owned and managed 
by the central state with employed farm workers. 
Tyiyn Kyrgyz currency, 100 tyiyn = 1 som 
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Appendix: Empirical approach 
Instruments used for data collection  
The empirical research in Kyrgyzstan was based on qualitative methods. 
Qualitative data are essential to address the questions posed by the present 
research and to identify potentials for and obstacles to the implementation 
of IWRM, as well as their causal mechanisms. 
Apart from the literature review, which was the basis of the preliminary 
desk study and was continued during the field research, the main instru-
ment of the empirical research was the guided semi-structured interview. 
Several compendiums of questions were developed, each of them focusing 
on one group of stakeholders. For the definite choice of interview partners, 
the research partly relied on established contacts in Kyrgyzstan and to a 
certain degree on the ‘snowball system,’ i. e. recommendations by inter-
viewed persons. Basically, the water management hierarchy for the se-
lected research areas was followed downwards, from the national level to 
the regional and local levels, ending with Water User Associations 
(WUAs) and water users. 
The interviews were generally conducted in teams of two persons and in 
most cases accompanied by an interpreter. Except for several interviews 
held in English and German, most interviews were conducted in Russian 
or Kyrgyz with the help of translation. The data was organized with the 
help of the software Atlas.ti®. 
With a view to better validation, the data collected were crosschecked by 
‘triangulation’ wherever possible. Therefore, information on the same 
aspects was collected from different interview partners, and then the 
statements were compared, also with sources from the literature or the 
Internet. This approach was especially important to secure the inclusion of 
the diverse perceptions and interests of various stakeholders. 
Another method applied especially at the local level was ‘participatory 
observation.’ The authors had the opportunity to participate in two WUA 
meetings, one general assembly (GA) of water users, and one meeting of 
members from several WUAs that were considering unification. These 
observations, which were also taken down in protocols, made it possible to 
gain insight into the functioning of these organizations. Other situations in 
which participatory observation was used were guided transects through 
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the WUAs’ service areas. Three of these visits were carried out, all of 
them guided by local farmers or water managers. They conveyed an im-
mediate visual impression of the problems and the ways in which local 
people perceived them. 
Main stakeholders 
Prior to the field research, the key stakeholders (organizations and indi-
vidual stakeholders) involved in water management were identified on the 
basis of a comprehensive literature review. Based on this first analysis, the 
relevant stakeholders were classified into six main groups: academics, 
donors, administration, NGOs, WUAs, and farmers. During the field 
research in Kyrgyzstan, 100 interviews were conducted with persons from 
these stakeholder groups, as shown in Table 3. Of these interviews, 29 
were conducted on the national level in the capital Bishkek, 38 with stake-
holders in the northern research areas, and 31 with stakeholders from the 
southern regions.1 
Geographical focus 
The research was concentrated on previously defined geographical areas. 
Due to the climatic, cultural, and socio-economic differences between the 
northern and the southern parts of Kyrgyzstan, empirical research had to 
                                                          
1  Two of the interviews, both with academic experts, were not conducted in Kyrgyzstan. 
One of them took place in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, the other in Germany.  
Table 3:  Interviews conducted, by stakeholder groups 
Stake-
holder 
group 
Aca-
dem-
ics 
Don-
ors 
Adminis-
tration 
NGOs WUAs Far-
mer
s 
Other*
 
Total
Number 
of inter-
views 
13 15 26 8 13 16 9 100 
* The category ‘Other’ includes protocols from guided transects, meetings 
of water users, and annotations from informal talks. 
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be conducted in both. The major areas for irrigated agriculture correspond 
to the main river valleys. The two most important regions were chosen 
with a view to population and agricultural production: the lower Chu 
basin, located in the north of the Kyrgyz Republic (Chui Oblast), and a 
part of the Kara Darya basin in the southern Ferghana Valley (Osh 
Oblast). Within these regions, the majority of the interviews were con-
ducted in the following districts (cf. Figure 10): 
- Chui Oblast: Sokuluk Rayon and Panfilov Rayon (1), Chui-
Tokmok Rayon (2) 
- Osh Oblast: Aravan Rayon and Kara-Suu Rayon (3) 
- Batken Oblast: Kadamjay Rayon (4) 
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